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Summary
The quadratic advantage in query-complexity that Grover’s algorithm offers for the unstructured
search problem is well-known by the cryptographic community and the security estimates for
many cryptosystems are based upon quantum resource estimates for Grover’s algorithm. In
essence, Grover’s algorithm consists of the repeated application of a quantum oracle, unique to the
instance of the search problem, and some less costly circuitry. This quantum oracle is essentially a
reversible boolean circuit, implemented via quantum gates. This thesis examines the optimisation
of quantum search routines in the noise-free quantum circuit model of computation, with the goal
of negating a portion of the cost associated with the necessity to implement quantum oracles in
Grover’s algorithm. The importance of such gains is illustrated by considering the approximate
circuit-size of Grover’s algorithm for the single-target search problem, π4 · 2
n
2 · poly(n) where
poly(n) is the cost of implementing the quantum oracle. If n = 100 and poly(n) = n3, then
the approximate quantum circuit-size is 270 compared to the lower bound implied by query-
complexity of 250 and this overhead of 220 has an associated real-world cost in terms of the
number of quantum gates which must be implemented. Reduction of this overhead can therefore
result in gains for any potential implementation. Optimisation of the reversible circuitry which
implements the quantum oracle can achieve this and this thesis demonstrates that this can also
be achieved by other methods for certain problems by using modifications of Grover’s algorithm.
As a motivating example throughout this thesis, we apply these techniques to lower quantum
resource estimates for cryptanalysis of the Multivariate Quadratic problem over F2 and later in
cryptanalysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
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We may construct our cipher in such a way that breaking it is equivalent to (or
requires at some point in the process) the solution of some problem known to be
laborious. Thus, if we could show that solving a certain system requires at least
as much work as solving a system of simultaneous equations in a large number of
unknowns, of a complex type, then we would have a lower bound of sorts for the work
characteristic.
- Claude Shannon (1949), Communication theory of secrecy systems [Sha49]
1.1 Introductory remarks
The goal of this thesis is to provide evidence that the projected resources required to solve
important cryptographic problems via quantum search routines are lower than current projections
may indicate, at least in the logical quantum-circuit model of computation. This stems from the
fact that many quantum resource estimates for important problems are extrapolated by using
Grover’s quantum search algorithm (see Theorem 3.10). This is somewhat natural, as (because
it assumes no structure in the problem) Grover’s quantum search algorithm can be treated as
a black-box algorithm whereby we can derive the cost using a standard formula and the design
of a reversible boolean circuit that is particular to the search problem we are considering. Our
results rely upon amplitude amplification, which is a generalisation of Grover’s algorithm and
the identification of various types of structure in the problems we consider.
Cryptography is by necessity a cross-disciplinary field and it can take time for knowledge
to diffuse between different fields. The formulation of theorems in an accessible manner is an
important first step in this dissemination of knowledge and in this thesis we work towards a
level that is accessible by anyone with a computer science background as soon as possible. This
is not a thesis about quantum computing, but a thesis on how to use quantum algorithms —
specifically the important quantum subroutine of amplitude amplification (see Theorem 3.6) in
order to optimise quantum search. With this in mind, we review the contents of this thesis.
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It is first worth briefly sketching the problem we are examining, before formally defining the
terms and algorithms. Say we are looking for a single element out of 2n possible elements and
that we only have the ability to test each element and check if it is suitable. Classically, the best
we can do is test, either exhaustively or at random, each element x ∈ {0, 1}n until we have found
this element. Such an approach requires 2n tests to obtain the element we are looking for in the
worst-case and approximately 12 · 2
n tests on average [Ahl14].
In comparison, Grover’s quantum search algorithm allows us to embed the same circuit that






serial executions of this circuit
— in addition to some other minor circuitry — allows us to obtain the element we are looking for
with near certainty. This so-called quadratic speedup is clearly an advantage, but the test has
an associated cost so that the full cost (which can be taken to be either the number of quantum





where poly(n) is the cost of implementing the test and minor circuitry as a quantum circuit. The
embedding of the classical circuit in quantum circuitry is a relatively simple procedure (though
care must be taken as the circuits must be converted to reversible boolean circuits, which destroy
no information). Quantum resource estimations for various cryptographic problems can therefore
be performed simply deriving the cost of a reversible boolean circuit which performs the required
test, adding the cost of the minor circuitry to derive poly(n) and using it in conjunction with
Equation (1.1).







in (1.1) [CGW00], known as the query-complexity term, the aim of this thesis is to
examine and exploit alternative structure, so that we can reduce the poly(n) overhead. That this
is important, both in regards to cryptographic functions and industrial uses of quantum search
is easily illustrated by the real-world cost of this overhead. If n = 100 and poly(n) = n3, then
we will have that this overhead is approximately 220. This is a substantial real-world cost, even
discounting the notion that quantum computers are expected to be magnitudes more expensive
than classical computers to both build and run.
Our results will stand in the logical quantum-circuit model of computation, which does not
factor in the effect of physical noise, the cost of quantum-error correction schemes, the cost of
building or running a quantum computer or the network topology of the connections between
quantum bits. The important metrics will be the same as for classical circuits, in that we will
wish to compute the requirements of quantum algorithms in terms of circuit-width (number of
quantum bits), circuit-size (number of quantum gates) and circuit-depth (number of timesteps
taken). We now review the chapters of this thesis.
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In Chapter 1 we define and review various definitions of search, most importantly the preimage
search problem, we define and provide the motivating examples we use throughout this thesis —
that of the multivariate quadratic (MQ) problem and the key-search problem.
In Chapter 2 we review the basic concepts of quantum computing required to understand the
algorithms in this thesis and discuss the implementation details of quantum phase oracles. Our
aim is not to provide an exhaustive knowledge of the intricacies of quantum computing, but to
draw a straight-line towards the theory of amplitude amplification. We define quantum phase
oracles (an integral component of amplitude amplification) and demonstrate several abstract
methods by which they may be implemented for the preimage search problem and a constraint-
based formulation of the search problem, paying attention to the explicit costs involved. We
conclude by demonstrating Schwabe and Westerbaan’s approach to the design of a quantum bit
oracle for the MQ problem [SW16], the quantum search oracle for the key-search problem for
AES [GLRS16] and how they fit into the abstract methods we have described.
In Chapter 3 we provide the theory and costs of quantum amplitude amplification and discuss
various applications of this quantum subroutine, including Grover’s quantum search algorithm.
We conclude with an examination of the costs involved in using Grover’s algorithm in conjunction
with the quantum bit oracles for theMQ and AES key-search problems described in Chapter 2.
In Chapter 4 we discuss the balancing of costs in Grover’s search algorithm when there exists
structure that we can exploit via an Efficient Neighbourhood Transition Strategy — a method that
can be used to evaluate a function for a reduced cost, if we have already evaluated a single point
in the domain. We apply this to theMQ problem and derive improvements for existing quantum
search methods [SW16] applied to this problem. We discuss a state-based decomposition of the
quantum phase oracle that allows us to implement the ENTS strategy described in Chapter 4 in
a generic manner and note that this can also be applied to the MQ problem.
In Chapter 5 we discuss how principles in Chapter 4 can be enhanced via preprocessing and
amplitude amplification and apply this to the MQ problem.
In Chapter 6 examine an existing method [KYYLHH15] that exploits structure in search
problems to provide lower quantum resource estimates. We examine the expected performance
of this existing solution and demonstrate that it can fail in real-world scenarios as it is dependent
upon a promise on the size of a subset defined by a function. We demonstrate how we can modify
this procedure to restore its correctness and apply our new method to achieve new quantum
resource estimates for quantum search applied to both the MQ and AES key-search problem
which are optimised towards requiring few qubits.
In Chapter 7 we summarise and give our conclusions. In particular we discuss the impact of
this work upon choosing cryptographic parameters.
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1.2 Search problems
One of the simplest and most generic search problems that one can consider is that of the
unstructured search problem. Simply put, we are searching for a length n bitstring and have only
one means of identifying this element. No other information about how we could construct a
more efficient algorithm is available. We will assume that we know the number of such bitstrings.
Definition 1.1 (The unstructured search problem).
Let χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} and Mχ = |χ−1(1)|. The unstructured search problem is to find an
x ∈ {0, 1}n such that χ(x) = 1, given only the ability to evaluate χ.
The function χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} will be referred to as the boolean indicator function for the
search problem.
It is this problem that Grover’s quantum search algorithm (see Theorem 3.10) solves and,
given the ease by which other formulations of search problem reduce to unstructured search,
gives rise to its utility in many aspects of computer science. Whilst Shor’s algorithm provides a
superpolynomial speedup for a narrow subset of problems with a periodic structure [Sho99] over
the best known classical algorithms [LLMP93], Grover’s algorithm provides only a polynomial
speedup compared to a classical brute-force or exhaustive search algorithm. However, Shor’s
algorithm can only be applied to a narrow subset of problems whilst Grover’s utility is generic
and wide-ranging as search is a key-component, subroutine and bottleneck of many classical
algorithms. We will primarily be interested in applying quantum search procedures to find the
preimage of pseudorandom functions (functions that may be assumed to be uniformly sampled
from the set of functions from length n bitstrings to length m bitstrings).
Definition 1.2 (The preimage search problem).
Let h : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}m, Yh ⊆ {0, 1}m and Mh = |h−1(Yh)|. The preimage search problem is
to find an x ∈ {0, 1}n such that h(x) ∈ Yh or prove that no such element exists.
The case where |Yh| = 1 will be known as the single-target preimage search problem, whereas the
case where |Yh| > 1 will be known as the multi-target preimage search problem.
We will predominantly concern ourselves with the single-target preimage search problem in
this thesis, but the topic of the costs involved with a naive implementation of multi-target search
will later come into our discussion. It is easily seen that the preimage search problem reduces to
the unstructured search problem as we can create the function χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} such that
χ(x) 7→
1 if h(x) ∈ Yh0 otherwise. (1.2)
The boolean indicator function χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} for the preimage search problem is therefore
simply an evaluation of h followed by a check for set membership. In the case of the single-target
preimage search problem, this is a single bitstring comparison, but more efficient methods could
be used if |Yh| is large. The total cost in terms of bit operations for performing a classical search
procedure to solve the preimage search problem is therefore the product of the number of times
χ must be evaluated, multiplied by number of bit operations that the evaluation of χ requires.
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If all we have is the ability to execute the pseudorandom function h : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}m,
then best we can do is to sample in some order x1, . . . , x2n ∈ {0, 1}n and test these elements
in turn by evaluating them and testing whether h(xi) ∈ Yh. If we consider the single-target
preimage search problem then if h is pseudorandom, we have that the expected number of tests
until we achieve a single success is 2
n+1
Mh+1
[Ahl14]. By the above discussion, the expected number






Cost of evaluating χ(x)
)
(1.3)





Cost of evaluating h(x) + Cost of testing if h(x) ∈ Yh
)
. (1.4)
It is worth noting that the process of testing these evaluations is embarrassingly parallel, in that
if the expected time for the above procedure to result in success is T to complete on one processor
and we have P processors available, then the expected time if we use all P processors is TP and
the number of bit operations required will remain identical.
In comparison, the cost to execute Grover’s quantum search algorithm in terms of the number
of quantum gates (as opposed to bit operations) and solve the unstructured search problem with










Cost of evaluating O(b)χ + Cost of the diffusion step on n qubits
)
, (1.5)
whereO(b)χ is a quantum bit oracle (see Definition 2.11) which is a quantum circuit that essentially
performs the quantum equivalent of evaluating χ. The cost of the diffusion step on n qubits will
cost O(n) quantum gates and Cost(O
(b)
χ ) will usually be O(nd) quantum gates, where d ≥ 1.
Full details of Grover’s quantum search algorithm can be found in Section 3.2.1, but for now
we simply note that Grover’s algorithm requires a long-running serial quantum computation and
is not embarrassingly parallel. It has been proven that in relation to the unstructured search
problem, the optimal parallelism strategy to follow is to essentially partition the search space
into P subsets of equal size and execute Grover’s algorithm upon each one. Whilst the time
taken will be reduced by a factor of 1√
P
by this strategy, the number of quantum gates required
will be increased by a factor of
√
P [Zal99].
Structure in either the problem or the circuit χ can help decrease the complexity of search
both in terms of classical search algorithms and quantum search algorithms. For example, if we
know that the solutions are not distributed uniformly throughout the domain we may choose to
sample elements and evaluate them in a specific order. Alternatively, we may be able to rule out
that the solution lies in large areas of the search space by performing specific tests — a process
known as pruning the search tree.
8
We give an example of structure that can be exploited by both a classical search procedure
and a quantum search procedure from [CGW00]. If χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} can be broken down
into several tests, some of which involve a smaller set of variables so that
χ(x1 . . . xkxk+1 . . . xn) 7→ χ1(x1 . . . xk) ∧ χ2(x1 . . . xkxk+1 . . . xn) (1.6)
then we can simply perform a search on the first k variables until we find a partial solution
x1 . . . xk ∈ {0, 1}k such that χ(x1 . . . xk) = 1, then fix these variables and attempt to extend this
partial solution to a full solution using a search on the remaining n− k variables until we have
located an assignment xk+1 . . . xn ∈ {0, 1}n−k such that χ2(xk+1 . . . xn) = 1, thus providing an
element x1 . . . xn ∈ {0, 1}n such that χ(x1 . . . xn) = 1. The expected complexity of this approach
is dependent upon Mχ = |χ−1(1)| and the expected number of preimages Mχ1 = |χ−11 (1)|.
If we sample x1 . . . xk ∈ {0, 1}k until we have a partial solution such that χ1(x1 . . . xk) = 1
and then exhaustively search the remaining n−k variables in an attempt to extend this to a full
solution, then this process will clearly terminate with a solution, if one exists. If we find that
χ1(x1 . . . xk) = 0, we need not check whether x1 . . . xk can be extended to a full solution, hence
this additional structure can be used to prune the search space.
The probability of obtaining a partial solution is
Mχ1
2k
, therefore we need on the order of 2
k
Mχ1
trials to find a partial solution. The probability that this partial solution can be extended to a
full solution is simply
Mχ
Mχ1
and, using the upper-bound 2n−k for the number of evaluations we







· (Cost(χ1)) + 2n−k · (Cost(χ2))
)
(1.7)
If we assume that n > k > a > 0, Cost(χ1) = k
2 Cost(χ2) = n
2, Mχ = 1 and Mχ1 = 2
k−a then
we have that a naive exhaustive search approach would require an expected
2n + 1
2
· 2n2 = (2n + 1) · n2 (1.8)






= 2kk2 + 2n−an2 (1.9)
bit operations. If k = n − a, then the naive search requires on the order of O(2n · n2) bit
operations whilst the nested search procedure requires on the order of O(2n−a ·n2) bit operations
and is efficient if a > 2. This can be extended to a nested approach, if the problem admits
such a decomposition, and the authors of [CGW00] propose a nested quantum search algorithm
based upon this approach which requires O(
√
2dn ·poly(n)) quantum gates compared to the same
classical algorithm which would require O(2dn ·poly(n)) classical bit operations, where 0 < d < 1.
We discuss this quantum algorithm in Section 5.3 and will exploit a similar decomposition in
Chapter 6, where the decomposition is instead of the form χ1, χ2 : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} and again
Cost(χ1) < Cost(χ2), but we have that both χ1 and χ2 involve n variables.
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We will examine several types of structure within this thesis that can be used to reduce the
overall cost of implementing Grover’s quantum search algorithm and to reduce the overhead
involved with cost of evaluation of O(b)χ in Equation (1.5). We now proceed to describe the main
examples of the preimage search problem that we use to illustrate the gains throughout this thesis
— that of the Multivariate Quadratic problem over F2 and the key-search problem for symmetric-
key encryption systems, specifically the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES-{128, 192, 256}).
1.3 The Multivariate Quadratic (MQ) problem
The Multivariate Quadratic problem over the finite field F2 will be used to demonstrate the
computational gains of all methods in this thesis. It is a problem that exhibits a large amount
of structure and that maps naturally to both classical and quantum hardware, hence is a use-
ful research tool for both investigating and benchmarking the optimisation of quantum search
algorithms. This is not a thesis directly about the MQ problem, but in this section we survey
the problem, paying special attention to the classical search method of Fast Exhaustive Search
(FES) in Section 1.3.4.2, which will later play a role in Chapter 4.
1.3.1 Definitions and motivation
The Multivariate Quadratic (MQ) problem is the problem of solving a system of degree-two
equations over a finite field and has a role in both the construction of cryptographic schemes and
in cryptanalysis. We will be concerned with cryptanalysis via quantum search in this thesis.
Definition 1.3 (The Multivariate Quadratic (MQ or MQ(Fq, n,m)) problem).
Let Fq be a finite field of size q and f (1), . . . , f (m) ∈ Fq[x1, . . . , xn] such that each f (i) is of
total degree two. The Multivariate Quadratic problem is the problem of finding a solution vector
x̄ = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fnq such that f (1)(x1, . . . , xn) = · · · = f (m)(x1, . . . , xm) = 0.
We will refer to the general problem by the shorthand MQ and specific instances of the MQ
problem via the shorthand MQ(Fq, n,m). In this thesis will be almost entirely concerned with
the case where q = 2 and most interesting in the case where n = m, which is thought to be the
hardest case. We note that each f (k)(x1, . . . , xn) which describes an instance of MQ(F2, n,m)
can be represented as

















(k) ∈ Fq, owing to the fact that xixj = xjxi over any field and x2i = xi over F2.
The field of Multivariate Cryptography [DGS06] is the study of public-key cryptosystems
which rely upon the hardness of the MQ problem. These systems are often easier to solve by
Gröbner bases inspired routines (see Section 1.3.5) than random MQ(Fq, n,m) instances would
be, but this structure does not help when it comes to solving them via search techniques.
We will examine one candidate multivariate quadratic public-key cryptosystem, the Gui
digital signature scheme [PCY+15] in Section 1.3.7 and its proposed quantum-resistant parame-
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ters [PCDY17a, PCDY17b] derived from Schwabe and Westerbaan’s approach to using Grover’s
quantum search algorithm to solve instances of MQ(F2, n,m) [SW16].
Performing cryptanalysis via reduction of goals to the problem of solving systems of equations
over finite fields and specialised methods to solve these systems (which often possess structure
and are weaker than an otherwise random system would be) has come to be known as the
field of Algebraic Cryptanalysis [Bar09a]. In the field of algebraic cryptanalysis, it has been
demonstrated that it is possible to reduce the cryptanalysis of stream-ciphers, such as Triv-
ium [DC06, TWB+14] and KeyLoq [Bar09b, CBW08] and block-ciphers (such as the Advanced
Encryption Standard [Pub01, MR02]) to the problem of solving the Multivariate Quadratic prob-
lem, usually over an extension field of F2. The systems arising from these problems are often
sparse (in that each equation involves only a small subset of the total number of variables) or
contain hidden structure, making the problem of solving them very different from that of solving
random MQ instances.
Whilst we have talked about structure arising from cryptosystems, we will concern ourselves
with the hardness of solving random instances of MQ(F2, n, n), which is thought to be the
hardest case to solve, as a case-study. We discuss this further in Section 1.3.3.
1.3.2 Why quadratic?
Before reviewing techniques to solve instances of theMQ(F2, n,m) problem and the Gui digital
signature scheme, whose security relies upon the hardness of solving this problem, it is worth
noting the reason why the problem is stated in terms of quadratic equations. This stems from
both cryptanalysis and the field of multivariate cryptography.
The public-key of a multivariate cryptosystem is a system of multivariate quadratic equations
over a finite field and the problem of breaking such a cryptosystem is often simply equivalent to
an instance of theMQ problem. This will need to be both stored and processed by users, hence
size is an issue. As the number of unique monomials of a degree-d system (assuming d < q by the
identity xq ≡ x for x ∈ Fq) us that the number of bits required to represent an instance of the





· (blog2 qc+ 1). In the case we are predominantly interested
in, that of MQ(F2, n,m) instances, we have that total number of bits required to represent the








In terms of cryptanalysis, there exists a simple method of reducing any degree d > 2 system
involving n equations in m variables to an instance of theMQ problem involving n′ > n variables
and m′ > m equations. This can be done via simple substitution, as (1.11) below demonstrates.
vwxyz + vwx+ xyz + xy + 1 = 0 =⇒






1.3.3 Basic complexity results and assumptions concerning the MQ problem
It is well-known that the MQ problem is NP-complete [GJ79] (for an explicit and well-written
reduction see p.29 of [Wol05]) and in particular, random instances of MQ(Fq, n, n) are thought
not only be hard not only in the worst-case, but also believed to be impractical to solve on aver-
age [LPT+17, JV17] owing to both a lack of any algorithm to solve the general case in time less
than O(qdn) for 0 < d < 1 and the discussion below. As no quantum algorithm to solve any NP-
hard problem has been discovered, and it is thought that quantum computers cannot solve NP-
complete problems in polynomial-time, this provides the motivation behind usingMQ(Fq, n,m)
instances as a quantum-resistant public-key for multivariate quadratic public-key encryption sys-
tems. We give an explicit description of the public-key digital signature Gui [PCY+15] in Section
1.3.7, which details how one such public-key is constructed.
As mentioned in Section 1.3.1, there exist many different scenarios from where instances of
the MQ problem can arise in cryptography. These lead to a variety of different definitions and
scenarios. We will primarily be interested in the case that is most generic and believed to be the
hardest to solve — that of random, dense and determined systems of theMQ problem. We will
also assume that n ≤ m ≤ 2n, for reasons that will become apparent in the discussion below.





(k) ∈ Fq in (1.10) have a 1q chance of being any given
element in Fq. By dense, we mean that each equation contains a large number of monomials and
that each equation almost certainly involves all variables — a random instance will therefore also
be dense for large n. There are three important cases for the relationship between the number
of variables n and the number of equations m in an MQ(Fq, n,m) instance.
AnMQ system is determined if n = m and this case is thought to be the hardest instance to
solve. We elaborate below by considering the cases where m < n and m > n, but intuitively it
can help to consider that in the case m < n there are fewer equations acting as constraints, hence
there are more solutions to the problem. Alternatively if m > n, then there is more information
available (in the form of equations) that can be computationally exploited by algorithms.
In the case where m < n, the system is underdetermined. As we can expect qn−m solutions
to such a system [FB09], one method has simply been to choose n−m variables and assign them
random values. The problem is then reduced to that of solving an instance of MQ(Fq,m,m),
which is expected to possess a single solution. There exists an alternative method in the form of a
reduction for underdetermined instances of theMQ(F2, n,m) problem. If we have that n = ωm
for some ω ∈ Q>1, then Thomae and Wolf [TW12] not only give us that underdetermined systems
can be solved in polynomial-time if n > m(m+1) but also a classical preprocessing step to obtain
an instance of MQ(F2,m − bωc + 1,m − bωc + 1) whose solution can be transformed into the




which, given that the cost of our methods will be O(2n/2 · poly(n)), will not impact upon the
overall complexity and is a negligible serial addition to any concrete resource estimate of the
costs involved. It is therefore possible to reduce underdetermined dense systems of equations
to determined systems of equations with a single solution. An instance of MQ(Fq, n,m) is
overdetermined if m > n. In this case Gröbner bases techniques (see Section 1.3.5) can exploit
these extra equations to achieve a polynomial-time algorithm when m > n(n+ 1)/2.
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1.3.4 Classical methods to solve the MQ problem
Classical methods to solve dense instances of the MQ(F2, n,m) problem usually rely upon two
ideas — search-based techniques and techniques related to the theory of Gröbner bases, with the
most efficient solutions being a hybrid mixture of the two techniques. In this section we give a
brief survey classical and quantum approaches to solving instances ofMQ(F2, n,m), specifically
instances ofMQ(F2, n, n). As we are studying quantum search in this thesis, we will pay special
attention to the leading method used to perform classical search — the Fast Exhaustive Search
(FES) algorithm, which we later demonstrate in Chapter 4 can be used advantageously to improve
the performance of Schwabe and Westerbaan’s quantum search oracle for the MQ(F2, n,m)
problem. We will only sketch the methods employed by the other techniques.
1.3.4.1 Naive exhaustive search
For comparison, we first state the complexity of performing a naive exhaustive search proce-
dure for instances of MQ(F2, n,m) where we treat the problem as an instance of the preimage
search problem. Under our assumption that m ≥ n and that there exists a single solution, an
MQ(F2, n,m) instance can easily be interpreted as the single-target preimage search problem
by construction of the function h : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}m, where
h(x1 . . . xn) 7→ f (1)(x1, . . . , xn)‖ . . . ‖f (m)(x1, . . . , xn) (1.12)
and setting Yh = {0n} and Mh = 1, so that h(x) is simply the concatenation1 of the result of
evaluating m equations. The cost of evaluating each of the m equations then allows us to compute
the total cost of a naive exhaustive single-target preimage search. Any method for evaluation
of multivariate polynomials of degree two can then be employed to compute h(x). There are
several strategies that can now be used dependent upon the resources that are available. In the
following discussion we count a single bit operation as either a multiplication or an addition.
As a basic strategy, we could simply add the constant c(k) to each equation register, followed
by the addition of the product xixj if a
(k)
i,j = 1 and add xi if b
(k)
i = 1. As each f
(k)(x1, . . . , xn)




i,j terms, n b
(k)
i terms and one constant c
(k), we can achieve the




2 + n + 1
additions. Checking if h(x)=0m requires at most m comparisons, meaning the cost of evaluating
all m equations and checking them is at most m · (n2 + 2) bit operations. We require at most
n+m+1 bits of space to compute h(x1 . . . xn) via this method, giving the single-target preimage
search procedure an asymptotic complexity of O(2nn2m) bit operations.
If instead of computing the individual xixj as needed, we first precompute these values then
we need only add these terms during the evaluation of each f (k)(x1, . . . , xn) via a lookup table.
This means that if we possess n
2−n
2 bits of memory for storage of the xixj terms then we only
require n
2−n
2 +m · (
n2−n
2 +n+ 1) bit operations to evaluate all the equations on the same input.
1The notation a‖b where a = a1 . . . an ∈ {0, 1}n and b = b1 . . . bm ∈ {0, 1}m denotes the concatentation (or
joining) of these bitstrings, so that a‖b = a1 . . . anb1 . . . bm ∈ {0, 1}n+m.
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1.3.4.2 Fast Exhaustive Search (FES)
The Fast Exhaustive Search (FES) algorithm [BCC+10, BCC+13] is the leading method of per-
forming classical exhaustive search for a solution to an instance of MQ(F2, n, n). The FES
algorithm possesses an asymptotic complexity of O(2n+2 · log2 n) bit operations to exhaustively
enumerate all solutions to an instance ofMQ(F2, n,m), hence has the same complexity to solve
the case where there exists a single satisfying solution. An open-source implementation of this
algorithm is freely available at http://www.lifl.fr/ bouillag/fes/ and the technique has
been successfully applied to solve instances of the MQ challenge [YDH+15].
FES improves upon the naive exhaustive search approach described in Section 1.3.4.1 by
improving upon two ideas. The first is relatively simple and reduces the dependence of the
complexity upon m, the number of equations. If we have evaluated k < m equations and found
that f (1)(x1, . . . , xn) = · · · = f (k)(x1, . . . , xn) = 0, but find that f (k+1)(x1, . . . , xn) = 1, then we
have learnt that h(x) 6= 0n and need not continue. For any fixed x1 . . . xn ∈ {0, 1}n, we have
that the evaluation of any random f (k)(x1, . . . , xn) modelled as a pseudorandom function has an
equal probability of probability evaluating to either 0 or 1. For any candidate x1 . . . xn ∈ {0, 1}n,
the average number of evaluations we need before we learn that h(x) 6= 0n is then only 2 by the
expected value of the geometric distribution. This can also be applied to the naive exhaustive
search strategy discussed in Section 1.3.4.1, implying that we can reduce the cost to an expected
O(2nn2) bit operations for an instance of MQ(F2, n,m) with a single solution.
The second method by which FES improves upon naive exhaustive search is by adapting the
so-called folklore differential technique (in that the technique is already known by the community,
but without an obvious original reference), which notes that once we have evaluated a single
equation upon x1 . . . xn ∈ {0, 1}n and obtained f (k)(x1, . . . , xn) at a cost of O(n2) operations,
we can evaluate f (k)(x1, . . . , xv ⊕ 1, . . . , xn) for a cost of O(n) by exploiting the F2-derivative.
Definition 4.4 (The F2-derivative [BCC+10])
Let f ∈ F2[x1, . . . , xn]. The F2−derivative of f with respect to xv for 1 ≤ v ≤ n is defined as
df
dxv
(x1, . . . , xn) = f(x1, . . . , xv ⊕ 1, . . . , xn)⊕ f(x1, . . . , xv, . . . , xn). (1.13)
The Fast Exhaustive Search algorithm then exploits the fact that
f (k)(x1, . . . , xv ⊕ 1, xn) = f (k)(x1, . . . , xn)⊕
df (k)
dxv
(x1, . . . , xn) (1.14)
which is computationally advantageous, as if we have already evaluated and stored f(x1, . . . , xn)
then we can evaluate a point in the domain which differs by only one bit for the cost of computing
and adding dfdxv (x1, . . . , xn). The F2−derivative of a degree-two equation f
(k)(x1, . . . , xn) is
df (k)
dxv
(x1, . . . , xn) = f






i,v xi ⊕ f
(k)(x1, . . . , xn) (1.15)





(x1, . . . , xn) can therefore be easily precomputed by extracting these
coefficients and evaluated by using at most n − 1 additions of xi to add corresponding a(k)i,v
terms and a single bitflip for the b
(k)
v term. If we consider the cost of evaluating a single
equation f (k)(x1, . . . , xn) over all of the 2
n possible inputs, then we can simply start with
f (k)(0, . . . , 0) = c(k) and use a Gray code (see Section 4.3.2) to enumerate and test all 2n el-
ements of the domain {0, 1}n by flipping one bit at a time (so that we update the state) and
adding the F2−derivative df
(k)
dxv
on each bitflip to each equation. Used naively (and without
taking account the reduction of the dependency upon m discussed earlier), this method means
that we only requires O(mn2 + 2nmn) bit operations to enumerate all solutions to an instance
of MQ(F2, n,m). We will later exploit the folklore differential technique in order to reduce the
cost of quantum search applied to instances of MQ(F2, n,m) in Chapter 4.
The Fast Exhaustive Search algorithm uses these techniques in combination with a recursive
strategy for the evaluation of dfdxv for the general case of degree-d polynomials over F2 to achieve
a complexity of O(d · 2n + n2d) bit operations to find the satisfying solutions for a single degree-
d equation over F2. However, this is only for the case of one equation and unfortunately the
filtering process which reduces the dependence upon m described earlier cannot be used with
their technique of enumeration via Gray codes. Their solution is to determine a subset of (F2)n
that satisfies a m′ ≤ m of the polynomials and then simply test these elements on the remaining
m−m′ polynomials to check whether these elements are satisfied, aborting the computation early
once the assignment leads to an unsatisfied polynomial. The optimal value of m′ to balance these
costs is therefore calculated to be (after optimisation) m′ = 1 + log2 n. This gives us the stated
complexity of O(2n+2 log2 n).
We will later exploit a quantum analogue of the strategy to reduce dependency upon m in
Chapter 6 and the folklore differential technique in Chapter 4.
1.3.5 Algebraic techniques
The majority of other methods to solve instances ofMQ(F2, n,m) can be traced back to variants
of algorithms which either explicitly use, or are related to methods involving Macaulay matrices.
Essentially, given an generic instance of MQ(Fq), n,m) one can build a matrix MD where each
column represents a monomial of degree ≤ D involving representing the elements of the set
MD = {x · f (k) : k = 1, . . . ,m and x is a monomial of degree ≤ D − 2}. (1.16)
for a given term ordering ≺, where each row represents an element of the set MD. In this
way, linear algebra techniques can be used to either locate elements which directly give, or can
be used to narrow the search space of solutions to the instance of MQ(Fq, n,m). As these
techniques involve manipulation of large matrices, they can be computationally intensive, even
though efficient linear algebra techniques are being exploited. The Gröbner bases techniques of
F4/F5 [Fau99, Fau02] and the XL (eXtended Linearisation) family of algorithms rely upon these
techniques [AFI+04], with the XL algorithm [CKPS00, CP03] often being used in conjunction
with sparse linear algebra techniques to manage the complexity of large matrix operations.
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These techniques will not be used in this thesis, but it is worth noting the complexity
of the leading method of solving instances MQ(F2, n, n) classically is the BooleanSolve algo-
rithm [BFSS13], which uses a strategy based upon fixing k < n of the variables and performing
an intensive computation to check if the resulting Macaulay matrix of the MQ(F2, n − k, n)
system has a solution — as it turns out that finding that a system does not admit a solution is
faster than solving it, this proves to be efficient, though the Fast Exhaustive Search algorithm
is expected to be practical for concrete parameters up until n = 200 [BCC+10]. The complex-
ity of BooleanSolve is O(20.892n) bit operations to solve an instance of MQ(F2, n, n) and this
technique has later been developed into the Crosbred algorithm [JV17] — the complexity of this
algorithm has not yet been fully analysed at the time of writing, though practical experiments
have demonstrated that it overtakes the Fast Exhaustive Search algorithm when n = 37.
1.3.6 Quantum methods to solve the MQ problem
This thesis is about the optimisation of quantum search applied to the preimage search problem
and we use the MQ(F2, n,m) problem to illustrate the computational gains we can make using
our techniques. We briefly highlight the known quantum algorithms to solve the MQ(F2, n,m)
problem here in this section. The methods in this thesis are derived from studying the initial
quantum resource estimation performed by Schwabe and Westerbaan [SW16] for the solution
of the MQ(F2, n,m) problem, which treats the MQ(F2, n,m) instance as a preimage search
problem whereby the classical circuit embedded into quantum circuitry and exploited by Grover’s
algorithm simply evaluates an element of the domain and checks if this evaluation is equal to the
target image. This approach requires a quantum circuit-size of O(2n/2 · n2m) gates. We discuss
their construction in Section 2.5.1 and provide a slightly optimised version in Section 2.5.2.
There exist alternative methods to solving an instance of the MQ(F2, n,m) problem via
exploiting Grover’s algorithm in a manner that differs from treating the problem as a preimage
search problem solved by evaluation and testing. We note that these methods were published
after the author of this thesis had devised several of the techniques in this thesis. These include
QuantumBooleanSolve [FHK+17] and QXL [BY18], which essentially embed the circuits used for
BooleanSolve and XL discussed in Section 1.3.4 within quantum circuitry and exploit Grover’s
algorithm to increase the efficiency of these algorithms. A comparison of the parameters for
instances ofMQ(F2, n,m) where one algorithm gains a concrete advantage in circuit-complexity
over another is left for future work, but for small parameters the techniques in this thesis may
outperform these superior methods as their asymptotic advantage hides constant terms.
We recall that BooleanSolve performs an exhaustive search of the first of k < n variables,
fixing these and testing whether the resulting system has a solution. QuantumBooleanSolve
replaces this exhaustive search procedure, so that the embedded classical circuit tests whether the
resulting system possesses a solution or not. With this strategy, QuantumBooleanSolve requires
O(20.462n) quantum gates to solve an instance ofMQ(F2, n, n). GroverXL also requiresO(20.462n)
quantum gates to solve an instance of the MQ(F2, n, n) problem. As GroverXL essentially uses
the same strategy as QuantumBooleanSolve of fixing variables and testing whether the resulting
system admits a solution, the identical asymptotic complexity is not suprising.
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There exists another recent algorithm in literature [CG17], which which involves the use of
the HHL [HHL09] quantum algorithm for solving linear systems but whose efficiency depends
upon the condition number of the corresponding boolean Macaulay matrix for theMQ(F2, n,m)
instance at hand. To the author’s knowledge, the study of the condition number of the corre-
sponding Macaulay matrices derived from MQ(F2, n,m) instances is an open problem and the
results simply imply that MQ(F2, n,m) instances with a small condition number may be easier
to solve. As far as the author is aware, this difficulty in determining the condition number of
matrices means that the impact of this algorithm is still unknown.
We do not go into details in this thesis concerning these algorithms apart from Schwabe
and Westerbaan’s approach in Section 2.5.1, simply noting that both the quantum versions of
BooleanSolve and the XL algorithm are asymptotically superior to the quantum search methods
employed in this thesis, but may require a larger number of qubits for smaller instances of
MQ(F2, n,m) and that all methods are based upon applying known quantum algorithms to
classical approaches to solve instances of theMQ(F2, n,m) problem. Whether our methods can
be used to improve the performance of QuantumBooleanSolve or QuantumXL, which simply
exploit Grover’s algorithm, is an open problem.
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1.3.7 A motivating example: the Gui digital signature scheme
There are many varieties of Multivariate Quadratic (MQ) cryptosystems — we highlight the
construction of the Gui MQ digital signature [PCY+15] scheme as a motivating example and
target for cryptanalysis, as the public-key of a user for the Gui signature scheme is an under-
determined system of MQ equations over F2 and forging the signature of a user corresponds to
solving several instances of MQ(F2, n, n).
1.3.7.1 Generic Multivariate Quadratic cryptosystems
The public key of a generic MQ cryptosystem consists of the map P : Fnq −→ Fmq described
by an ordered MQ system over Fq and the private key consists of a method to efficiently find
a preimage of P. The generic method to construct such a system consists of three components
which define the private key
• The affine (or linear) uniformly randomly chosen map of maximal rank S : Fmq −→ Fmq .
• The affine (or linear) uniformly randomly chosen map of maximal rank T : Fnq −→ Fnq .
• An MQ system F : Fnq −→ Fmq whose structure allows us to compute F−1 efficiently.
The public key is then the composition of these maps
P = S ◦ F ◦ T. (1.17)
As S, T and F are all efficiently invertible, to find a preimage of h ∈ (Fq)m the holder of the
private key simply computes
• x = S−1(h)
• y = F−1(x)
• z = T−1(y)
By composition, the holder the private-key therefore has an efficient method of computing (if
one exists) the preimage z ∈ Fnq such that P(z) = h.
The random affine (or linear) maps S and T hide the special structure of the map F , which
we know how to invert. Ideally, the resulting public key should both appear and act as a random
instance of the MQ problem and contain no special structure. Unfortunately, many of the
methods used to create the central map F lead to special structure appearing P, which has
been exploited by cryptanalysts to break the security of the system. Ultimately the security
of MQ cryptosystems relies on two problems — direct attacks and structural attacks. Direct
attacks consist of treating the public key P as a purely algebraic problem and attempting to
solve it. Direct attacks can include those described in Section 1.3.4 and 1.3.6 for instances of
MQ(F2, n,m) and in the general case for instances of (Fq, n,m) are performed using methods
based upon Gröbner basis algorithms, exhaustive search methods or a hybrid mix of the two.
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Structural attacks take into account how the central map was created, exploiting this knowl-
edge in order to break the cryptosystem by gaining knowledge of S, T and F and are beyond the
scope of this thesis. The focus of this thesis is on the optimisation of quantum search routines
and we treat the problem as purely a preimage search problem. We do not take into account
these algebraic or structural weaknesses in the public-key P. For our purposes, P may as well
be a random instance of MQ(F2, n,m), but it is worth noting that the public-key of an MQ
cryptosystem is usually easier to solve with algebraic methods such as Gröbner bases routines
than a truly random instance of MQ(Fq, n,m) [DK12, DY13, DG10].
1.3.8 Hidden Field Equation (HFE) cryptosystems
The Hidden Field Equations (HFE) construction is one potential method of realising the invert-
ible central map we described in construction of a generic MQ cryptosystem in Section 1.3.7.1.
The basic construction is defined by the affine maps of maximal rank T, S : Fnq −→ Fnq and the
MQ central map F : Fnq −→ Fnq . The efficient inversion of F for HFE cryptosystems is reliant
upon the (so-called) canonical isomorphism Φ : Fnq −→ Fqn given by





where Fqn = Fq[Z]/(p(Z)) and p is an irreducible polynomial of degree n. The isomorphism Φ
allows the construction of an instance ofMQ(Fq, n, n) which can be efficiently inverted via first















qi + C. (1.19)
As the coefficients are non-zero for only powers of Xq
i+qj , Xq
i
and X0, this leads to an
instance of MQ(Fq, n, n) as if we consider the isomorphism Φ−1 : Fqn −→ Fnq applied to the
term Ai,jX
qi+qj for arbitrary i, j ∈ N then we have that
Φ−1(Ai,jX
qi+qj ) = Φ−1(Ai,jX






























































r,s is simply the collected terms after reduction by P (Z). Finally, we can apply Φ−1











In the same way we have that the isomorphism applied to each term Xq
i
results in a vector
whose components are simply linear equations in x1, . . . , xn and the isomorphism Φ
−1 applied
to C results in a vector of constant terms. Using the additive property of the isomorphism, we
can compute the map Φ−1 applied to each term of the polynomial F̄(X) and add these vectors
component-wise to obtain a system of n multivariate quadratic equations in n variables over Fq.
When it comes to inverting this system of equations, we therefore simply take the element
y ∈ Fnq and apply Φ to lift it to Y ∈ Fqn [Z]/P (Z). Knowledge of the univariate polynomial
F̄(X), then allows F̄(X) then allows us to compute the root of F̄(X) − Y = 0 via any root-
finding algorithm for finite fields and the solution X ∈ Fqn can then be converted to an element
x ∈ Fnq using the isomorphism Φ−1. After optimisations, the univariate root-finding procedure
will usually be the bottleneck in this procedure and its complexity is dependent upon the degree
D of the polynomial F̄ ∈ Fqn [X] — using Berlekamp’s algorithm gives a complexity of O(D3)
operations over Fqn and hence choosing D to be small allows this process to be efficient.
h ∈ Fnq z ∈ Fnqy ∈ Fnq x ∈ Fnq







P = S ◦ F ◦ T
Figure 1-1: The workflow of a generic HFE cryptosystem
The hardness of solving F via algebraic attacks is dependent upon a parameter known as
the degree of regularity of an MQ system. An upper bound for the degree of regularity of HFE
systems scales with logqD, hence the degree D of F̄ must be chosen with respect to both the
efficiency for the root-finding step and the security of the system against algebraic attacks.
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1.3.9 Gui: An example of HFEv-
GUI [PCY+15] was introduced by Petzoldt et. al in 2015 and will be our leading example of an
HFE, in fact HFEv-, multivariate signature scheme. We will examine how our methods apply to
finding a preimage for theMQ system for the public key of this cryptosystem. To our knowledge,
it remains unbroken classically, but the chosen parameters for quantum security are susceptible
to our improvements to quantum search techniques for the MQ problem over F2, in Chapters
4, 5 and 6 in this thesis.
GUI [PCY+15] is an updated form of the QUARTZ HFE cryptosystem [PCG01], which
takes into account theoretical advances concerning the aforementioned degree of regularity for
HFE cryptosystems [DK12, DY13, DG10] that were not available during the design phase of
QUARTZ. It uses both vinegar variables (the substitution of random field elements) and the
minus technique (the removal of equations) in the central map and the base field of the resulting
MQ system is F2, leading to the authors naming it after a design of Chinese pottery named
Gui with three legs, representing the three design principles of HFE it implements. We will first
describe the central map, which is a special case of the QUARTZ central map, where the only
difference is that QUARTZ allows a finite field of arbitrary size to be used, instead of Gui’s
fixed choice of F2. Gui is parameterised by the tuple (n,D, a, v, k), where n is the number of
variables, D is the degree of the central HFE map, a is the number of equations we remove, v is
the number of vinegar variables in the central map and k is the number of times a preimage of
the public-key is computed.
1.3.10 The HFEV- core map
The HFEv- core map is parameterised by the tuple (Fq, n,D, a, v) and the central map of Gui
is simply an HFEv- core map with Fq fixed to be F2. We therefore describe the generic HFEv-
core map and inversion procedure.
In the context of the generic HFE construction as described in Section 1.3.7.1, the affine
components are the maps, S : Fnq −→ Fn−aq and T : Fn+vq −→ Fn+vq of maximal rank and the
central map F is constructed from the canonical isomorphism Φ : Fnq −→ Fqn applied to the map








βi(v1, . . . , vv) ·Xq
i
+ γ(v1, . . . , vv), (1.25)
where βi : Fvq −→ Fqn and γ : Fvq −→ Fqn are respectively degree one and degree two affine maps
in the vinegar variables. The central map is then defined by F : Fn+vq −→ Fnq ,
F = Φ−1 ◦ F̄ ◦ Φ (1.26)
and the public-key is the composition P : Fn+vq −→ Fn−a given by
P = S ◦ Φ−1 ◦ F̄ ◦ Φ ◦ T. (1.27)
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In order to avoid birthday attacks due to the chosen sizes of input, the authors of Gui use
k > 1 applications of the HFEv- core map to sign and verify messages. In order to sign a
document d, an instance of Gui(n,D, a, v, k) consists of the following process:
1. A hash of the message h← H(d) we wish to sign is first computed.
2. The variable S0 := 0
n−a ∈ Fn−a2 is initialised.
3. For i = 1, . . . , k :
a. The variable Di is set to be the first n− a bits of h.
b. The preimage of P−1(Di ⊕ Si) is then computed and the result interpreted as an
element Si ∈ Fn−a2 and an element Xi ∈ F
a+v
2 .
c. A hash of the original hash is then computed so that h← H(h).
4. The signature σ = (Sk‖Xk‖ . . . ‖Xk) is output.
Verification, which is unimportant for our purposes, is then handled by performing this operation
in reverse, with the signature being verified if and only if the final value of S0
?
= 0n ∈ Fn−a2 .
1.3.11 Gui as a target for cryptanalysis
As a target for cryptanalysis via search based methods, we have for an instance of Gui(n,D, a, v, k)
that the public-key is an instance of MQ(F2, n+ v, n− a) and that the most costly part of the
process of forging a signature will be the inversion of the public-key P : Fn+v2 −→ F
n−a
2 a total
of k times, which must be performed in serial. Either fixing variables or using methods to solve
underdetermined systems of equations [TW12] implies that the total effort involved will be that
required to solve k serial instances of MQ(F2, n − a, n − a). We make the assumption that
there exists a single solution, as do the authors of the Gui cryptosystem when choosing their
quantum-resistant parameters [PCDY17a, PCDY17b].
With regards to choosing parameters for a quantum-resistant for Gui, the authors in the
original design document for Gui [PCY+15] state that choosing n to be twice as large as their
parameters for resistance to classical cryptanalysis will provide protection from attacks by quan-
tum computers. This doubling of n takes into account the square-root advantage that Grover
provides over classical search (2n/2 quantum queries compared to 2n classical queries) but does
not take into account the overhead involved with implementing the quantum oracle.
After the publication of Schwabe and Westerbaan’s quantum oracle (see Definition 2.11) for
use with Grover’s algorithm to solve instances ofMQ(F2, n,m), the authors of Gui suggest new
parameters based upon this attack being optimal — it is these targets we attack in this thesis.
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Gui(n,D, a, v, k) Security level Cryptanalysis target Source
Gui(94, 17, 4, 4, 4) λ = 80 (classical) 4×MQ(F2, 90, 90) [PCY+15]
Gui(95, 9, 5, 5, 3) λ = 80 (classical) 3×MQ(F2, 90, 90) [PCY+15]
Gui(96, 5, 6, 6, 3) λ = 80 (classical) 3×MQ(F2, 90, 90) [PCY+15]
Gui(127, 9, 3, 4, 4) λ = 120 (classical) 4×MQ(F2, 124, 124) [PCY+15]
Gui(188, 17, 4, 4, 4) λ = 80 (quantum) 4×MQ(F2, 184, 184) [PCY+15]
Gui(190, 9, 5, 5, 3) λ = 80 (quantum) 3×MQ(F2, 185, 185) [PCY+15]
Gui(192, 5, 6, 6, 3) λ = 80 (quantum) 3×MQ(F2, 186, 186) [PCY+15]
Gui(254, 9, 3, 4, 4) λ = 120 (quantum) 4×MQ(F2, 251, 251) [PCY+15]
Gui(120, 9, 3, 3, 2) λ = 80 (quantum) 2×MQ(F2, 117, 117) [PCDY17b]
Gui(212, 9, 3, 4, 2) λ = 128 (quantum) 2×MQ(F2, 209, 209) [PCDY17b]
Gui(464, 9, 7, 8, 2) λ = 256 (quantum) 2×MQ(F2, 457, 457) [PCDY17b]
Table 1.1: Suggested parameters for the Gui cryptosystem [PCY+15, PCDY17a, PCDY17b].
In particular we note the case of Gui(188, 17, 4, 4, 4) and Gui(120, 9, 3, 3, 2) which are both
proposed to possess the property that forging a signature requires at least 280 quantum gates.
Both parameter sets for Gui were proposed corresponding to an attack by Grover’s algorithm
(see Theorem 3.10) being used to search for a preimage, — but Gui(188, 17, 4, 4, 4) takes into
account only the number of calls to the quantum oracle that are required, whilst Gui(120, 9, 3, 3, 2)
takes into account both the number of calls and the cost of calling the quantum oracle. It is
clear that these parameters and targets for cryptanalysis are very different and that solving
Gui(120, 9, 3, 3, 2) will be far easier. This provides a motivating case-study for our optimisations
and leads to our conclusions in Chapter 7, that it is fundamentally dangerous to extrapolate
cryptographic parameters from quantum resource estimates for quantum search algorithms —
the true costs of these algorithms, even in the logical quantum circuit-model, is not yet fully
understood.
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1.4 The key-search problem
In this section we describe the computational resources required to attack the key-search problem
for block-ciphers via search techniques, which we will examine again in Chapter 6.
Definition 1.4 (Block cipher [MKVOV96]).
A block-cipher with a message-block length of n and a key-length of k is defined by the message-
space {0, 1}n, the keyspace K ⊆ {0, 1}k, a function Gen which randomly samples a key k ∈ K
and the two functions
Enc : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}k −→ {0, 1}n (1.28)
and
Dec : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}k −→ {0, 1}n, (1.29)
which must have the property that for (P,K) ∈ {0, 1}n×K it holds that Dec(Enc(P,K),K) = P .
The usual definition of breaking a block-cipher is either the recovery of a plaintext P ∈ {0, 1}n,
given a ciphertext C ∈ {0, 1}n such that C = Enc(P,K) for a given K ∈ K or the recovery of the
key K used to encrypt P , which naturally implies obtaining P and the decryption of all other
P ′ ∈ {0, 1}n encrypted under this choice of K ∈ K. We will be interested in the latter scenario,
known as the key-search problem for block ciphers (see Definition 1.5).
The example to which we will immediately specialise to is that of the Advanced Encryption
Standard [Pub01]. The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is defined with a fixed block-
length of n = 128 and K = {0, 1}k for k = 128, 192, 256 and these cases will be respectively
referred to as AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256. The Advanced Encryption Standard was the
winning entry of the five year NIST2 standardisation process (or competition) to choose and
establish a standardised, publicly available and community-supported block-cipher from entries
from the cryptographic community. The Rijndael block-cipher was eventually chosen to be the
Advanced Encryption Standard and remains the standard choice of symmetric-key encryption
for the majority of web traffic today.
For our purposes the implementation details of AES will not matter, only that we will model
AES as a pseudorandom function in the key-search scenario for cryptanalysis of this primi-
tive. The costs required to solve the key-search problem via Grover’s algorithm exist in litera-
ture [GLRS16] and will be recalled explicitly in Section 2.6 to be used in Chapter 6.
Definition 1.5 (The key-search problem for block-ciphers).
Let (Gen,Enc,Dec) define a fixed block-cipher with a message block size n and a key size k.
Let K ← Gen(1k) be fixed. Let r ∈ N and P1, . . . , Pr ∈ {0, 1}n. Suppose we can obtain
~Pr = ((P1, C1) , . . . , (Pr, Cr)) where Ci = Enc(Pi,K). (1.30)
for any choice of r and P1, . . . , Pr. The key-search problem is to find the fixed key K ∈ {0, 1}k.
2National Institute of Standards and Technology (http://www.nist.gov)
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Attacking a block-cipher in this way is known as a known plaintext-ciphertext attack, where
Pi are the plaintexts and Ci are the ciphertexts. In a realistic attack scenario, whilst the fixed-
key may be hidden inside the device used for encryption, the cryptanalyst may be able to either
deduce from the context of the message (for instance, an encrypted header of a file), trick or
bribe someone to send a specific message — or in a modern context infect a device with malware
in order to get the device to send a specific message. Regardless of the method used to obtain
the plaintexts, we will wish to examine the resources required to attack this problem via search
based methods — specifically quantum search based methods in Chapter 6.
The first problem is that of plaintext unicity distance, or the number r of plaintext-ciphertext
pairs required to uniquely determine the fixed key K ∈ {0, 1}k. It will do the cryptanalyst no
good if they locate a K ∈ {0, 1}k that satisfies ~Pr, but decrypts all other plaintexts to random
messages. A good block-cipher will possess the property that if we fix a plaintext P ∈ {0, 1}n
then the function EP : {0, 1}k −→ {0, 1}n defined by
EP (x) = E(P, x) (1.31)
will act as a pseudorandom function, in that any particular input x ∈ {0, 1}k corresponding to
a key has an equal chance of mapping to any element C ∈ {0, 1}n of the co-domain. It is plain
that if k > n, then some keys must map the fixed plaintext to the same ciphertext. In order
to uniquely determine the fixed key with high probability, the cryptanalyst chooses r (in the
context of Definition 1.5) to be large enough and specifies the problem as a preimage search
problem where hr : {0, 1}k −→ {0, 1}rn, yh = C1‖ . . . ‖Cr and
hr(x) 7→ EP1(x)‖ . . . ‖EPr(x). (1.32)
In this way we have that the probability of any one key mapping r plaintexts to exactly r
ciphertexts is 2−rn. The scenario guarantees that there exists a single key (as we have captured
the corresponding plaintext-ciphertext pairs), hence the expected number of solutions to the
single-target preimage search problem as defined by hr and yh above is 1 + (2
k − 1) · 2−rn. The
expected number of spurious keys is therefore approximately 2k−rn. Hence we will wish to choose
r such that this value is as close to 1 as possible, without choosing r to be too large so as to
incur additional costs.
For AES, this means that as n = 128 is fixed for each each key size k = 128, 192, 256, we can
choose r = 2 for k = 128, 192 and r = 3 for k = 256. This means that we expect 2−128 spurious
keys for AES-128, an expected 2−64 spurious keys for AES-192 and an expected 2−128 spurious
keys for AES-256. In the original paper on applying Grover’s algorithm to cryptanalysis of AES
via the preimage search problem, they describe this analysis but choose r = 3 for AES-128, r = 4
for AES-192 and r = 5 for AES-256. This may partly be because the analysis is recycled from
a previous paper by two of the authors [RS15] where r is derived based upon the probability
that pairs of keys encrypt the same plaintext to the same ciphertext, as opposed to our scenario
where one key (the key we are attempting to find) is fixed. Their choice of r is therefore not
incorrect, but is inefficient for the single-target preimage attack scenario.
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We note that classically a filtering process can be used, much as in the case of Fast Exhaustive
Search Algorithm described in Section 1.3.4.2 to reduce the dependency of the algorithm on the
number of equations. In this scenario, we simply test keys until we find one that fulfils the
condition EP1(x) = C1, then proceed to test the key to check if it satisfies the remaining r − 1
plaintext-ciphertext pairs. This is impossible in Grover’s algorithm as the nature of implementing
boolean circuits in quantum circuitry does not allow conditional execution to work in this fashion.
Our adaptation in Chapter 6 is essentially a quantum analogue of this filtering system, building




The first thing to realise about parallel universes, the Guide says, is that they
are not parallel. It is also important to realise that they are not, strictly speaking,
universes either, but it is easiest if you try and realise that a little later, after you’ve
realised that everything you’ve realised up to that moment is not true.
- Douglas Adams, Mostly Harmless [Ada92]
In this chapter we provide the required background in quantum computing to understand
the quantum search algorithms and cost model contained in this thesis. This is not a thesis
about how quantum computers work, but rather on how to optimise and use quantum search
algorithms. We will rely upon a simple abstraction of quantum computing which requires only
that we accept some basic principles as facts and provide discussion around the subject.
In Section 2.1 we introduce the mathematical model of quantum computation, relating briefly
as to its connection to the postulates of quantum mechanics. The mathematical model of quan-
tum computing allows us to describe quantum algorithms in the language of linear algebra, with
the quantum state being represented by a unit vector in a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert
space and quantum algorithms being the space of all unitary operators acting upon this Hilbert
space. The mathematical model is a particularly useful tool in regards to the creation of quan-
tum algorithms and the proof of their correctness, as quantum algorithms may be described in
terms of unitary operators given only in terms of a high-level description.
In Section 2.2 we cover the logical quantum circuit model of computation, which concerns itself
with how the abstract unitary operators in the mathematical model of quantum computation
may be implemented via a finite set of quantum gates acting on only one or two qubits. A finite
set of quantum gates which enable any theoretical quantum algorithm to be implemented, at
least up to an arbitrarily chosen level of error, is known as a universal quantum gate set (see
Section 2.2.1) and we provide the cost of our quantum algorithms in terms of the Clifford+T
universal quantum gate set (see Section 2.2.2).
In Section 2.3 we discuss the topic of quantum phase oracles and how they can be constructed
via implementing boolean primitives in quantum circuitry. We discuss design patterns for quan-
tum oracles in Section 2.4 and conclude with explicit details of how the quantum phase oracle
for the MQ problem may be implemented in Section 2.5.
27
Whilst the theory of quantum algorithms and quantum computation is progressing, the even-
tual architecture(s) that quantum computers will utilise is still an open question. This thesis
ignores concerns such as how qubits will be implemented, the internal topology of quantum
computers and full details of error-correction. These are important real-world concerns, but
ignoring them is both sensible from a technical and sociological perspective. From the technical
perspective, the cost of executing a fault-tolerant quantum circuit is extrapolated from the cost
of executing a noise-free quantum circuit, hence providing the cost of a quantum algorithm in
the noise-free quantum circuit model of computation allows us to crudely compare quantum
algorithms, without tying us into any assumptions concerning the engineering principles of any
future implementation of a quantum computer.
We will therefore ignore the issue of error-correction in this thesis, as optimisations in the
logical circuit-model of computation are both relevant in terms of cryptanalysis and will be
expected to carry over to an implementation which involves quantum error correction if the
techniques involve strict-gains for all metrics for the logical quantum circuit. The impact of
error-correction upon optimisations which involve advantageous tradeoffs relative to metrics in
the logical quantum circuit-model of computation is trickier to analyse, as the true impact will
depend upon how these metrics impact upon the particular quantum error-correction scheme.
From a sociological perspective, the cryptographic currently uses the noise-free quantum-
circuit model, sometimes refered to as the logical quantum circuit model, as a means of comparing
quantum algorithms and extrapolating security parameters. Hence, in some respect it does not
matter if the quantum algorithms can ever be implemented, or what their true execution costs will
be — only that the cryptographic community is currently making informed decisions based upon
the estimated noise-free quantum-circuit complexity of these algorithms. Such quantum resource
estimates have been performed for cryptanalysis of AES [GLRS16] with the Clifford+T universal
gate set, the Multivariate Quadratic problem over F2 using logical quantum gates [SW16], the
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm problem using only Toffoli gates [RNSL17] and for solving the
SHA preimage problem with Grover’s algorithm by using a cost-model based upon the projected
classical resources required for a fault-tolerant implementation [ADMG+16]. This study of the
resources required to implement quantum algorithms (relative to any cost model) has colloquially
become known as the study of quantum resource estimation.
The use of logical quantum gates as a metric for security estimates with respect to quantum
algorithms was strengthened by the announcement of the NIST1 standardisation process for
quantum-resistant public-key cryptosystems [oST16a]. The NIST call for proposals for this
standardisation process [oST16b] required submissions to quantify the estimated “computational
resources” required to attack submitted cryptosystems with classical or quantum algorithms in
comparison with those required to attack the AES-128/192/256 symmetric key primitives and
SHA-256/384/512 hash functions. ”Computational resources” is a well-understood term with
regards to classical bit operations, but as the underlying hardware architectures of classical
and quantum computers are fundamentally different, it is currently difficult to make a straight
forward comparison — though efforts have been made [ADMG+16].
1National Institute of Standards and Technology
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The NIST call for proposals therefore suggests using the logical quantum circuit model for
security estimates. The NIST call for proposals states that various metrics may eventually be
used and that research into metrics for quantum algorithms is ongoing. For now at least, the
logical quantum circuit-model is a standard choice for quantifying the resources required to
execute a quantum algorithm and the Clifford+T gate set is useful to consider, owing to its
use in the analysis of Grover’s algorithm applied to AES [GLRS16] and proposed benefits with
regards to quantum error-correction schemes.
2.1 The mathematical model of quantum computing
We now introduce the mathematical model of quantum computation, which can in some sense
be considered as level of abstraction at which we design quantum algorithms. Our aim is not to
be exhaustive in our description of quantum computation, but to provide a model of quantum
computation that is suitable for the purpose of this thesis. Much of the following material is
adapted from several well-known resources on quantum computation and the interested reader
is directed towards these [NC10].
Data structures are at the core of computer science and in some sense quantum computing can
be considered as a method of exploiting a unique data structure, the quantum state, whose cre-
ation, manipulation and access is enabled by our understanding of quantum mechanics. As with
other data-structures, it is built of relatively simple components (qubits), which are connected
in a unique manner to create the data structure (the quantum state), has a means of extracting
data from the structure (measurement) and a means of manipulating the data structure itself
(application of unitary operators).
2.1.1 A word on dirac notation
In the following and in Chapter 3 we use Dirac notation to describe quantum states and opera-
tions, which are described by vectors over C of unit length and unitary matrices. The length of
these vectors will be implicit — when we are working with n qubits, the vector will a unit length
element of C2n . In all cases throughout this thesis vectors will be relative to the canonical basis
e0, . . . , e2n−1 where ei ∈ C2
n
is zero apart from the ith component, which is 1. For our purposes,
this will be known as the computational basis. With this in mind, the following may be useful:
• The ket |ψ〉 is an element of C2n whose ith component is indexed by the binary expansion
of i, padded on the left with zeroes so that the index is a length n bitstring.
• The bra 〈ψ| will represent the conjugate-transpose of |ψ〉, so that (if we treat vectors as
column matrices) 〈ψ| = |ψ〉†, where † is the notation for the conjugate-transpose.




• The notation 〈ϕ|A |φ〉 will denote the inner product 〈ϕ| (A |φ〉), where A ∈ C2n×2n .
• The notation |ϕ〉 |φ〉 will be used as shorthand for the tensor product |ϕ〉 ⊗ |φ〉.
29
2.1.2 Quantum states and quantum registers
Together, postulate one and postulate two mathematically describe the basic components of the
data structure upon which quantum algorithms act.
Postulate one
The space of configurations for which any isolated physical system may be in can be described
by a Hilbert space over C. At any point in time the physical system is completely described by
a state vector |ψ〉 of unit length in this state space so that 〈ψ|ψ〉 = 1.
For our purposes, the physical system will represent the internal state of the quantum computer
and the state space will always be a finite dimensional Hilbert space over C of dimension 2n,
where n is the number of quantum bits, or qubits, in our system. These qubits act as the
quantum analogue to classical bits and comprise the basic building blocks of the data structure
upon which universal quantum computers process information. In the case n = 1, the state space
of each qubit is described by the two-dimensional complex vector space C2. If the basis of this
vector space is comprised of the orthonormal unit vectors {|0〉 , |1〉}, then the qubit may be in
any superposition (see Definition 2.4) of these basis states
|ψ〉 = α0 |0〉+ α1 |1〉 , (2.1)
with α0, α1 ∈ C and with the unit vector constraint 〈ψ|ψ〉 = 1 giving us that |α0|2 + |α1|2 = 1.
Definition 2.1 (Computational basis state of a single qubit).
The basis {|0〉 , |1〉} for the Hilbert space C2 representing an individual qubit is called the com-





In order to consider systems comprised of more than one qubit, we require postulate two.
Postulate two
The state space of a composite physical system may be described by the tensor product of
the individual components of the system. If two separate quantum systems are in the states
|ψ1〉 ∈ H1 and |ψ2〉 ∈ H2 are treated as a single system, this composite system is in the state
|ψ1〉 ⊗ |ψ2〉 ∈ H1 ⊗H2. (2.3)
Together, the first two postulates provides us with a method of describing the state of the
quantum system as a whole.
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As we will treat the state of the quantum system as memory upon which operations are
formed, in the context of quantum algorithms we will refer to the state of the system as the
quantum register. It will be useful to consider different logical decompositions of the state space
when we analyse quantum algorithms and consider the effect of entanglement. As such, we will
refer to specific subsystems by named quantum registers. For example, in (2.3), we might refer
to the subsystems H1 and H2 as the first and second register, or the search-space and ancillae
registers. As is standard notation, we will often exclude the tensor sign ⊗, so that the state
|ψ1〉 ⊗ |ψ2〉 is simply written |ψ1〉 |ψ2〉 or even |ψ1ψ2〉.
As the basis of a tensor of vector spaces is the set of tensors of all combinations of the
basis states for the individual subsystems of the tensored vector space, this provides a canonical
description of the state of an arbitrary system via the computational basis.
Definition 2.2 (n-qubit computational basis states).
The set of computational basis states of an n-qubit quantum state is the set
{|x1 . . . xn〉 = |x1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |xn〉 : x1 . . . xn ∈ {0, 1}n}. (2.4)
As is standard notation, we will write the state alternatively as |x1x2 . . . xn〉 or, when the
number of qubits is implicit, by simply the notation |x〉 = |x1 . . . xn〉. Whilst a tensor product
can be used to describe a composite system, after these components have interacted they cannot
always be described as a tensor product.
Definition 2.3 (Entanglement).
Given a tensor decomposition of a composite quantum system and state vector belonging to this
composite quantum system |ψ〉 ∈ H1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Hn, we say that |ψ〉 is entangled if it cannot be
written as the tensor product
|ψ1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ψn〉 ∈ H1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Hn, with |ψi〉 ∈ Hi. (2.5)
We note that entanglement must be defined in relation to a specific tensor decomposition
of the Hilbert space representing the composite quantum system. For instance, we could define
the state |ψ〉 = |ψ1〉 ⊗ |ψ2〉 ∈ H1 ⊗ H2 such that |ψ1〉 ∈ H1 is entangled with regards to the
decomposition H1 = C2⊗C2, but |ψ〉 is unentangled with regards to the decomposition H1⊗H2.
As a simple example of this and to illustrate the vector and ket notation for systems of more
than one qubit, we consider the two-qubit Bell state |β00〉, which can be written respectively as
|β00〉 =
|0〉 ⊗ |0〉+ |1〉 ⊗ |1〉√
2
=














Whilst this can always be expressed relative to the computational basis {|00〉 , |01〉 , |10〉 , |11〉},
the state |β00〉 cannot be written as the tensor product |ϕ〉 |φ〉 for any choice of |ϕ〉 and |φ〉.
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Relative to the tensor decomposition C2⊗C2, the state |β00〉 is entangled as, if there existed
constants such that |β00〉 =
(




c |0〉+ d |1〉
)





































Whilst the set of states {|e0〉 , . . . , |e2n−1〉} forms an orthonormal basis (in that 〈ei|ej〉 = δi,j),
in general a quantum state may be expressed relative to any orthonormal basis. Whilst we will
only be concerned with the computational basis {|e0〉 , . . . , |e2n−1〉} in this thesis, it is important
to mention this in relation to the notion of superposition.
Definition 2.4 (Superposition and amplitude).
Given an orthonormal basis for anN -dimensional vector space associated with a quantum system,




αi |ψi〉 , where ai ∈ C (2.10)
and |ψ〉 6= |ψi〉 for any i. The αi ∈ C are referred to as the amplitudes of the basis state |ψi〉.
It is worth noting that the concept of superposition and amplitude are only relevant with
regards to a given orthonormal basis, as we can always define a new basis with the Gram-
Schmidt procedure such that the state |ψ〉 as in (2.10) is defined to be the first basis vector and
the computational basis states are modified accordingly to be the remaining vectors in the basis.
Definition 2.5 (Global and relative phase).
Two quantum states are said to differ by a global phase of eiθ if there exists a θ ∈ (0, 2π) such
that |ψ′〉 = eiθ |ψ〉. Two amplitudes α and β are said to differ by a relative phase if there exists








are said to differ by a relative phase if for each basis state |i〉 it holds that αi and α′i differ by a
relative phase and that |ψ〉 and |ψ′〉 do not differ by a global phase.
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Finally, we note that the above may be generalised via considering qudits instead of qubits,
so that each individual qudit is described by a d ≥ 2 dimensional complex Hilbert space and the
state space associated to the entire quantum system comprised of n qudits is of dimension dn.
In this case, we have that qubits are simply the special case of d = 2. As in the case of classical
complexity, qudits do not change the fundamental complexity of algorithms, though can have
significant impact upon the efficiency of implementing certain circuits and on the performance
of error-correction schemes.
2.1.3 Measurement
Whilst postulates one and two deal with how we can mathematically describe a closed quantum
system, postulate three lays the foundations of the nature of information that can be extracted
from it by observation and how such interaction affects the quantum state. Such observation is not
only required for obtaining the end result of a computation, but is also of utility in creating certain
useful subroutines [WR14]. We will only require the case of measurement of a quantum system
in relation to the computational basis (see Definition (2.4), whilst postulate three describes the
general case of projective or Von Neumann measurement, which is one formulation of quantum
measurement.
Postulate three (Projective Measurement)
For an n-qubit system whose state space H is spanned by the 2n computational basis states
{|x〉 : x ∈ {0, 1}n}, it is possible to perform a Von Neumann measurement on the system H with




αx |x〉 , (2.12)
then measurement outputs x ∈ {0, 1}n with probability |αx|2 and leaves the system in state |x〉.
The fact that quantum states are described by unit-length vectors is now clearer, as measurement




Theorem 2.6 (Global phase is irrelevant).
The global phase of a quantum state cannot be observed by measurement and can therefore be
ignored or factored out.
Proof. This can be seen by taking two quantum states which differ by a global phase, so that
|ψ′〉 = eiθ |ψ〉. If we consider the probability of measuring an arbitrary x ∈ {0, 1}n, then we have
that the probability of measuring |ψ〉 and obtaining x ∈ {0, 1}n is |αx|2, whilst the probability
of measuring |ψ′〉 and obtaining x ∈ {0, 1}n is |eiθαx|2 = |eiθ| · |αx| = |αx|. Hence the probability
of measurement is identical.
Whilst the subject of quantum measurement can be given a more formal treatment, this is
all that we will require from quantum measurement in this thesis.
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2.1.4 Unitary evolution
The fourth postulate states how closed quantum systems evolve — that is, how quantum states
change over time when no measurement is performed. Whilst the fact that the postulate describes
closed systems may imply that we have no control over the system, it can be shown that by using
specific experimental techniques, such as a laser shone on an atom at a certain frequency, we
can alter the evolution of an otherwise closed quantum system without interferring with any
other aspect of it, or measuring the quantum state. This allows for direct manipulation of the
quantum state and, alongside measurement, allows for a complete instruction set of the possible
operations we can perform in quantum algorithms.
Postulate four
The evolution of a closed quantum system is described by a unitary transformation. In other
words the state of the system at time t is related to the state of the system at time 0 by a unitary
operator U which depends only upon the time t
|ψt〉 = U |ψ0〉 . (2.13)
Definition 2.7 (Unitary operator).
An operator U is unitary if U †U = I, where U † = (UT )∗ is the conjugate-transpose operation.
This immediately characterises all operations, excluding measurement, that we may perform on
the quantum state. It also implies that all operations must be reversible, as a unitary transfor-
mation always has an inverse. This has a direct impact upon the implementation of any classical
subroutine in quantum circuitry, as we must take care to implement these circuits in a reversible
manner, so that they implement permutations on each computational basis state. As we will see
in Section 2.3.1, there are effective methods to realise this.
Whilst there exist models of quantum computation, such as adiabatic quantum computation
which model quantum computation in continuous time, the circuit model of quantum computation
(see Section 2.2) we use relies upon discrete unitary transformations referred to as quantum gates.
This use of discrete operations is purely an abstraction that assists in the modelling and design
of quantum computers and the design of algorithms, as each operation we perform will, in reality,
be a continuous transformation of the quantum state.
Together with the principal of deferred measurement (which loosely states that for any quan-
tum algorithm that involves measurement, we can delay that measurement until the end of the
computation at the cost of using more qubits), this implies that any quantum algorithm can
theoretically be viewed as consisting of three steps:
1. An initialisation phase.
2. A series of unitary transformations upon the state space.
3. Measurement.
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This is not to say that intermediate measurement is not useful — it can result in advantageous
tradeoffs with regards to the resources used to implement quantum algorithms, in implementa-
tions of primitives [WR14] and in quantum error-correction [NC10, FMMC12], but that it is
not required for quantum algorithms to be correct. The quantum algorithms we describe in this
thesis will not use intermediate measurement and the author is not confident that it can be used
to improve any of the methods in this thesis.
It is important to note that postulate four makes no claims concerning the efficiency of
implementing unitary operations and a key aspect of the design of quantum algorithms is ensuring
that we can efficiently construct useful unitary transformations. Whilst there are an uncountable
number of unitary transformations over the state-space of a quantum system, a set of finite
unitary operators known as a universal quantum gate set (see Section 2.2.1) acting only upon
single qubits and pairs of qubits will suffice to emulate any unitary transformation up to an
arbitrary level of precision in the quantum circuit model.
2.1.5 Describing unitary transformations
An alternative way of representing unitary transformations is via their outer product represen-
tation. For any two vectors |v〉 , |w〉 ∈ H, the outer product of these two vectors is defined as the
linear operator |v〉 〈w| : H −→ H whose action is
(|v〉 〈w|) |x〉 7→ 〈w|x〉 |v〉 . (2.14)
This allows us to represent unitary operators via their outer product representation, which will
be of utility in the proof of Theorem 3.4, a component of the proof of amplitude amplification
(see Theorem 3.6).
Theorem 2.8 (Outer product representation of a unitary operator (see Theorem 2.3.2 [KLM07])).
Let B = {|bi〉} be an orthonormal basis for a vector space H. Then every linear operator U on




Ui,j |bi〉 〈bj | (2.15)
We will give several examples of this decomposition for illustration in Section 2.1.6.
2.1.6 A collection of basic unitary transformations
We now describe a set of unitary transformations, which will be used throughout this thesis. Just
as a composite system can be described by a tensor product, it will be useful to describe a tensor
product of unitary operators acting upon the state space. Hence if we have the system H1⊗H2,
with U1 acting upon H1 and U2 acting upon H2, then we denote the parallel application of these
unitary operators upon their respective vector spaces by the tensor product of the two operators
U1⊗U2 : H1⊗H2 −→ H1⊗H2. When we wish to signify that we are applying the same unitary
U to each component of the composite system H1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Hk, we will use the notation U⊗k.
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We now proceed to give the unitary operators for several of the important quantum gates that
we will use, to illustrate the above concepts.
2.1.6.1 The Identity operator
The identity unitary operator is the simplest unitary operator that we consider, but is technically
required if we are to write other unitary operators as a tensor product of unitary operators, if we
are in essence as acting upon parts of the composite system. It has the representation in matrix






= |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1| . (2.16)
If we wish to signify that the identity is acting upon the state space C2n representing n qubits,
we will use either the notation I⊗n or In. The extension of (2.16) to these cases is trivial.
2.1.6.2 The X operator






= |1〉〈0|+ |0〉〈1| . (2.17)
2.1.6.3 The Hadamard unitary



























|0〉 〈1| − 1√
2
|1〉 〈1| . (2.18)
2.1.6.4 The Controlled-NOT (Controlled-X, CNOT or ∧1(X) unitary




1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
 = |00〉 〈00|+ |01〉 〈01|+ |11〉 〈10|+ |10〉 〈11| . (2.19)
The actual unitary representation of the algorithms we use will not be important for our
purposes, other than the explicit description of the Hadamard operator given above. The outer
product representation in relation to a given orthonormal basis on the other hand, will prove
useful. We now summarise the key take-home points concerning the mathematical model of
quantum computation and move on to discuss the quantum circuit model of computation.
36
2.1.7 A summary of the mathematical model of quantum computation
We briefly recap the previous section, noting the key points that we must keep in mind.
• Quantum states consisting of n-qubits may be considered to be unit-length complex vectors
dimension 2n. The set of all possible n-qubit states is the set of unit-length complex vectors




αi |ψi〉 , (2.20)
where {|ψi〉}2
n−1
i=0 is any orthonormal basis for the vector space H = C2
n
that represents




|αi|2 = 1 must hold.
Relative to the computational basis {|x〉 : x ∈ {0, 1}n}, the components of these vectors
are labelled αx, so that the i
th component of this vector is the amplitude associated with
|x〉, where x is the binary interpretation of i (where i = 0, . . . , 2n − 1).
• Quantum algorithms act upon n-qubit quantum states and may be considered to be unitary
operators (see Definition 2.7). The space of all possible quantum algorithms (involving no
measurement) that act upon n-qubit states is therefore described by the set of all possible
unitary operators of dimension 2n × 2n over C, ie.
{
U ∈ C2n×2n : U †U = UU † = I2n
}
.
• Quantum measurement of the entire quantum state (all we will require in this thesis) allows
us to collapse the n-qubit state into one of 2n computational basis states, which provides us
with a method of extracting classical information from the quantum state. The probability





and obtaining the bitstring x is |αx|2. Measurement will only be performed at the end of
a quantum computation in this thesis.
Whilst the mathematical model of quantum computation is a useful tool for algorithm design
(see Chapter 3), the quantum circuit model of computation is a useful tool for deriving the costs
of these algorithms.
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2.2 The quantum circuit model of computation
Whilst the mathematical model of quantum computation gives us the basic data structure of the
quantum state and tells us how we can extract information via measurement from it, a quantum
algorithm is simply described as a unitary operator acting upon the state space. The quantum
circuit model of computation helps quantify the resources required to implement these unitary
operators via operations on a small number of qubits, much as classical circuits can be considered
as functions which can be implemented via logical gates which act upon a small number of bits.
For our purposes, a quantum circuit will consist of
• A finite number of quantum wires, each of which represent a qubit.
• An initialisation phase where all qubits are set to |0〉. This can be performed via measuring
any quantum state and simply applying an X (see Section 2.1.6.2) gate to qubits measured
in the state |1〉.
• The application of quantum gates to subsets of these wires.
• Measurement of the quantum state at the end of the computation.
Other features, such as intermediate measurement of the state and conditional application of
quantum gates based upon these measurements are required by the full quantum circuit model
of computation, but are not required for our purposes as we only perform measurement during
the initialisation phase and at the end of the quantum computation.
A quantum gate is loosely defined as the implementation of a unitary operator that acts upon
a small number of qubits. It is important that these gates are fixed in advance in order to quantify
the resources required by the quantum algorithm. Some authors include all possible single-qubit
gates and the Toffoli gate [AdW17], whilst others fix a finite set of quantum gates [GLRS16]
known as a universal quantum gate set (see discussion on the next page) such as the Clifford+T
gate set (see Section 2.2.2), which consists of a finite number of quantum gates that can be used
to approximate any given single-qubit unitary transformation. The question of approximating
gates will not be important for the majority of this thesis, as our algorithms can be implemented
exactly using our choice of the Clifford+T universal quantum gate set. We mention the arbitrary
approximation of single-qubit unitaries as one of the algorithms that we compare our methods
to in Chapter 6 requires this.
The quantum circuit model is similar to the classical circuit model, in that the metrics we
care about are
• Circuit-width — the number of qubits used in a quantum circuit.
• Circuit-depth — the number of time-steps we must perform before the computation ends,
where quantum gates may be executed in parallel in each time-step.
• Circuit-size — the total number of primitive quantum gates used in the quantum circuit
(though individual gates may possess different real-world costs).
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In particular, it is the quantum circuit-size of quantum search algorithms that we are interested
in, as the quantum security levels of Gui and AES are benchmarked against these metrics.
Quantum-circuit depth is considered less important in the cryptographic community when it
comes to applying brute-force search methods, but quantum circuit-width has a very real impact
upon the timeline for if or when schemes become vulnerable to attack from quantum computers.
Considering the fact that we currently have quantum computers consisting of just under one
hundred physical qubits and that quantum search algorithms will require logical qubits, each
consisting of thousands of physical qubits, circuit-width is a very real-world concern. Our results
in Chapter 6 are aimed towards this, demonstrating that we can achieve better results with
regards to circuit-depth and circuit-size than Grover’s algorithm (see Theorem 3.10) can achieve
if we use a finer-grained approach via exploiting amplitude amplification (see Theorem 3.6).
It can be useful to visualise a quantum circuit via a quantum circuit diagram, which for a
quantum circuit acting upon n qubits, consists of n parallel lines or quantum wires, representing
the qubits. The individual quantum gates or quantum algorithms can then be represented via
boxes or control-lines acting upon these wires. Figure (2-1) below illustrates a quantum circuit
that maps the state |xy〉 (where x, y ∈ {0, 1}) to the Bell state |βxy〉, which is a general circuit
which can create the Bell state |β00〉 as given in (2.6). The circuit consists of first applying a
Hadamard gate (the implementation of a Hadamard unitary) to the first qubit, then applying
the ∧1(X) gate (the implementation of the two qubit ∧1(X) or controlled-NOT gate) to both
qubits, with the first qubit being the control qubit and the second qubit being the target qubit.
The ∧1(X) gate and its generalisation ∧k(X) is further discussed in Section 2.3.1.
|x〉 H • |βxy〉
|y〉
Figure 2-1: The Bell state quantum circuit, mapping the computational basis |xy〉 to |βxy〉.
In terms of unitary operations, this should be interpreted as first applying the tensor of the
Hadamard unitary with the identity (H ⊗ I), followed by the ∧1(X) unitary. Written out
explicitly, this circuit applied to the state |00〉 gives us





1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
 ·

1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 −1 0












1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 1 0 −1





















|11〉 = |β00〉 . (2.24)
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2.2.1 Universal quantum gate sets
Much as a classical circuit may be implemented by a universal logic gate (or set of gates), such
as the NAND gate (or the set {¬,⊕,∧}), we will discuss the implementation costs of quantum
algorithms relative to a fixed set of finite gates. As postulate four (see Section 2.1.4) states that
the space of all possible quantum operations on a single qubit is the set of unitary operations
{U ∈ C2×2}, no finite sequence from a finite set of gates can implement these exactly.
When it comes to implementing these arbitrary single-qubit unitary transformations as single-
qubit quantum gates, it can be demonstrated by the Solovay-Kitaev Theorem [KIT96] that a
finite set of quantum gates acting upon single qubits can suffices to implement any given single-
qubit unitary transformation up to an arbitrarily chosen level of precision and that furthermore,
this is efficient in the sense that we require only O(logc2(
1
ε )), where ε > 0 is the chosen level of
precision and 1 < c < 4. As it can be demonstrated that the error in implementing the unitary
Uε = Uεk · · ·Uε1 , (2.25)




this gives an easy method of choosing the level of precision we must implement any given unitary
to achieve a given tolerance level of error for the quantum algorithm as a whole. In order to
implement any quantum algorithm up to a level of precision ε > 0, if we are implementing m
quantum gates approximately, then we must implement each quantum gate up to a precision level
of εi ≤ εm [NC10]. The Solovay-Kitaev theorem implies that if our algorithm uses m single-qubit
quantum gate that we are approximating, then we expect to execute O(m logc(mε )) gates from the
universal quantum gate set. Asymptotically optimal (c = 1) algorithms exist [KBRY15, RS14],
but our results rely upon the existence, not the efficiency of arbitrary single-qubit quantum gates.
It can be demonstrated that arbitrary unitary operators acting upon any number of qubits
can be implemented via a ∧1(X) gate (which acts upon pairs of qubits) in combination with
arbitrary single-qubit unitary operators (see [NC10] Section 4.5.2). A finite set of gates which
can implement any unitary transformation on n qubits is known as a universal quantum gate set
and by the discussion above, a method to implement arbitrary single-qubit gates up to a given
level of precision combined with the ∧1(X) gate is a universal quantum gate set.
For our purposes it is the correctness of methods involving these gates, rather than the costs
involved that we are concerned with and it suffices that they can be implemented with only a small
overhead as they will only be needed in Theorem 3.11, which we reference rather than use. The
algorithms in this thesis can all be implemented precisely using the Clifford+T quantum gate set,
which is our fixed choice of universal quantum gate set. We specifically chose this gate set owing
to the fact that we are discussing concrete costs, that this gate set is a popular choice in literature
owing to its proposed utility in implementing fault-tolerant quantum computation [FMMC12]
and that it has previously been used to cost the resources required for the quantum oracle to
solve the key-search problem for the Advanced Encryption Standard [GLRS16] (see Section 2.6).
We now examine the quantum gates that we will count as primitive operations.
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2.2.2 The Clifford+T universal gate set
We count the set of gates
Clifford+T := {H,S,∧1(X)} ∪ {T} (2.26)
as the Clifford+T universal quantum gate set and additionally include the X and Z gates as
quantum gate primitives. We note that the the H,S and T gates all act upon single qubits,
whilst the ∧1(X) gate (the controlled-X/controlled-NOT/CNOT gate) acts upon two qubits. It
will not prove necessary to discuss the action of the S (phase) gate or the T gate as we do not use
them directly — these gates will only be a component of the cost of the primitives described in
Section 2.3.1, which describes how boolean functions can be implemented using the Clifford+T
quantum gate set. Nevertheless, we include their unitary transformations for completeness. We
count each of these gates as having a cost of 1, though will perform a gate count in certain areas
of this thesis in terms of both the Clifford+T quantum gates and separately for T gates.
2.2.3 Implementing the T gate in fault-tolerant quantum computation
The circuit-complexity of a quantum circuit is often separated into that required for gates from
the Clifford gate set {H,S,∧1(X)} and the circuit-size and circuit-depth for the T gate on its
own. This owes itself to the difficulty and cost of implementing T -gates in a fault-tolerant fashion.
Fault-tolerant quantum computation is a topic beyond the scope of this thesis, but we sketch







the fault-tolerant implementation [FMMC12, ADMG+16, NC10] of this unitary operation is
performed via state injection of the logical quantum state




which is consumed upon the application of each T gate by the process of state injection, which
consists of performing the application of several gates based upon the outcome of a measurement.
Constructing the state |Θ〉 to the required level of precision is a costly process, referred to as
magic state distillation which must be performed to an error tolerance that scales with the inverse
of the number of T gates in the entire quantum circuit. Each T gate therefore takes magnitudes
more effort to implement than any of the those from the Clifford gate group {H,S,∧1(X)} and
hence the costs are often given separately, with T count and depth being optimisation targets.
|Θ〉 • SX T |ψ〉
|ψ〉
Figure 2-2: State injection circuit for implementation of the T gate (see [NC10] pp.486).
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2.2.4 Our set of primitive Clifford+T quantum gates
We note that the X and Z gates are not technically part of the Clifford+T gate set, but include
them as a primitive gate as they are both relatively simple gates and we have the identities
X = HSSH and Z = S2 if we examine the unitary transformations below. Each gate below will
be considered to take a single time-step to execute.








































1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
 (2.34)
We will return to the H gate in Section 2.3, which deals with how quantum oracles may be
constructed and the X and ∧1(X) gates in Section 2.3.1, where they will be used to implement
boolean primitives in quantum circuitry.
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2.2.5 The phase-shift gate
In addition to these gates, it will be useful to define the phase-shift gate Rφ. The Rφ gate is
not part of the Clifford+T gate set, but is a gate which (apart from special cases) must be
synthesised using the methods discussed in Section 2.2.1.







2.2.6 A summary of the quantum circuit-model of computation
We have discussed the logical quantum circuit-model of computation and have a primitive set
of quantum gates that will be the basis for costing the quantum algorithms designed in the
mathematical model of quantum computation. We will see these primitives used in Section
2.3.1, where we construct quantum circuits which will be used in the amplitude amplification
subroutine discussed in Chapter 3. The important points to take home are:
• Quantum gates are simply the implementation of unitary operators acting upon a small
number of qubits.
• Any given unitary operator acting upon a quantum state vector can be implemented up to
an arbitrary level of precision via a universal quantum gate set.
• Our chosen universal quantum gate set is the Clifford+T gate set.
• The important metrics are the number of logical qubits, circuit-size and circuit-depth.
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2.3 Quantum oracles and evaluations
Quantum phase oracles can be considered the quantum equivalent of a classical circuit which
computes a boolean function which decides whether x ∈ {0, 1}n possesses a particular property.
Whereas the output of a classical circuit would be a single bit which indicates whether or not the
element x satisfies some condition, the quantum phase oracle performs a conditional change in
the phase associated to each computational basis state which possesses this property. In terms
of the unstructured search problem (see Definition 1.1), this property is simply defined as being
a solution to our search problem, but it will be useful to define property testing of length n
bitstrings by considering boolean indicator functions later in this thesis.
Definition 2.9 (Boolean indicator function).
We say that the function χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} is a boolean indicator function for the set of
bitstrings x ∈ {0, 1}n in that it partitions the set into two disjoint subsets χ−1(1) and χ−1(0).
A classical circuit for χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} therefore takes as input x ∈ {0, 1}n and out-
puts χ(x) = 1 if x satisfies the property we are looking for and outputs χ(x) = 0 other-
wise. In contrast, amplitude amplification exploits quantum phase oracles, which manipulate
the phase of the amplitudes {αx : x ∈ {0, 1}n} associated with the set of computational basis
states {|x〉 : x ∈ {0, 1}n ∧ χ(x) = 1}.
Definition 2.10 (Quantum phase oracle defined by a boolean indicator function).
Let χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} and 0 ≤ φ < 2π. We define the quantum phase oracle Oχ(φ) to be the
unitary operator acting upon the n qubit computational basis state |x〉, where x ∈ {0, 1}n
Oχ(φ) |x〉 7→
eiφ |x〉 if χ(x) = 1|x〉 if χ(x) = 0. (2.36)
When φ = π, so that Oχ |x〉 7→ (−1)χ(x) |x〉, we will simply use the notation Oχ.
We will use the definition of the generalised quantum phase oracle within the proof of ampli-
tude amplification (see Theorem 3.6) and note that it is one of several ways that exact amplitude
amplification (see Theorem 3.11) may be implemented [BHMT02], but we will exploit the case
where φ = π for the majority of results in this thesis.
The quantum phase oracle therefore does not change the probability of measuring the state
and obtaining any particular bitstring x ∈ {0, 1}n on its own, as it only affects the relative phase
of the amplitudes of each individual computational basis states and not the magnitude. Ampli-
tude amplification (see Theorem 3.6) will later exploit this so-called phase-kickback conditioned
on a boolean function in conjunction with additional unitary operators in order to manipulate
the magnitude of the amplitudes associated to each computational basis state.
Quantum phase oracles themselves can be implemented in a variety of manners, the simplest
of which is via quantum bit oracles, which act act upon n+m qubit states and compute the value
of an arbitrary boolean vector-valued function h : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}m for each computational
basis state |x〉, but do not alter the phase.
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Definition 2.11 (Quantum bit oracle).
Let h : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}m. We define the quantum bit oracle O(b)h to be the unitary operator
acting upon the n+m qubit state |x〉 |b〉, where x ∈ {0, 1}n and |b〉 is any m qubit state where
O(b)h |x〉 |b〉 7→ |x〉 |b⊕ h(x)〉 . (2.37)
Lemma 2.12 (Implementation of the quantum phase oracle Oχ via quantum bit oracles [NC10]).
Let χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} and |−〉 = |0〉−|1〉√
2
. The action of the quantum phase oracle Oχ on the
n qubit state |x〉, where x ∈ {0, 1}n may be implemented by a single application of the quantum
bit oracle O(b)χ upon the n+ 1 qubit state |x〉 |−〉, so that
(Oχ ⊗ I) |x〉 |−〉 = O(b)χ |x〉 |−〉 . (2.38)
If a single qubit is initialised and kept in the state |−〉 = HX |0〉, then the computational
resources required to implement Oχ are then identical to those required to implement O(b)χ .
Proof. This can be seen via direct computation as
O(b)χ |x〉 |−〉 = |x〉 |− ⊕ χ(x)〉 = (−1)χ(x) |x〉 |−〉 = (Oχ ⊗ I) |x〉 |−〉 (2.39)
as












= − |−〉 . (2.41)
The quantum state |−〉 can be easily initialised at the beginning of the quantum computation
via the application of an X gate to the |0〉 state followed by a Hadamard (H) gate, so that
HX |0〉 = H |1〉 = |0〉 − |1〉√
2
= |−〉 . (2.42)
An alternative method of implementing Oχ via O(b)χ is to use an ancillae initialised to |0〉, two









|x〉 |χ(x)〉 = (−1)χ(x)O(b)†χ |x〉 |χ(x)〉 = (−1)χ(x) |x〉 |0〉 . (2.43)
At first glance this appears to be almost twice as expensive as the method described in Lemma
2.12, but neither decomposition takes into account the fact that implementing quantum bit
oracles for non-trivial boolean indicactor functions usually requires ancilla qubits to implement
and quantum evaluations, which must be executed once to compute χ(x) and then run in reverse
to ensure that the ancillae qubits used form a tensor product with the rest of the quantum state.
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Definition 2.13 (Quantum evaluation).
Let h : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}m. We define the quantum evaluation Eh to be the unitary operator
acting upon the w +m+ n qubit state |0w〉 |0m〉 |x〉, where x ∈ {0, 1}m
Eh |0w〉 |0m〉 |x〉 7→ |g(x)〉 |h(x)〉 |x〉 (2.44)
and g(x) ∈ {0, 1}w is the end state of the working memory used to compute h(x) ∈ {0, 1}m.
Lemma 2.14 (Implementation of quantum bit oracles via quantum evaluations).
Let h : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}m. The action of the quantum bit oracle O(b)h on the n+m qubit state
|x〉 |b〉, where x ∈ {0, 1}n and |b〉 is any m qubit state can be implemented by one application of
Eh, one application of E†h and m ∧1(X) gates, so that(
Iw+m ⊗O(b)h
)
|0w〉 |0m〉 |x〉 |b〉 = |0w〉 |0m〉 |x〉 |b⊕ h(x)〉 (2.45)
is equivalent to the compute-copy-uncompute paradigm given by the sequence
|0w〉 |0m〉 |x〉 |b〉 Eh7→ |g(x)〉 |h(x)〉 |x〉 |b〉
∧k(X)⊗m7→ |g(x)〉 |h(x)〉 |x〉 |b⊕ h(x)〉 (2.46)
E†h7→ |0w〉 |0m〉 |x〉 |b⊕ h(x)〉 .
Proof. By inspection and equivalence of (2.45) and (2.46).
By lemmas 2.12 and 2.14, we can therefore implement the quantum phase oracle Oχ for any
χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} so long as we can implement the quantum evaluation Eχ.
Lemma 2.15 (Implementation of the generalised quantum phase oracle).
Let χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} and 0 ≤ φ < 2π. The generalised quantum phase oracle Oχ(φ) can be
implemented via using n+ w + 1 qubits and the sequence E†χ (I⊗n+w ⊗Rφ) Eχ.
Proof. We recall that the single-qubit phase-shift gate (see Section 2.2.5) is defined by the unitary









|g(x)〉 |x〉 |χ(x)〉 (2.47)
7→ E†χ(eiφ)χ(x) |g(x)〉 |x〉 |χ(x)〉 (2.48)
7→ (eiφ)χ(x) |0w〉 |x〉 |0〉 (2.49)
We therefore have several methods of implementing quantum phase oracles — an ancilla-based
method exploiting the state |−〉 for the case where φ = π and a method for the generalised
case.We now turn how we can concretely implement quantum evaluations via quantum circuitry.
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2.3.1 Contructing quantum evaluations for arbitrary boolean functions
We rely upon on the well-known fact that the set of boolean logic gates {∧,⊕,¬} is a univer-
sal gate set, in that they can be used to create a circuit which computes any given boolean-
vector-valued function h : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}m. The exact unitary operations we use are the set
{X,∧1(X),∧2(X)} — which are also known respectively as the X gate, the controlled-NOT (or
CNOT) gate and the Toffoli gate. Other gates will prove are useful, such as the ∧k(X) gate
for k > 2 (sometimes referred to as the k-fold controlled-NOT gate, k + 1 bit Toffoli gate or
k + 1-bit Multiple Control Toffoli (MCT) gate), SWAP and ∧1(SWAP ) (the Fredkin) gates,
but can be implemented directly via the set {X,∧1(X),∧2(X)}. We now list these quantum
gates and their implementation costs in the Clifford+T universal quantum gate set (see Section
2.2.2), providing their notation in the quantum circuit-model of computation. We list their costs
in the Clifford+T universal gate set in Table 2.1.
2.3.1.1 The X gate
The X gate acts upon the single qubit basis state |x〉, where x ∈ {0, 1} and can be interpreted
as flipping this bit or performing the addition x⊕ 1, so that
X |x〉 7→ |¬x〉 or equivalently X |x〉 7→ |x⊕ 1〉 . (2.50)
X has the quantum circuit representation
|x〉 X |x⊕ 1〉
Figure 2-3: The X gate.
We will treat the X gate as a primitive Clifford gate.
2.3.1.2 The ∧1(X) or controlled-NOT (CNOT) gate
The ∧1(X) gate acts upon the two qubit basis state |x1〉 |x2〉, where xi ∈ {0, 1}, and can be
interpreted as performing the reversible exclusive-or operation x2 ⊕ x1, so that
∧1(X) |x1〉 |x2〉 7→ |x1〉 |x1 ⊕ x2〉 . (2.51)
The first qubit is known as the control qubit whilst the second is known as the target qubit. ∧1(X)
has the quantum circuit representation
|x1〉 • |x1〉
|x2〉 |x2 ⊕ x1〉
Figure 2-4: The ∧1(X) gate.
The ∧1(X) is also known as the controlled-NOT or CNOT gate and is a primitive Clifford gate.
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2.3.1.3 The ∧2(X) or Toffoli gate
The ∧2(X) (or Toffoli) gate acts upon the three qubit basis state |x1x2〉 |x3〉, where xi ∈ {0, 1},
and can be interpreted as performing the reversible multiplication x1 ∧ x2 = x1 · x2, so that
∧2(X) |x1x2〉 |x3〉 7→ |x1x2〉 |x1 ⊕ (x1 ∧ x2)〉 . (2.52)
The qubits x1 and x2 are known as the control qubits whilst x3 is known as the target qubit.
∧2(X) has the quantum circuit representation
|x1〉 • |x1〉
|x2〉 • |x2〉
|x3〉 |x3 ⊕ (x1 · x2)〉
Figure 2-5: The ∧2(X) gate.
The Toffoli gate can be implemented in a number of ways, but it has been proven that it requires a
minimum of 7 T gates to implement [GKMR14]. It can be implemented efficiently with a T -depth
of 4 using no additional ancillae, or with a T -depth of 1 with four clean ancillae [AMM14]. We
will use the following quantum circuit for the Toffoli gate for our quantum resource estimations
• T † • T † T † S •
• = T • • T † •
H T • T • H
Figure 2-6: The logical Toffoli gate decomposed into Clifford+T gates [AMMR13, Sel13].
which has a Clifford count of 10, a T -count of 7, a T -depth of 3 and an overall depth of 10.
2.3.2 The ∧k(X) gate (for k ≥ 3)
The ∧k(X) (sometimes referred to as the k-fold controlled-NOT gate, the k+1-bit Toffoli gate or
the Multiple Control Toffoli (MCT) gate), acts upon the k+1 qubit basis state |x1 . . . xk〉 |xk+1〉,
where xi ∈ {0, 1}, and is a generalisation of the ∧1(X) and ∧2(X) gates so that
∧k(X) |x1 . . . xk〉 |xk+1〉 7→ |x1 . . . xk〉 |xk+1 ⊕ (x1 ∧ · · · ∧ xk)〉 . (2.53)
The qubits x1, . . . , xk are referred to as the control qubits whilst xk+1 is referred to as the target







|xk+1〉 |xk+1 ⊕ (x1 ∧ · · · ∧ xk)〉
Figure 2-7: The ∧k(X) gate.
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There are a variety of methods to implementing the ∧k(X) gate, the most basic of which is via a
network of Toffoli gates [BBC+95] using one ancilla qubit which begins and ends in the state |0〉.
Other methods exploit relative phase Toffoli gates in order to make computational gains over
this method [Mas16]. Both of these methods use at least one ancilla qubit and O(k) quantum
gates and it is known that implementing the ∧k(X) gate will require O(k2) quantum gates if no
ancilla are available [BBC+95].
Theorem 2.16 (Implementation of ∧3(X) using one ancilla [Mas16]).
A ∧3(X) gate may be implemented using 1 ancilla qubit that begins and ends in the same
arbitrary state and requires a circuit count and depth of 20 Clifford gates and 16 T gates.











ancilla qubits, which begin and end
in the same arbitrary state. This circuit requires a circuit count and depth of 12k − 18 Clifford
gates and a circuit count and depth of 8k − 8 T gates.
Theorem 2.18 (Implementation of ∧k(X) with one ancilla (Lemma 7.3 [BBC+95])).
Let k ≥ 3 and r ∈ {2, . . . , k − 1}. A ∧k(X) gate can be implemented with one ancilla qubit
which begins and ends in the same arbitrary state and the serial application of two ∧r(X) gates
and two ∧k−r+1(X) gates, assuming there are sufficient ancilla to implement these smaller gates.
Proof. Let ∧k(X) be defined as acting upon the basis state |x1 . . . xrxr+1 . . . xk〉 |b〉 |y〉, where |b〉
is the ancilla bit in an arbitrary state, |y〉 is the target qubit and b, y ∈ {0, 1}. If we apply one
∧r(X) gate with the controls set to be |x1 . . . xr〉 and the target set to be the ancilla bit |b〉, then
the computational basis state is now
|x1 . . . xrxr+1 . . . xk〉 |b⊕ (x1 ∧ · · · ∧ xr)〉 |y〉 . (2.54)
Applying a single ∧k−r+1(X) gate with the controls set to be |xr+1 . . . xk〉 and the ancilla qubit,
with the target qubit set to be the output qubit of the ∧k(X) gate then leaves us in the state
|x1 . . . xrxr+1 . . . xk〉 |b⊕ (x1 ∧ · · · ∧ xr)〉 |y ⊕ (b ∧ xr+1 ∧ · · · ∧ xk)⊕ (x1 ∧ · · · ∧ xr ∧ xr+1 ∧ · · · ∧ xk)〉 , (2.55)
owing to the distributive property of ⊕ and ∧. Applying another ∧r(X) gate with the controls
set to be |x1 . . . xr〉 and the target set to be the ancilla qubit then resets the ancilla, giving us
|x1 . . . xrxr+1 . . . xk〉 |b〉 |y ⊕ (b ∧ xr+1 ∧ · · · ∧ xk)⊕ (x1 ∧ · · · ∧ xr ∧ xr+1 ∧ · · · ∧ xk)〉 . (2.56)
The final ∧k−r+1(X) gate is then applied, with the controls set to be |xr+1 . . . xk〉 and the ancilla
bit, with the target being the output bit. This leaves us in the state
|x1 . . . xrxr+1 . . . xk〉 |b〉 |y ⊕ (x1 ∧ · · · ∧ xr ∧ xr+1 ∧ · · · ∧ xk)〉 , (2.57)
completing the implementation of the ∧k(X) gate as described in Theorem 2.18.
49
Theorem 2.19 follows from one suggested by Dr. Dmitri Maslov in personal communication.
Theorem 2.19 (Clifford+T cost of implementing ∧k(X) using one ancilla qubit).
Let k ≥ 7. A ∧k(X) gate can be implemented using one ancilla qubit that starts and ends in the
same arbitrary state and the serial application of 24k − 48 Clifford gates and 16k − 16 T gates.





and m2 = k−m1 + 1. We can then use two ∧m1(X)
gates and two ∧m2(X) gates and one ancilla qubit as in Theorem 2.18 to implement the ∧k(X)
gate. As these gates are operated in serial, the ∧m1(X) gate has k −m1 + 1 qubits available at
all times that can act as ancilla qubits — as k −m1 + 1− dm1−22 e ≥ 0 for k ≥ 7 (see below), we
will always have enough ancilla qubits to enable the action of ∧m1(X). The ∧m2(X) gate has
k −m2 + 1 qubits available at all times and as k −m2 + 1− dm2−22 e ≥ 0 for k ≥ 7 (see below),
we always have enough ancilla qubits to enable the action of ∧m1(X). The result follows.






































which holds when k ≥ 7.




















≥ 0 for k ≥ 7





k − k+22 − 1
2
− 1 = k
4
+ 1, (2.59)
which is clearly satisfied when k ≥ 7.
2.3.2.1 The SWAP gate
The SWAP gate acts upon the two qubit computational basis state |x1〉 |x2〉, where xi ∈ {0, 1}
and can be interpreted as simply swapping the values of these two bits, so that
SWAP |x1〉 |x2〉 7→ |x2〉 |x1〉 . (2.60)
The SWAP gate has the following quantum circuit representation and can be implemented by
three CNOT gates. The SWAP gate has many uses in quantum computation — in particular it
|x1〉 × |x2〉 •
|x2〉 × |x1〉 = • •
Figure 2-8: The SWAP gate.
can be used to bypass problems with the topology of connections between qubits or it can simply
be used to relabel qubits (though this may as well be done by simply relabelling the wires).
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2.3.2.2 The ∧1(SWAP ) (Fredkin) gate
The ∧1(SWAP ) (also known as the Fredkin) gate acts upon the three qubit basis state |x1〉 |x2x3〉,
where xi ∈ {0, 1}, and can be interpreted as performing a controlled-SWAP operation on the the
second two qubits if and only if x1 = 1, so that
∧1(SWAP ) |x1〉 |x2x3〉 7→
|x1〉 |x3x2〉 if x1 = 1|x1〉 |x2x3〉 if x1 = 0. (2.61)
We will later use the ∧1(SWAP ) gate in the implementation of a quantum counter, which was
first suggested by Schwabe and Westerbaan [SW16] and has applications to low-qubit implemen-
tations of quantum oracles, which we discuss in Section 2.4.3.
2.3.2.3 A conversion dictionary between reversible circuits and quantum circuits
We therefore have a set of quantum gates {X,∧1(X),∧2(X),∧k(X), SWAP,∧1(SWAP )}<∞k=3
which act purely upon the computational basis states and can be used to implement quantum
evaluations. The set {X,∧1(X),∧2(X)} is clearly equivalent to the universal boolean logic gate
set {¬,⊕,∧} and the other quantum gates we describe ∧k(X), SWAP and ∧1(SWAP ) are
simply tools in that they provide efficient quantum realisations of useful circuits.
By the above, it is clear that designing a basic quantum evaluation based upon a classical
circuit-design requires no more theory than that required for designing reversible classical circuits
using these components. Given a suitable framework or formula, such as Equation (3.36) which
describes the circuit-complexity of Grover’s algorithm, it is then a simple matter to compute the
cost of executing Grover’s algorithm if we have a dictionary to assign each reversible gate a cost
in terms of quantum-gates relative to a universal gate set (see Section 2.2.1) of choice. In this
thesis our fixed choice of univeral quantum gate set is the Clifford+T gate set (see Section 2.2.2)
and we provide such a dictionary in Table 2.1 below. In this thesis we follow this methodology,
designing reversible circuits and translating the costs via Table 2.1.
Clifford T Total T Total Qubits/ Notes
gates gates size depth depth ancillae
X 1 0 1 0 1 1/0 We include X ∈ Clifford
Z 1 0 1 0 1 1/0 We include Z ∈ Clifford
H 1 0 1 0 1 1/0
∧1(X) 1 0 1 0 1 2/0 CNOT gate
∧2(X) 10 7 17 3 10 3/0 Toffoli gate [Sel13]
∧3(X) 20 16 36 20 36 4/1 (ancilla in state |x〉) Theorem 2.16
∧4(X) 30 24 54 24 54 5/1 (ancilla in state |x〉) Theorem 2.17
∧5(X) 42 32 74 32 74 6/2 (ancilla in state |xx〉) Theorem 2.17
∧6(X) 54 40 94 40 94 7/2 (ancilla in state |xx〉) Theorem 2.17
∧k(X) 24k − 48 16k − 16 40k − 64 16k − 16 40k − 64 k + 1/1 k ≥ 7 (ancilla in state |x . . . x〉) Theorem 2.18
SWAP 3 0 3 0 3 2/0 —
∧1(SWAP) 10 7 17 5 10 3/0 Fredkin gate [AMMR13]
Table 2.1: Useful circuit costs in the Clifford+T universal quantum gate set.
We therefore have all the tools we need to implement and derive the cost of quantum evalua-
tions and have discussed the implementation of the quantum phase oracle Oχ by these methods.
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Ultimately it is important to understand that it is the action of the quantum phase oracle
that it important — if we can implement it via more efficient quantum algorithms or other
methods, then all the better. As we will later see, the execution cost or circuit-complexity of the
implementation of the quantum phase oracle has a very real impact upon Grover’s algorithm (see
Section 3.2.1). It is this overhead in Grover’s algorithm that stems from implementing quantum
phase oracles via quantum evaluations and the analysis of methods that can be used to overcome
these costs that motivates this thesis.
2.3.3 The implementation of −O0n(φ)
We briefly discuss the implementation of one specific unitary operator that will be required for
the theory of amplitude amplification (see Theorem 3.6), that of −O0n(φ), which is simply a
quantum phase oracle with a negative phase. The negative phase is not technically required as
it simply adds an invisible global phase, but is relatively cheap to implement.
Definition 2.20 (The boolean-function 0n : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}).
We define 0n : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}, the indicator function for the zero-bitstring, by the function
0n(x) 7→
1 if x = 0n0 if x 6= 0n. (2.62)
The boolean function 0n : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} in conjunction with a phase 0 ≤ φ < 2π naturally
defines the quantum phase oracle O0n(φ).
Theorem 2.21 (Clifford+T Implementation cost of −O0n(φ)).
Let n ≥ 8 and let 0 ≤ φ < 2π and 0n : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} be as in Definition 2.20. The unitary
operator −O0n(φ) can be implemented using a quantum circuit which requires one Rφ gate in
addition to at most 50n − 142 Clifford gates and 32n − 64 T gates for a total of 82n − 206
Clifford+T gates. This quantum circuit has a T gate depth of 32n− 64 and a total Clifford+T
depth of 80n− 206, in addition to the depth required by the Rφ gate. This approach requires 1
ancilla qubit in any state, for a total of n+ 1 qubits.
Proof. If we apply n − 1 X gates in parallel to the first n − 1 qubits and use a ∧n−1(X) gate
with these qubits as the controls and the final qubit as the target, then the nth bit of each
computational basis state is |1〉 if and only if the initial state was |0n〉. We need only apply a
Rφ gate to the final qubit to obtain the action of the conditional phase-kickback before restoring
the computational basis state to its original state by applying ∧n−1(X) and n−1 X gates again.
The negative phase can easily be added to this operator via applying the sequence of gates
XZXZ to a qubit that is not being operated on for at least four time-steps. It is easily checked
that this sequence maps |x〉 7→ − |x〉. The costs of this algorithm follow from Table 2.1.
We can implement the unitary operator −O0n = −O0n(π) via an approach similar to the ancilla
based oracle approach for a slightly smaller cost.
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Theorem 2.22 (Implementation cost of −O0n = −O0n(π)).
Let n ≥ 8 and 0n : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} be as in Definition 2.20. The unitary operator −O0n can be
implemented using a quantum circuit which requires at most 26n−66 Clifford gates and 16n−32
T gates. This quantum circuit has a T gate depth of 16n − 32 and a total depth of 40n − 102
Clifford+T gates. This approach requires 1 ancilla qubit in any state, for a total of n+ 1 qubits.
Proof. If we apply an X gate followed by a Hadamard gate to the nth qubit, then we have that
this qubit will be in the state |−〉 = |0〉−|1〉√
2
if it was initially |0〉 and in the state |+〉 = |0〉+|1〉√
2
if it was initially |1〉. If an X gate is applied to each of the first n − 1 qubits and a ∧n−1(X)
gate uses these qubits as controls with the nth qubit as a target, then it is plain that as the
state |+〉 is invariant with regards to the X gate and that the phase will only be altered if the
initial state was |0n〉. The H gate and n X gates can then be applied once more to restore each
computational basis state to their original values. Using this construction in conjunction with
the implementation of ∧n−1(X) as given in Theorem 2.19 gives the stated costs.
As in the proof of Theorem 2.21, the negative phase can easily be added to this operator via
applying the sequence of gates XZXZ to a qubit that is not being operated on for at least four
time-steps. The costs of this algorithm follow from Table 2.1.
It will be useful to introduce some notation to describe the cost of quantum oracles and
algorithms. We describe the cost of quantum algorithms relative to the execution of subroutines
that must be executed in serial. In this way we can derive a cost equation for a quantum
algorithm and later substitute the cost-metric we are interested in, which may be the circuit-size
or circuit-depth relative to either the total number of quantum gates or a specific quantum gate.
Definition 2.23 (Cost notation).
We use the following execution cost notation for amplitude amplification to represent the cost
(where cost can be circuit-size or circuit-depth) of a quantum circuit
• EA represents the cost of executing an arbitrary quantum algorithm or gate A.
• En̄ represents the cost of executing −O0n .
• EOχ represents the cost of executing the quantum phase oracle Oχ.
• EO(b)χ represents the cost of executing the quantum bit oracle O
(b)
χ .
• EEh represents the cost of executing the quantum evaluation Eh or E
†
h.
2.4 Quantum oracle designs for the preimage search problem
In this section we discuss several basic quantum bit oracle design patterns that can be applied to
the single-target preimage search problem (see Definition 1.2) defined by h : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}m,
Yh = {yh} ⊆ {0, 1}m and Mh = h−1(yh). The first design relies upon no structure in the function
h : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}m and is very simple, whilst the second design focuses upon exploiting
structure in the function h : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} in order to lower the number of qubits required
at the expense of the circuit-complexity of the quantum bit oracle.
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2.4.1 A direct approach
Given a quantum evaluation Eh which requires w ancilla bits for working memory, a quantum bit
oracle for the single-target preimage search problem can be implemented by the serial application
of Eh, at most m X gates executed in parallel, one ∧m(X) gate, at most m X gates executed
in parallel and one application of E†h. This approach requires n + w + m + 1 qubits and has an
execution cost of at most 2EEh + 2EX⊗m +∧m(X). This is easily seen as executing Eh computes
|x〉 |0w〉 |0m〉 |0〉 7→ |x〉 |g(x)〉 |h(x)〉 |0〉 (2.63)
and we can then use at most m X gates to compute
|x〉 |g(x)〉 |h(x)⊕ yh ⊕ 1m〉 |0〉 (2.64)
before applying one ∧m(X) gate to compute the output bit, so that we obtain
|x〉 |g(x)〉 |h(x)⊕ yh ⊕ 1m〉 |h(x)
?
= yh〉 . (2.65)
Applying at most m X gates and executing E†h again then clearly returns us to the state
|x〉 |0w〉 |0m〉 |h(x) ?= yh〉 , (2.66)
which gives us the action of the quantum bit oracle for the single-target preimage search problem.
2.4.2 A low-memory approach
An alternative approach is possible if the problem admits a constraint-based decomposition. This
approach is a generalisation of the method introduced by Schwabe and Westerbaan [SW16] for
an approach to designing a quantum bit oracle for the MQ problem over F2 which requires
n + dlog2 (m+ 1)e + 2 qubits for a quantum oracle using this design pattern compared to the
n+m+2 qubits that the depth optimal approach described in Section 2.4.1. We generalise their
approach in this section, then give concrete oracle costs in Sections 2.5 and 2.6.
Definition 2.24 (Constraint based decomposition of χ).
Let χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} and k ≥ 2. If we know the existence of χ1, . . . , χk : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}
such that each χi 6= χj for i 6= j, no χi is constant and
χ(x) = χ1(x) ∧ · · · ∧ χk(x), (2.67)
then we say that χ admits a constraint based decomposition.
The constraint based decomposition is simply a special-case of those traditionally exploited
in Constraint Satisfaction Problems (CSP), as each χi may involve all variables whereas CSP
constraints often involve only a subset of variables. Each χi has both an associated implemen-
tation cost for the corresponding quantum bit oracle O(b)χi and evaluation Eχi , which are both
assumed to require wi ancilla bits to compute and a set of Mχi = |χ−1i (1)| preimages.
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It may hold that EO(b)χi
≈ EO(b)χj
(also EEχi ≈ EEχj ) and Mχi ≈ Mχj for i 6= j or that these
values will be very different. In the cases we examine, that of the MQ problem over F2 and
cryptanalysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard, it will hold that the execution costs will be
nearly identical and whilst Mχi 6= Mχj , they will follow the same probability distribution.
Given an instance of a search problem exhibiting a constraint-based decomposition, we could
simply treat the decomposition as an instance of the single-target preimage search problem where
h : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}k is defined by h(x) 7→ χ(x) and Yh = {1k}. If we use the quantum evalu-




wi + k + 1 qubits and has a cost of 2
k∑
i=1
EEχi + E∧k(X) as we compute
|x〉 |0w1〉 . . . |0wk〉 |0k〉 |0〉 7→ |x〉 |g1(x)〉 . . . |gk(x)〉 |χ1(x) . . . χk(x)〉 |0〉 (2.68)
and then use a single ∧k(X) gate to compute the output bit
|x〉 |g1(x)〉 . . . |gk(x)〉 |χ1(x) . . . χk(x)〉 |χ1(x) ∧ · · · ∧ χk(x)〉 (2.69)
before applying E†χ1 , . . . , E
†
χk to leave us in the state
|x〉 |0w1〉 . . . |0wk〉 |0k〉 |χ1(x) ∧ · · · ∧ χk(x)〉 . (2.70)
We next examine how we can reduce the number of ancilla qubits at the cost of the circuit-
complexity via using quantum bit oracles instead of quantum evaluations.
Setting w̄ = max{wi}ki=1, we can execute O
(b)
χ1 , . . . ,O
(b)
χk−1 , Eχk in serial, giving us the state
|x〉 |0w̄〉 |0k〉 |0〉 7→ |x〉 |gk(x)〉 |χ1(x) . . . χk(x)〉 |0〉 (2.71)
as the w̄ ancilla qubits are enough to compute any one of these unitary operators. A single
∧k(X) gate is then enough to compute the output bit of the quantum oracle O
(b)
χ , giving us
|x〉 |gk(x)〉 |χ1(x) . . . χk(x)〉 |χ1(x) ∧ · · · ∧ χk(x)〉 . (2.72)
Finally, we need only execute E†χk ,O
(b)
χk−1 , . . . ,O
(b)
χ1 in serial to obtain the state
|x〉 |0w̄〉 |0k〉 |χ1(x) ∧ · · · ∧ χk(x)〉 , (2.73)
giving us the action of the quantum oracle O(b)χ . This approach requires n+ max{wi}ki=1 + k+ 1





+ 2EEχk + E∧k(X). (2.74)
This method is inherently serial and, as EO(b)χi
≈ 2EEχi for the problems we examine, this approach
approximately doubles the quantum circuit-size of the quantum bit oracle over the direct method.
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2.4.3 A counter-based approach
Schwabe and Westerbaan’s counter-based oracle uses this approach to reduce the number of
ancilla bits used for memory and additionally reduces the dependence on requiring k qubits to
store |χ1(x) . . . χk(x)〉, requiring only n + max{wi}ki=1 + dlog2(k + 1)e + 1 qubits. The counter-
based approach consists of using a counter register consisting of c qubits, which records only
how many of χ1(x), . . . , χk(x) have been satisfied — not which ones. Assuming that |z1 . . . zc〉
represents the counter register, we have that the procedure consists of the following:
– For i = 1, . . . , k
• Execute Eχi to compute |x〉 |gi(x)〉 |χi(x)〉 |z1 . . . zc〉.
• Perform an increment of the counter controlled upon |χi(x)〉.
• Execute E†χi to restore the state to |x〉 |0w̄〉 |0〉 |z′1 . . . z′c〉.
– Via applying at most c X gates, a single ∧c(X) gate and at most another c X gates, we
output |1〉 if and only if the counter has been incremented k times.
– For i = k, . . . , 1
• Execute Eχi to compute |x〉 |gi(x)〉 |χi(x)〉 |z1 . . . zc〉.
• Perform a decrement of the counter controlled upon |χi(x)〉.
• Execute E†χi to restore the state to |x〉 |0w̄〉 |0〉 |z′1 . . . z′c〉.
The counter-register itself can be implemented using only c = dlog2(k + 1)e qubits to represent
a maximum of k possible increments. The counter-register encodes a number from 0 to k by
allowing the c bits of each computational basis state to represent a non-zero element of the ring
F2[Z]/ (p(Z)), where p(Z) is a primitive polynomial of degree c. In this way we have that
|z1 . . . zc〉 ↔ z1Z0 + z2Z1 + · · ·+ zcZc−1 (2.75)
By standard properties of this ring, the action of multiplication by Z on a non-zero element
of F2[Z]/ (p(Z)) induces a permutation of the 2c − 1 non-zero elements of this ring. Hence if we
start the counter register in the state |z1 . . . zc〉 6= |0c〉 and perform a controlled multiplication by
Z for increments or Z−1 for decrements, then the counter can be easily implemented. The exact
element that corresponds to the counter register being incremented k times is easily precomputed





1 + · · ·+ zcZc−1
)
.
We first discuss how an increment of the counter can be performed, noting that if we wish to
decrement, then we simply need run this procedure in reverse. An increment is simply multipli-
cation of a ring element by Z and is done in two stages. First, a multiplication by Z is performed
in the ring F2[Z]/ (Zc + 1), which corresponds to mapping
|z1z2 . . . zc−1zc〉 7→ |zcz1 . . . zc−2zc−1〉 . (2.76)
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This can be performed via the serial application of c − 1 SWAP gates. An addition of the
element p(Z)− (Zc + 1) is then performed, controlled on the value of zc. This can be performed
via at most c − 1 ∧1(X) gates. As a controlled SWAP gate is a ∧1(SWAP ) or Fredkin gate
and a controlled ∧1(X) gate is simply a ∧2(X) or Toffoli gate, a single controlled increment or
decrement therefore costs (c− 1) · (E∧1(SWAP ) + E∧2(X)).
As we need not uncompute or compute the working memory |gk(x)〉 for the correctness
to be preserved and we can leave the most expensive quantum evaluation til last, we can
save one execution of E†χk and Eχk . A counter-based quantum-bit oracle therefore requires




EEχi + 2EEχk + 2k(dlog2(k + 1)e − 1) ·
(
E∧1(SWAP ) + E∧2(X)
)
+ 2EX⊗dlog2(k+1)e + E∧dlog2(k+1)e(X)
. (2.77)
The counter-based approach therefore requires approximately double the circuit-size of the direct
approach, but is advantageous in terms of the number of qubits required as it both allows us to
reuse the ancilla qubits used to compute and record the fulfillment of the constraints χ1, . . . , χk.
2.5 Quantum evaluations and bit oracles for the MQ problem
We now examine how the above frameworks impact upon the design of a quantum bit oracle
for the MQ problem over F2. We first discuss the design principles used by Schwabe and
Westerbaan, relating how they fit into the above framework.
2.5.1 Previous work by Schwabe and Westerbaan







, where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and 1 ≤ k ≤ m and a vector v = (v1, . . . , vm) ∈ Fm2 . These
describe a system of degree-two equations over F2 whose solution is the vector (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fn2




i,j xixj = 0. (2.78)
A transformation is then applied in a classical preprocessing phase to convert this cube into form
they refer to as a convenient transformation. Their core results are in the design of the quantum
bit oracle and we present these results using a standard and more intuitive representation of a
quadratic equation over F2. It is clear that any degree-two equation f (i) ∈ F2[x1, . . . , xn] has the
representation










i xi + c
(k), (2.79)
owing to the fact that xjxi = xixj and xixi = xi. We will present their method in relation to
this representation, which does not change the essential nature of their results.
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Their convenient transformation essentially reduces the cube representation to that of (2.79),
ensuring that the commutative property xixj = xjxi and the identity x
2
i = xi is taken into
account and has the consequence that instead of evaluating and checking whether
f (1)(x1, . . . , xn) = · · · = f (m)(x1, . . . , xn) = 0, (2.80)
the equivalent condition of evaluating and checking whether
f̃ (1)(x1, . . . , xn) = · · · = f̃ (m)(x1, . . . , xn) = 1 (2.81)
is satisfied is performed, where
f̃ (k)(x1, . . . , xn) = f
(k)(x1, . . . , xn) + c
(k) + 1. (2.82)
It is easily seen that the computational resources required to evaluate f (k)(x1, . . . , xn) and
f̃ (k)(x1, . . . , xn) are essentially identical. The quantum bit oracle designs are then those given in
Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3, with k = m and each constraint defined by χi(x1 . . . xn) = f̃
(k)(x1, . . . , xn).
We have simply generalised their methods in these sections. All that remains is to examine their
method of implementing the quantum bit oracles Of (i) and quantum evaluations Ef (i) . We will
then easily derive the total cost of their quantum bit oracles O(b)χ for the MQ problem over F2.
A naive approach for creating these primitives would be evaluating f (k)(x1, . . . , xn) via the
addition of each term of f (k)(x1, . . . , xn) to an equation register (consisting of a single qubit)
which holds the result of the evaluation. This would require at most 1 X gate for the addition of
c(k), at most n ∧1(X) gates for the addition of the b(k)i xi terms and at most
n2−n
2 ∧2(X) gates.
Whilst this can be done using no ancilla bits, this proves to be a large number of ∧2(X) gates,
which as we recall (see Section 2.3.1.3) require 10 Clifford gates and 7 T gates to implement.
Schwabe and Westerbaan instead suggest an alternative approach which requires only n ∧2(X)
gates per equation, with the majority of the work being done via ∧1(X) gates. The basic
strategy that Schwabe and Westerbaan employ for evaluating a single equation f (k)(x1, . . . , xn)
is to observe the decomposition















i,j xj , (2.83)
using a single ancilla qubit to act as a temporary storage register to compute each |y(k)i 〉, which
starts and ends in the state |0〉. The procedure consists of the following.
Add c(k) to the output register. Then for i = 1, . . . , n:
• Compute |y(k)i 〉 using the ancilla qubit using at most 1 X gate and n− i ∧1(X) gates.
• Add xiy(k)i to the register which will store |f (k)(x1, . . . , xn)〉 via a single ∧2(X) gate.
• Uncompute |y(k)i 〉 using the ancilla qubit using at most 1 X gate and n− i ∧1(X) gates.
The above procedure clearly implements the quantum bit oracle O(b)
f (k)
and requires n+ 2 qubits.
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In terms of the total number of gates, the procedure therefore requires at most n ∧2(X) gates, n2−
n ∧1(X) gates and 2n+ 1 X gates. There construction therefore has the following requirements
#Clifford #T #Total T Total #Qubits
gates gates gates depth depth
O(b)
f̃ (k)
n2 + 11n+ 1 7n n2 + 18n+ 1 3n n2 + 10n+ 1 n+ 2
Table 2.2: Clifford+T gate costs for Schwabe and Westerbaan’s quantum bit oracle O(b)
f̃ (k)
.
This primitive can then be used in conjunction with the constraint-based quantum bit oracle
designs given in Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3. We note that Schwabe and Westerbaan describe their
circuit in terms of only the quantum bit oracles O(b)
f̃ (i)
, hence their versions of the cost Equations













+ 2m(dlog2(m+ 1)e − 1) ·
(
E∧1(SWAP ) + E∧2(X)
)
+ 2EX⊗dlog2(m+1)e + E∧dlog2(m+1)e(X)
. (2.85)
The difference will be minor in the case of theMQ problem and Grover’s algorithm, as we assume
that m ≥ n and that the implementation of the quantum evaluation Ef (k) will be identical to
the quantum bit oracle O(b)
f̃ (k)
, save simply not uncomputing the register |y(k)n 〉. The difference in
cost between a quantum evaluation and quantum bit oracle is therefore negligible in this case,
but will later be important in Chapter 6, where k will be relatively small and we are dealing
with the key-search problem instead. The two constructions therefore have the cost
Method used Section 2.4.2 Section 2.4.3
#Clifford gates 2mn2 + 22mn+ 26m− 48 4mn2 + 44mn+ (40dlog2(m+ 1)e − 36)m+ 26dlog2(m+ 1)e − 48
#T gates 14mn+ 16m− 16 28mn+ (28dlog2(m+ 1)e − 14)m+ 16dlog2(m+ 1)e − 16
#Total gates 2mn2 + 36mn+ 42m− 64 4mn2 + 72mn+ (68dlog2(m+ 1)e − 64)m+ 42dlog2(m+ 1)e − 64
T depth 6mn+ 16m− 16 12mn+ 16(dlog2(m+ 1)e − 1)m+ 16dlog2(m+ 1)e − 16
Total depth 2mn2 + 22mn+ 40m− 64 4mn2 + 44mn+ (40dlog2(m+ 1)e − 40)m+ 40dlog2(m+ 1)e − 62
#Qubits n+m+ 2 n+ dlog2(m+ 1)e+ 2
Table 2.3: Clifford+T cost of quantum bit oracles from [SW16] for instances of MQ(F2, n,m).
We will return to these costs and the full cost of quantum search using Grover’s algorithm
in conjunction with Schwabe and Westerbaan’s quantum bit oracles once we have discussed
Grover’s algorithm in Section 3.2.1. For now we now turn to the slightly optimised versions of
quantum evaluations and quantum bit oracles that we will use throughout this thesis.
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2.5.2 Our standard quantum evaluation Ef̃ (i) and quantum bit oracle Of̃ (i)
We make several changes to Schwabe and Westerbaan’s representation, which do not impact
upon the cost and will later be of benefit when it comes to quantum oracle design. The first
change is simply in the representation of the individual equations. Instead of the representation















i,j xj , (2.83)
we simply change definition of y
(k)
i so that we have the representation















j,i xj . (2.86)






′ ≤ n, involves only the variables
x1, . . . , xn′ . This will later be exploited in Chapter 4. We additionally make a minor change to









2 x2 + a1,2x1x2. (2.87)




2 to the register holding the evaluated equation with
two ∧1(X) gates and a single ∧2(X) gate, without modifying the temporary storage register. In
comparison, Schwabe and Westerbaan’s method requires that we start and end with the tempo-
rary storage register in the state |0〉, giving us a cost to add xn−1y(k)n−1 + xny
(k)
n to the equation
register of 4 X gates 4 ∧1(X) gates and 2 ∧2(X) gates. This is only a minor optimisation,
but worth noting. The quantum evaluation Ef̃ (k) corresponding to f
(k)(x1, . . . , xn) for n ≥ 2 is
therefore given by the following procedure.




1,2x1x2 to the output register via 1 X, 2 ∧1(X) and 1 ∧2(X) gates.
• For i = 3, . . . , n− 1:
• Compute |y(k)i 〉 using the ancilla qubit using at most 1 X gate and i− 1 ∧1(X) gates.
• Add xiy(k)i to the register which will store |f (k)(x1, . . . , xn)〉 via a single ∧2(X) gate.
• Uncompute |y(k)i 〉 using the ancilla qubit using at most 1 X gate and i− 1 ∧1(X) gates.
• Compute |y(k)n 〉 using the ancilla qubit using at most 1 X gate and n− 1 ∧1(X) gates.
• Add xny(k)n to the register which will store |f (k)(x1, . . . , xn)〉 via a single ∧2(X) gate.
This procedure performs the required mapping
Ef̃ (k) |x1 . . . xn〉 |0〉 |0〉 7→ |x1 . . . xn〉 |y
(k)
n 〉 |f̃ (k)(x1, . . . , xn)〉 . (2.88)
The quantum evaluation Ef̃ (k) therefore requires n + 2 qubits and at most n − 1 ∧2(X) gates,
n2 − 2n+ 1 ∧1(X) gates and 2n− 4 X gates.
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The quantum bit oracle Of̃ (k) is simply the same procedure, but with the register holding
|y(k)n 〉 uncomputed at the end, which gives us the mapping
O(b)
f̃ (k)
|x1 . . . xn〉 |0〉 |0〉 7→ |x1 . . . xn〉 |0〉 |f̃ (k)(x1, . . . , xn)〉 . (2.89)
The qubit requirement for the quantum bit oracle Of̃ (k) is therefore still n + 2 qubits and the
cost is at most n− 1 ∧2(X) gates, n2 − n ∧1(X) gates and 2n− 3 X gates.
These optimisations are minor and make only a constant difference in the cost, but the main
point of this section was to provide discussion around the construction of quantum oracles and
provide a standard worst-case formula for computing the cost of the quantum evaluation Ef̃ (k) ,
which fits into the quantum oracle design framework. With these in hand we can easily compute
the cost of our optimisations. These primitives have the costs
#Clifford #T #Total T Total #Qubits
gates gates gates depth depth
Ef̃ (k) n
2 + 10n− 13 7n− 7 n2 + 17n− 20 3n− 3 n2 + 10n− 16 n+ 2
O(b)
f̃ (k)
n2 + 11n− 13 7n− 7 n2 + 18n− 20 3n− 3 n2 + 11n− 16 n+ 2
Table 2.4: Clifford+T gate costs for the quantum evaluation and bit oracle O(b)
f̃ (k)
.
This in turn gives us the worst-case cost of the quantum evaluations and quantum bit oracles
we will use for instances of MQ(F2, n,m). We will use these costs for computations later on.
Type/Method used O(b)χ : Section 2.4.2 O(b)χ : Section 2.4.3
#Clifford gates 2mn2 + 22mn− 2n− 2m− 48 4(m− 1)(n2 + 10n− 12) + 2(n2 + 10n− 12) + 2m(dlog2(m+ 1)e − 1)20 + 2dlog2(m+ 1)e+ 24dlog2(m+ 1)e − 48
#T gates 14mn+ 2m− 16 4(m− 1)(7n− 7) + 2(7n− 7) + 2m(dlog2(m+ 1)e − 1)14 + 16dlog2(m+ 1)e − 16
#Total gates 2mn2 + 36mn− 2n+ 26m− 88 4(m− 1)(n2 + 17n− 19) + 2(n2 + 17n− 19) + 2m(dlog2(m+ 1)e − 1)34 + 2dlog2(m+ 1)e+ 40dlog2(m+ 1)e − 64
T depth 6mn+ 10m− 16 4(m− 1)(3n− 3) + 2(3n− 3) + 2m(dlog2(m+ 1)e − 1)8 + 16dlog2(m+ 1)e − 16
Total depth 2mn2 + 22mn+ 12m− 2n− 64 4(m− 1)(n2 + 10n− 14) + 2(n2 + 10n− 14) + 2m(dlog2(m+ 1)e − 1)20 + 2 + 40dlog2(m+ 1)e − 64
#Qubits n+m+ 2 n+ dlog2(m+ 1)e+ 2
Table 2.5: Clifford+T cost of quantum bit oracles for instances of MQ(F2, n,m).
2.5.3 A note on using more qubits for temporary memory
We will be predominantly interested in strategies which use few qubits in this thesis, but it is
worth noting that if we allow more qubits then the cost of quantum evaluations compared to
quantum bit oracles becomes clearer. If we allow n − 2 temporary storage registers for the for
the computation of |y(k)3 〉 . . . |y
(k)
n 〉, then we need not uncompute |y(k)i 〉 before computing |y
(k)
i+1〉.
This leads to the costs for the quantum evaluation and quantum bit oracle as given in Table 2.6.
#Clifford #T #Total T Total #Qubits





2 3n− 3 11n− 10 2n− 1
O(b)
f̃ (k)
n2 + 11n+ 10 7n− 7 n2 + 18n− 20 3n− 3 12n− 10 2n− 1





2.6 Quantum evaluations and bit oracles for AES-{128, 192, 256}
The quantum evaluation and quantum bit oracles for the key-search problem for the Advanced
Encryption Standard or AES-{128, 192, 256} (see Definition 1.5) is available in literature [GLRS16]
and we will simply use their gate metrics. We denote the AES-k block-cipher encryption function
via AES(k) : {0, 1}128 × {0, 1}k −→ {0, 1}128 and the function AES(k)Pi : {0, 1}
k −→ {0, 1}128 for




(x) 7→ AES(k)(Pi, x). (2.90)
We recall from discussion in Section 1.4 that uniquely specifying a users key requires a set
of r known plaintext-ciphertext pairs ((P1, C1), . . . , (Pr, CR)) such that we have the promise
AES(Pi,K) = Ci for i = 1, . . . , r for a single user’s keyK ∈ {0, 1}k. With respect to cryptanalysis
of a single user’s key, we expect AES-128 and AES-192 we expect to use r = 2 plaintext-ciphertext
pairs to uniquely specify a user’s key with overwhelming probability, whilst for AES-256 we will
wish to use r = 3 plaintext-ciphertexts. The authors of the original study of the implementation
cost of Grover applied to AES define their quantum oracle for the AES key-search problem via
the preimage search problem defined by the function hk,r : {0, 1}k −→ {0, 1}128r and the image
yh = C1‖ . . . ‖Cr ∈ {0, 1}128r, where
hk,r(x) 7→ AESP1(x)‖ . . . ‖AESPr(x). (2.91)
The quantum evaluation Ehk,r is itself defined by first making r − 1 copies of the search-
register |x1 . . . xk〉 using k(r− 1) ∧1(X) gates with a depth of dlog2 re. In this way the execution
of each EAESPi has access to the key we are testing and we do not need to worry about conflicting













circuit requires k + wk + 128 ancilla qubits
to implement, we have that Ehk,r requires r(k + wk + 128) qubits to implement. The quantum
bit oracle O(b)χ for the AES-k key-search problem using the direct-method from Section 2.4.1
therefore requires r(k+wk + 128) + 1 qubits, 2k(r− 1) ∧1(X) gates, 2r applications of EAES(k)Pi
,
at most 256r X gates and a single ∧128r(X) gate. The costs of the quantum evaluations are
given in Table 2.7 below.
#Clifford #T #Total T Total #Qubits















1, 956, 099 1, 505, 280 3, 461, 379 59, 904 130, 929 1, 336






It is clear that the key-search problem admits a constraint-based decomposition, so that










The quantum evaluation E(b)χi for therefore requires k + wk + 1 qubits (where wk is the number
of ancilla qubits required to implement the AES circuit in quantum hardware) and consists of
one quantum evaluation EAESPi , at most 128 X gates and one ∧128(X) gate.
We can therefore use it with the methods in Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3. As r is small, we could
use either the low-qubit approach given in Section 2.4.2, which requires k+wk + r+ 1 qubits or
the counter-based approach, which requires k + wk + dlog2(r + 1)e + 1 qubits. We will use the
counter-based approach, as it is easier to work with quantum evaluations and will demonstrate
the benefits of the approach we present in Chapter 6. The cost of the quantum bit oracles using
this method can therefore easily be computing using the formula (2.77) from Section 2.4.2 and
are given in the table below for several values of r, which again we will later use in Chapter 6.
The cost of the quantum bit oracles using these two approaches are given in Table
O(b)χ for AES(k)/r #Clifford gates #T gates #Total gates T depth Overall depth #Qubits Method
AES(128)/2 5, 527, 776 4, 247, 536 9, 775, 312 105, 456 272, 034 1, 969 Direct evaluation [GLRS16]
AES(192)/2 6, 273, 264 6, 273, 264 12, 548, 544 92, 784 204, 088 2, 225 Direct evaluation [GLRS16]
AES(256)/3 11, 745, 762 9, 037, 808 20, 783, 570 125, 936 277, 154 4, 009 Direct evaluation [GLRS16]
AES(128)/2 8, 301, 596 6, 274, 176 14, 675, 772 313, 120 695, 314 988 Counter-based (Section 2.4.3)
AES(192)/2 9, 422, 852 7, 234, 336 16, 657, 188 256, 104 612, 256 1116 Counter-based (Section 2.4.3)
AES(256)/3 19, 592, 754 15, 069, 976 34, 662, 730 616, 216 1, 360, 118 1, 340 Counter-based (Section 2.4.3)
Table 2.8: Cost of quantum bit oracles for AES-128 key-search with r plaintext-ciphertexts.
The trade-offs for a concrete problem are now clear. Chapter 6 will focus upon how to remove
many of the negative aspects of this trade-off, so that we can use the same number of qubits as
the counter-based method, but get a better quantum circuit-size than direct evaluation. We will
later require the case r = 1, which can be performed via direct evaluation.
O(b)χ for AES(k)/r #Clifford gates #T gates #Total gates T depth Overall depth #Qubits Method
AES(128)/1 2, 764, 120 2, 123, 760 4, 887, 880 103, 408 266, 915 985 Direct evaluation [GLRS16]
AES(192)/1 3, 137, 744 3, 136, 624 6, 274, 368 90, 736 198, 969 1, 113 Direct evaluation [GLRS16]
AES(256)/1 3, 915, 350 3, 012, 592 6, 927, 942 121, 840 266, 915 1, 337 Direct evaluation [GLRS16]
Table 2.9: Cost of quantum bit oracles for AES-128 key-search with r plaintext-ciphertexts.
With the construction methods of quantum oracles explained via the quantum bit oracles
for instances of theMQ(F2, n,m) problem and the costs for the key-search problem for the Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard, we will proceed to discuss the topic and applications of amplitude
amplification. We refer to these costs throughout this thesis, but from now on use only the
metrics of circuit-width (#qubits), circuit-size (#total gates) and circuit-depth (overall depth).
Given the cost framework, it is plain that the that the other metrics can also be extracted via
our cost formula if required. As we are interested in the impact upon the quantum security




”These go to eleven.”
- Nigel Tufnel[Rei84], (concerning amplification)
In this chapter we review the well-known theory of quantum amplitude amplification [BHMT02],
of which quantum search is one particular application. In Section 2.3 we introduced the concept
of quantum phase oracles and now discuss their use in conjunction with the theory of quantum
amplitude amplification in Section 3.1. We conclude by examining the application of amplitude
amplification to quantum search in Section 3.2, in the form of Grover’s algorithm and the asso-
ciated costs for solving instances of MQ(F2, n,m) (see Section 1.3) and the key-search problem
for AES (see Section 1.4) using the respective quantum oracles in Sections 2.5.2 and 2.6.
3.1 Amplitude amplification
Amplitude amplification [BHMT02] can be considered a generalisation of Grover’s quantum
search algorithm [Gro96] that utilises two components — an arbitrary quantum algorithm A
that uses no measurements and a quantum phase oracle Oχ. Whilst we can treat amplitude
amplification as a quantum algorithm in of itself, in that we can execute and measure the
quantum state, quantum amplitude amplification is better understood as a quantum sub-routine
which can be used to design quantum algorithms.
In this section we first discuss and prove the generalised amplitude amplification theorem,
then give Grover’s algorithm as a special case in Theorem 3.10. We will later move to a level of
abstraction that requires only a basic knowledge of quantum computing, but will first prove the
generalised amplitude amplification theorem in this section before discussing applications, includ-
ing Grover’s algorithm, in Section 3.2. The following simple definition is key to understanding
the theorems and results in this thesis.
Definition 3.1 (Success probability of a quantum algorithm [BHMT02]).
Let A be a measurement-free quantum algorithm acting upon n qubits and χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}.
We say that the success probability of A relative to χ is the probability that measuring the state
A |0n〉 in the computational basis results in a bitstring x ∈ {0, 1}n such that χ(x) = 1.
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In order to discuss the computational advantages that amplitude amplification offers and
provide discussion on the costs involved, we first examine a classical method discussed in the
original amplitude amplification paper [Høy00] that uses A to obtain a bitstring x ∈ {0, 1}n such
that χ(x) = 1 with high probability.
3.1.1 A classical procedure to achieve success
Suppose we possess the ability to execute an arbitrary measurement-free quantum algorithm A
which possesses a success probability of a > 0 relative to χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}. By repeatedly
creating the quantum state A |0n〉, measuring it and testing the resulting bitstring x ∈ {0, 1n}
with a classical evaluation of χ, we will eventually obtain a bitstring such that χ(x) = 1. This
can either be done in serial or parallel — we examine the serial case, but note that the procedure
is embarrassingly parallel.
The natural question is how many times must we perform the procedure described above to
achieve our objective with high probability? As the procedure can be modelled as performing
independent Bernoulli trials, the problem can be modelled as finding the expected value of a
geometric distribution. As the probability of success upon the kth attempt is
Pr[X = k] = (1− a)k−1a (3.1)









(1− a)k−1 · k (3.3)






where p = 1− a (3.4)
















= a · 1 · (1− p)− (−1) · p
(1− p)2
(3.7)







We will therefore require O( 1a) executions of A and the same number of measurements of the
quantum state A |0n〉 and classical evaluations of χ : {0, 1} −→ {0, 1}. We will return to these
costs after we have proven the amplitude amplification theorem (see Theorem 3.6).
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We note for now that we have placed special emphasis on the number of executions of A,
as opposed to the number of evaluations of χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}. We will return to this after
amplitude amplification and in the discussion concerning Grover’s algorithm (Theorem 3.10).
3.1.2 The amplitude amplification theorem
In this section we state and prove the theory behind quantum amplitude amplification. The
proof of quantum amplitude amplification will require will require an understanding of quantum
computing up the level provided in Chapter 2. After the quantum amplitude amplitude theorem
is proven (see Theorem 3.6) we will move to a higher level of abstraction that simplifies the
process of designing quantum search algorithms in this thesis.
The amplitude amplification subroutine can be executed with any quantum phase oracle Oχ
which is defined by (or defines) a boolean function χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} and any quantum
algorithm A that uses no measurements. Whilst it has been proven that if A implements a
uniformly randomly chosen unitary operator U ∈ C2n×2n , almost any transformation will work
for quantum search [Gro98], we will wish to make specific choices for A. Whilst eventually both
the quantum phase oracle and chosen quantum algorithm have to be implemented and each have
an associated cost, we will ignore the costs in this section and deal only with the mathematical
model of quantum computation so that each quantum algorithm acting on n qubits (plus any
number of ancillae qubits required for implementing their action efficiently) may be treated as a
unitary operator acting upon the complex Hilbert space C2n .
We will prove the general case of amplitude amplification, which can exploit quantum phase
oracles defined by an arbitrary phase angle 0 ≤ φ < 2π, as we lose nothing by this approach and
the results required by this thesis are easily obtained by simple substitution of φ = π. We first
require some basic definitions and terms
Definition 3.2 (Boolean projection operators).
Let χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} be any boolean function and H be the complex Hilbert space of
dimension 2n with the computational basis {|x〉 : x ∈ {0, 1}n}. We define the pair of boolean










This gives us a way method of representing any n qubit quantum state |ψ〉 in relation to a
boolean function χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}.
Lemma 3.3 (Boolean partition of Hilbert spaces).
Let H be the complex Hilbert space of dimension 2n. All boolean functions χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}
partition H into the direct sum of two subspaces, so that H = H0 ⊕H1, where
Hi = SpanC
({




Proof. Any quantum state |ψ〉 ∈ H can be expressed in the form
|ψ〉 = P (0)χ |ψ〉+ P (1)χ |ψ〉 , (3.12)
where P
(i)
χ |ψ〉 ∈ Hi, giving us the decomposition of H into the direct sum H = H0 ⊕H1.
Lemma 3.3 gives us that any quantum state |ψ〉 ∈ H has a projection onto two subspaces
defined by the boolean function χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}. In the case where χ is a constant function
then such a decomposition is clearly trivial, in that either H0 or H1 is the trivial Hilbert space.
The following proof relies upon the outer-product representation (see Theorem 2.8) of the two-
dimensional vector space spanned by these boolean projections.
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Theorem 3.4 (Action of the Amplitude Amplification iterator [BHMT02, Høy00]).
Let χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} be any boolean function and 0 ≤ φ, ϕ < 2π. Let H be the complex
Hilbert space with computational basis
{
|x〉 : x ∈ {0, 1}n
}
and A be any quantum algorithm
acting upon H which uses no measurements. We define the quantum state |Ψ〉 = A |0n〉 and
denote the projections |Ψi〉 = P (i)χ |Ψ〉 for i = 0, 1 so that |Ψ〉 = |Ψ0〉+ |Ψ1〉.
Let Oχ(ψ) and O0n(φ) be quantum phase oracles defined by the functions χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}
and 0n : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} (see Definition 2.20) and define the generalised amplification operator
Q(A, χ, φ, ϕ) = −AO0n(φ)A−1Oχ(ϕ). (3.13)
Let a = 〈Ψ1|Ψ1〉 = sin2 θa and 0 < a < 1 so that θa ∈ (0, π2 ), then we have that the action of









is given by the matrix
M(A, χ, φ, ϕ) =
[









1− a eiϕ{(1− eiφ)a− 1}
]
(3.14)
Proof. It will first be useful to express the operator Q(A, χ, φ, ϕ) in terms of projection operators








. It is clear that
















In − (1− eiφ) |Ψ〉〈Ψ|
)
= (1− eiφ) |Ψ〉〈Ψ| − In.
From the representation of Q(A, χ, φ, ϕ) by the projection operators given by (3.15) and (3.16),














































is invariant under the action of Q(A, χ, φ, ϕ).
The matrix M(A, χ, φ, ϕ) as given in Equation (3.14) is therefore sufficient to represent the action
of Q(A, χ, φ, ϕ) upon this subspace and is easily derived from Equations (3.17) and (3.18).
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Theorem 3.5 (Repeated application of Q(A, χ, π, π) [BHT98, BHMT02]).
Let χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} be any boolean function and 0 ≤ φ, ϕ < 2π. Let H be the complex
Hilbert space with computational basis
{
|x〉 : x ∈ {0, 1}n
}
and A be any quantum algorithm
acting upon H which uses no measurements. We define the quantum state |Ψ〉 = A |0n〉 and
denote the projections |Ψi〉 = P (i)χ |Ψ〉 for i = 0, 1 so that |Ψ〉 = |Ψ0〉+ |Ψ1〉.
Let a = |〈Ψ1|Ψ1〉| = sin2 θa and 0 < a < 1, such that θa ∈ (0, π2 ). Then for k ∈ N0, it holds that











In the case |〈Ψ1|Ψ1〉| = a = sin2 θa ∈ {0, 1}, it holds that Qk(A, χ, π, π)A |0n〉 = (Oχ)kA |0n〉.




























into (3.20) gives us that



































and proceed via induction. The base case for k = 0 clearly holds by examination of Equation
































































(2(k + 1) + 1)θa
)] . (3.23)
Equation (3.19) follows trivially from Equations (3.20), (3.21) and (3.22).
That Qk(A, χ, π, π)A |0n〉 is identical to the state (Oχ)kA |0n〉 when |〈Ψ1|Ψ1〉| = a ∈ {0, 1}
follows from the fact that in this case we have that |Ψ〉 = |Ψa〉 and so
Q(A, χ, π, π)A |0n〉 = −
(
In − 2 |Ψa〉〈Ψa|n
)
Oχ |Ψa〉 = Oχ(π) |Ψa〉 (3.24)
as Oχ only alters the amplitude of the state |Ψa〉, whilst −
(




Theorems 3.4 and 3.5 give us that we can construct a specific quantum state defined by
the quantum algorithm A, boolean function χ and number of times k ∈ N0 that we run the
amplitude amplification iterator. Whilst it is possible to work with these theorems directly, we
will eventually want to measure the quantum state and so it is easier to state them as Theorem
3.6, a statement close to the original formulation of the theorem [BHMT02].
Theorem 3.6 (Amplitude amplification).
Let χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} be any boolean function and A be a measurement-free quantum
algorithm with a success probability of a > 0 relative to χ. Let k ∈ N0.
Then there exists a quantum algorithm B(k) with a success probability relative to χ of
sin2
(





and which possesses an execution cost (using the notation in Definition 2.23) of
EA + k · (Eχ + En̄ + 2EA) . (3.26)
Proof. This is simply a convenient restatement of the previous two theorems in relation to Def-
initions 3.1 and 2.23. The success probability is directly obtained from Theorem 3.6 and the
computational costs are derived from Theorem 3.6 in combination with the cost of the amplitude
amplification operator from Theorem 3.5 using the cost notation from Definition 2.23.
This notation and methodology make the design and costing of quantum algorithms relatively
simple. It is now clear that we can easily assign a cost to any quantum algorithms which solely
exploit amplitude amplification and quantum evaluations/quantum bit oracles. We need simply
design the quantum algorithm, derive the cost in terms of unitary operators using Equation
(3.26) and assign each unitary operator an implementation cost using the results in Section 2.3.
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Theorem 3.7 (Quadratic speedup [BBHT96, Gro96, BHMT02]).







. Then we have that
sin2
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≥ max {a, 1− a} . (3.27)
Proof. The optimal k̂ ∈ R to ensure sin2
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However, in amplitude amplification an integer k ∈ N0 must be chosen as it represents the
















, then we obtain that
|k̂ − k| ≤ 1
2
=⇒
∣∣∣(2k̂ + 1) · arcsin√a− (2k + 1) · arcsin√a∣∣∣ ≤ arcsin√a. (3.29)




− (2k + 1) · arcsin
√
a
∣∣∣ ≤ arcsin√a (3.30)





= cos(x), we have that
=⇒
∣∣cos ((2k + 1) · arcsin√a)∣∣ ≤ ∣∣sin (arcsin√a)∣∣ = √a, (3.31)
which, by squaring both sides and using the fact that sin2(x) = 1− cos2(x), provides the bound
=⇒ sin2
(




≥ 1− a. (3.32)







= 0, then sin2 (arcsin
√
a) = a.
Theorem 3.7 gives us k, the optimal number of times to apply the amplitude amplification
operator Q(A, χ, π, π) with regards to Theorem 3.6 with the objective of creating a quantum
algorithm which succeeds with a probability of at least 1−a relative to χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}. This
gives us both a bound on the probability of success and allows us to quantify the computational
resources required to achieve this success probability.
We recall from Section 3.1.1 which describes a classical method to exploit a quantum algo-
rithm A with a success probability of a > 0 relative to χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}, that the number of
executions of A, measurements of the state and classical evaluations of χ was O( 1a). If we assume











with Theorem 3.6 to succeed with probability close to 1. This is equivalent to 2k+1 applications
of A, k applications of the quantum phase oracles Oχ, k applications of the quantum phase
oracle O0̄n and one measurement. Asymptotically, this is O(
1√
a
) applications of the quantum
algorithm A, which is clearly an advantage. A direct comparison of costs is not straight forward
and we briefly discuss this before describing applications of amplitude amplification.
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Whilst an asymptotically amazing result that we need only apply O( 1√
a
) executions of A
and quantum queries to Oχ compared to O( 1a) executions of A and classical queries to χ, there
are some crucial real-world costs in consider. In the classical procedure we perform multiple
independent executions of the quantum algorithm A and must only protect the quantum state
from noise for a relatively short period. Verification that measurement of the quantum state
A |0n〉 has produced a bitstring x ∈ {0, 1}n such that χ(x) = 1 is also performed on a classical
computer, which will be relatively cheap compared to any such execution on a quantum com-
puter. In comparison, amplitude amplification requires that the quantum state be protected
from decoherence for a long-running serial computation and that Oχ (often a costly procedure),
be executed on the quantum computer.
In this thesis we optimise in the logical quantum circuit model of computation and ignore
the requirement for error-correction, but note it for completeness. Our results should be viewed
as advantages with respect to existing quantum search procedures and their impact upon cryp-
tographic parameters— whether these optimisation help in any real-world execution of quantum
search will depend upon many engineering parameters including the error-correction scheme,
hardware tolerance and topology of connections between qubits. These costs may imply that once
we factor in real-world costs, quantum search procedures based upon amplitude amplification,
including Grover’s algorithm and the results in this thesis, may not even begin to offer an advan-
tage over classical search procedures until the search-space is large (n ≈ 55) [ADMG+16, Ghe17],
even with quantum phase oracles which are relatively inexpensive to implement and optimistic
assumptions with regards to our ability to perform error-correction.
3.2 Applications of amplitude amplification to quantum search
We now turn to examine applications of amplitude amplification. Grover’s quantum search al-
gorithm [Gro96], which we cover in Section 3.2.1 can be seen as a relatively simple application of
amplitude amplification [BHMT02] with a fixed choice of quantum algorithm A = H⊗n — the
Hadamard transform on n qubits (see Definition 3.8). The understanding of the computational
benefits it provides is often framed solely in terms of the asymptotic number of queries to the
quantum phase oracle Oχ compared to the number of classical queries of χ required by the classi-
cal search procedure described in Section 3.1.1. This is natural and helpful in understanding the
basic costs involved, as the cost of implementing Oχ for Grover’s algorithm will often dominate
the cost of A, but can be misleading if we think of amplitude amplification in these terms.
Our goal in this thesis is to examine modifications of quantum search procedures involving
amplitude amplification that can reduce the overall cost of the quantum search procedure when
the quantum phase oracle Oχ is expensive to implement. Grover’s quantum search algorithm
will be our benchmark for all comparisons. It will be essential to keep in mind that amplitude
amplification offers a quadratic reduction in both the number of quantum queries of Oχ versus
classical queries of χ and the quantum algorithm A. As we proceed to examine applications of
amplitude amplification, the first of which is Grover’s quantum search algorithm (see Theorem
3.10), we ask the reader to keep this in mind.
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In addition to Grover’s quantum search algorithm, we will describe an implementation of
exact amplitude amplification in Section 3.2.3, which has various applications — one of which is
the derandomisation of quantum search so that (at least in the logical circuit model of quantum
computation), if we know the cardinality of Mχ = |χ−1(1)|, then we can use the components of
amplitude amplification to create a quantum algorithm with a success probability of 1 relative
to χ, instead of at least max{a, 1− a}.
The nesting of quantum amplitude amplification is a common approach to the design of
quantum search algorithms [CGW00], but to the author’s knowledge has only been loosely studied
as a method to reduce the overall cost of quantum search in the logical quantum circuit model
of computation by Kimmel et al. in relation to the Search with Two Oracles (STO) problem,
which we cover and extend to real-world scenarios in Chapter 6. One notable exception is the
metaoptimisation of Grover’s quantum search algorithm by Arunachalam and de Wolf [AdW17],
which examines how a nuanced usage of amplitude amplification can reduce the number of gates
other than those used in the application of the quantum search oracle. Our methods in Section
5.2 will bear some similarity to their methods.
We first define a basic quantum algorithm, which will be used throughout this thesis.
Definition 3.8 (The Hadamard transform on n qubits).
The Hadamard transform on n qubits is the parallel application of n H (Hadamard) gates upon
n different qubits. When the qubits are contiguous, we will denote this by H⊗n.
Theorem 3.9 (The uniform superposition).
When applied to the n-qubit state |0n〉, the action of the Hadamard transform on n qubits is





H⊗n |0n〉 will be referred to as the uniform superposition of n qubits or the uniform superposition.
Proof. This can be seen by induction. The case n = 1 is simply the Hadamard transform applied
to one qubit, which produces the quantum state






by definition of the Hadamard gate (see Section 2.1.6.3), satisfying the case n = 1.













The uniform superposition H⊗n |0n〉 has the property that as the amplitude of each com-
putational basis state |x〉 is αx = 12n/2 , we have that |αx|
n = 12n . Measurement of the uniform
superposition therefore gives an equal probability of obtaining any x ∈ {0, 1}n. Knowledge of
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Mχ = |χ−1(1)| then allows us to compute the success probability of H⊗n, which is simply Mχ2n .
The success probability of H⊗n is therefore easy to estimate, as it only relies upon knowledge of
Mχ. Any other algorithm would require not only knowledge of Mχ, but partial knowledge about
the location of the solutions.
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3.2.1 Grover’s algorithm
Theorem 3.10 (Grover’s quantum search algorithm [Gro96, BBHT96]).
Let χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} and Mχ = |χ−1(1)| be known. There exists a quantum algorithm with














 · (Eχ + En̄ + 2EH⊗n) . (3.36)
Proof. If we apply amplitude amplification (see Theorem 3.6) with the quantum algorithm set to
be the Hadamard transform on n qubits so that A = H⊗n, then as H⊗n has a success probability
relative to χ of a =
Mχ
2n , we can use Theorem 3.7 to give us our choice of k and new success
probability.
If we assume that n is large and Mχ  2n, then via the small angle approximation arcsinx ≈ x,





















) queries toOχ. Zalka proved that Grover’s
algorithm is optimal [Zal99] in terms of the number of calls to the quantum phase oracle Oχ we
must make to maximise the success probability for the case Mχ = 1. This was later extended by
Fluher to the case where Mχ ≥ 1 [Flu17]. Both results are based upon the assumption that the
quantum phase oracle is treated as a black-box and that the distribution of elements x ∈ {0, 1}n
that satisfy χ(x) = 1 in the domain {0, 1}n is uniform. We will later see that if the quantum
phase oracle admits specific decompositions, then we can obtain computational gains by using
a finer-grained approach to quantum algorithms by using nested applications of amplitude am-
plification — but that the results of Zalka and Fluher still hold as we will in fact make more
queries than Grover’s algorithm requires, but to cheaper quantum oracles.
In many cases it will hold that Eχ will scale with the size of the search domain. The
approximate quantum circuit-size of Grover’s algorithm for the case Mχ = 1 will therefore be
≈ π
4
· 2n/2 · poly(n) (3.37)
and if n = 100 and poly(n) ∈ O(n3), then we have that Grover’s algorithm will require approxi-
mately 269.5 quantum gates compared to the 250 compared to the lower bound of 250 quantum
gates. The aim of this thesis is to examine how structure can be used to reduce this poly(n)
overhead imposed by the requirement to implement the quantum phase oracle Oχ.
Chapter 4 involves only Grover’s algorithm whilst Chapters 5 and 6 also involve amplitude
amplification. We first briefly consider the concrete cost of solving an instance ofMQ(F2, n,m)
and the key-search problem for the Advanced Encryption Standard using the oracles given re-
spectively in Tables 2.5 and 2.8.
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3.2.1.1 Applying Grover’s algorithm to instances of MQ(F2, n,m)
Using the quantum bit oracle designs in Table 2.5 and formula (3.36) we obtain the following
costs for Grover’s algorithm applied to instances of MQ(F2, n,m). We give the costs relative
to the parameters required to forge a Gui signature, as discussed in Section 1.3.7, recalling that
to break a security level of λ = 80, 128, 256 we must respectively solve two serial instances of
MQ(F2, 117, 117), MQ(F2, 209, 209) and MQ(F2, 457, 457).
λ MQ(F2, n,m) #Clifford #T #Total T Total #Qubits Success Oracle type
gates gates gates depth depth %
80 2 · MQ(F2, 117, 117) 2 · 279.89 2 · 274.53 2 · 279.97 2 · 274.53 2 · 279.89 236 ≈ 100.00 Low-memory [SW16]
80 2 · MQ(F2, 117, 117) 2 · 280.88 2 · 276.76 2 · 280.96 2 · 275.57 2 · 280.88 126 ≈ 100.00 Counter-based [SW16]
128 2 · MQ(F2, 209, 209) 2 · 2128.35 2 · 2123.38 2 · 2128.34 2 · 2122.18 2 · 2128.35 420 ≈ 100.00 Low-memory [SW16]
128 2 · MQ(F2, 209, 209) 2 · 2129.34 2 · 2124.42 2 · 2129.39 2 · 2123.21 2 · 2129.34 219 ≈ 100.00 Counter-based [SW16]
256 2 · MQ(F2, 457, 457) 2 · 2255.69 2 · 2249.63 2 · 2255.72 2 · 2248.42 2 · 2255.69 916 ≈ 100.00 Low-memory [SW16]
256 2 · MQ(F2, 457, 457) 2 · 2256.69 2 · 2250.65 2 · 2256.71 2 · 2249.44 2 · 2256.69 468 ≈ 100.00 Counter-based [SW16]
Table 3.1: Quantum resource estimates for solving instances of MQ(F2, n,m) using Grover.
As it plain from the above table, these security levels are safe (in terms of total number of
quantum gates) from a quantum attack via Grover’s algorithm using the quantum oracle design
principles of Schwabe and Westerbaan discussed in Section 2.5.1. This is unsuprisingly, as the
parameters were chosen [PCDY17a, PCDY17b] specifically in relation to an attack Grover’s
algorithm with Schwabe and Westerbaan’s quantum bit oracle.
3.2.2 Applying Grover’s algorithm to the key-search problem for AES
We again apply Grover’s algorithm to solving the single-target case of the key-search problem
for AES-{128, 192, 256} as discussed in Section 1.4 and with the quantum bit oracle designs
from Table 2.8. We provide quantum resource estimates for both the direct evaluation approach
used in the original paper (with a small choice of r as previously discussed in Section 1.4) and
the counter-based oracle method from Schwabe and Westerbaan’s paper [SW16] introduced in
Section 2.4.3.
AES-k/r #Clifford #T #Total T Total #Qubits Success Quantum algorithm/oracle type
gates gates gates depth depth %
128/2 286.05 285.67 286.87 280.37 281.73 1969 ≈ 100.00 Grover/direct-evaluation [GLRS16]
128/2 286.64 286.23 287.45 281.92 283.07 988 ≈ 100.00 Grover/counter-based [GLRS16]
192/2 2118.23 2118.23 2119.23 2112.2 2113.34 2225 ≈ 100.00 Grover/direct-evaluation [GLRS16]
192/2 2118.82 2118.44 2119.64 2113.63 2114.89 1340 ≈ 100.00 Grover/counter-based [GLRS16]
256/3 2151.14 2150.76 2151.96 2144.64 2145.78 4009 ≈ 100.00 Grover/direct-evaluation [GLRS16]
256/3 2151.88 2151.5 2152.7 2146.89 2148.04 1340 ≈ 100.00 Grover/counter-based [GLRS16]
Table 3.2: Quantum resource estimates for the AES key-search problem via Grover [GLRS16].
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3.2.3 Exact amplitude amplification
In this section we describe a variant of exact amplitude amplification that will later be referenced.
Theorem 3.11 (Exact amplitude amplification I [BHMT02]).
Let χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} be any boolean function and A be any measurement-free quantum
algorithm with a success probability of a > 0 relative to χ. Suppose we guess that a = ag. Then
there exists a quantum algorithm C with a success probability relative to χ of
sin2







) · (ag − a · ag
ag − a · âg
)
+
a · ag − a · âg
ag − a · âg
, (3.38)













. The success probability of C relative to χ is 1
when ag = a and C has a cost of
EB + k̂g ·
(
Eχ̂ + En+1 + 2EB
)
(3.39)
where B = A⊗Zâg/ag , we have that Zâg/a is an arbitrary single-qubit unitary transformation and
χ̂ : {0, 1}n+1 −→ {0, 1} is defined by χ̂(x1 . . . xnxn+1) 7→ 1 if and only if χ(x1 . . . xn) = xn+1 = 1.
Proof. We first describe one of several methods [BHMT02] of implementing exact amplitude
amplification when we have correctly guessed that ag = a. We then derive (3.38) and (3.39).
Guessing correctly. In this case, we have that ag = a. Our goal is to construct a quantum




− 12 is an integer, then
we are already done as Theorem 3.6 implies that the success probability after k iterations is
sin2
((
























and will construct a quantum algorithm B acting upon





< a relative to χ̂ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}, where
χ̂(x1 . . . xnxn+1) 7→
1 if χ(x1 . . . xn) = 1 and xn+1 = 10 otherwise. (3.41)
Theorem 3.6 then implies a quantum algorithm C with success probability 1 relative to χ̂ as
sin2
(














We now demonstrate how B can be constructed. We can define the single-qubit unitary operator
Zâ/a =














The quantum algorithm B = A⊗Zâ/a has a success probability relative to χ̂ of â = a · âa . If we
consider C acting upon the n-qubit state |0n〉, then C has a success probability of 1 relative to χ.
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Guessing incorrectly. If we perform the algorithm as described on the previous page, but








âg and Zâg/ag , is derived from ag instead of a. We therefore have that the quantum algorithm








relative to χ̂ whilst the quantum
algorithm C has a success probability relative to χ̂ of
c = sin2








If again we consider C as acting upon the n-qubit state |0n〉 and treating the additional qubit
as an ancilla, then we have that the probability of success of C relative to χ is the sum of the
probabilities that we measure the n + 1 quantum state and the first n bits of the measurement
result in a bitstring x ∈ {0, 1}n such that χ(x) = 1. We must therefore consider the probabilities
of the two cases where we measure x‖0 ∈ {0, 1}n+1 or x‖1 ∈ {0, 1}n+1 such that χ(x) = 1. The
case of measuring x‖1 ∈ {0, 1}n+1 such that χ(x) = 1 is simply the success probability of C
relative to χ̂ and is therefore c as given by (3.44).
The case where we measure x‖0 ∈ {0, 1}n+1 such that χ(x) = 1 can be broken down into
the product of the probability that we measure a bitstring x1 . . . xnxn+1 ∈ {0, 1}n+1 such
that χ̂(x1 . . . xnxn+1) = 0 and the conditional probability that χ(x1 . . . xn) = 1 given that
χ̂(x1 . . . xnxn+1) = 0. The probability that χ̂(x1 . . . xnxn+1) = 0 is clearly 1 − c. The prob-
ability that χ(x1 . . . xn) = 1 conditioned on χ̂(x1 . . . xnxn+1) = 0 can be derived by considering
the effect of applying the quantum algorithm B = A⊗Zâg/ag upon the state
∣∣0n+1〉.










The conditional probability that we measure x1 . . . xnxn+1 ∈ {0, 1}n+1 such that χ(x1 . . . xn) = 1











a · ag − a · âg
ag − a · âg
. (3.45)





, which can be rewritten
sin2







) · (ag − a · ag
ag − a · âg
)
+
a · ag − a · âg
ag − a · âg
, (3.46)
giving us the success probability (3.38) as stated in Theorem 3.11. It is easily verified that when
ag = a, we have that (3.46) is equal to 1. The cost of exact amplitude amplification is therefore
EB + k̂g ·
(
Eχ̂ + En+1 + 2EB
)









Exact amplitude amplification can therefore be used to derandomise Grover’s quantum search
algorithm, as if we precisely know ag = a, then we have a quantum algorithm that terminates with
a success probability of 1 with respect to χ. This holds in the mathematical model of quantum
computation, where we assume that arbitrary unitary operators can be synthesised, but in the
logical quantum circuit model of computation when we have a fixed universal quantum gate set,
we have that the correctness is dependent upon the precision to which we can implement the
single-qubit quantum gates Zâ/a. By the Solovay-Kitaev Theorem [KIT96, NC10] single-qubit
unitary operators can be efficiently using O(logc(1ε ) single-qubit gates up to an arbitrary ε > 0
level of precision, but we note that in general this implies that in any real-world scenario where
we have a fixed universal quantum gate set it will hold that this method will still possess some
probability of failure, no matter our choice of ε. However, this can be made arbitrarily small.
It is easily seen that the costs of exact amplitude amplification are slightly higher than that
required for amplitude amplification as we must perform one more iteration of a slightly more
costly amplitude amplification iterator, which requires one more qubit. The costs are therefore
comparable, but the advantages dependent upon precise knowledge (or at least an extremely
good approximation) of a, the success probability of A relative to χ, the method by which
single-qubit gates are approximated (which determines the constant c) and the use-case. If we
can only make an imprecise guess ag of a, then there is little point in using exact amplitude
amplification over amplitude amplification. We will take this approach when we later examine
the Search with Two Oracles (STO) problem [KYYLHH15] in Chapter 6 with respect to real-
world problems, where we only know the probability distribution of a. Our main objective in
introducing this formulation of exact amplitude amplification will be to demonstrate how the
solution to the STO problem as put forth by Kimmel et al. [KYYLHH15], which exploits exact





I do not think that all who choose wrong roads perish; but their rescue consists in
being put back on the right road. A wrong sum can be put right: but only by going
back till you find the error and working it afresh from that point, never by simply
going on.
- C.S. Lewis, The Great Divorce [LW45]
In this chapter we examine how the advantages of multi-target preimage search can be gen-
eralised and exploited to reduce the quantum resources required to execute Grover’s algorithm.
This chapter introduces the basic principles that we exploit, in some way or another, throughout
this thesis. In this section we examine how an Efficient Neighbour Transition Strategy (ENTS)
can be exploited to lower the quantum resources required to execute Grover’s algorithm.
4.1 Parallel approaches and the advantages of multiple-targets
Whilst it is well-known that quantum search cannot be parallelised better than by partitioning
the search domain and performing parallel searches of these partitions upon different quantum
computers [Zal99], this assumes a unit cost for the quantum oracle. We first define some termi-
nology before discussing this further.
Definition 4.1 (Bitmask set of size K).
We say that Z ⊆ {0, 1}n is a bitmask set of size 1 ≤ K ≤ 2n if |Z| = K and 0n ∈ Z.
Definition 4.2 (Bitmask neighbourhood).
Let Z ⊆ {0, 1}n be a bitmask set of size K and x ∈ {0, 1}n. We say that the set
Zx = {x⊕ z : z ∈ Z} (4.1)
is the bitmask neighbourhood of x of size K.
In this way, it is plain that as 0n ∈ Z, we have that for all x ∈ {0, 1}n we have that x ∈ Zx.
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4.1.1 The cost of a basic approach to parallel quantum search
If we consider the case of an unstructured search problem defined by χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} and
Mχ = |χ−1(1)| = 1, then if we possess the quantum phase oracle Oχ, we can define the new
quantum phase oracle OχZ
OχZ |x〉 7→
− |x〉 if ∃z ∈ Z : χ(x⊕ z) = 1|x〉 otherwise. (4.2)
Using the quantum phase oracle OχZ in conjunction with Grover’s algorithm (see Theorem
3.2.1), therefore does not give us the exact answer we are searching for and we must perform a
subsequent search procedure afterwards. The initial quantum search with OχZ as above in (4.2)
results in a bitstring x′ ∈ {0, 1}n with the property that x′ = x⊕ z for some z ∈ Z — or in other
words, x = x′ ⊕ z for some z ∈ Z. As we precisely know the K bitstrings in Z, we need simply
exhaustively evaluate χ(x′ ⊕ z) for z ∈ Z until we find the element that satisfies the original
search problem. If the set Z possesses no structure, this may be difficult via quantum search —
but if chosen according to some ordering (say z = 0n−ky ∈ {0, 1}n for |Zk| = 2k), the secondary
search can be easily performed via a subsequent quantum search.
Assuming that the quantum phase oracle Oχ requires w ancilla qubits to implement, the
quantum phase oracle OχZ requiring K(n+ w) qubits can easily be seen to be accomplished in
a depth-optimal parallel fashion by using a dlog2Ke+ 1 depth circuit involving n(K − 1) ∧1(X)
gates and at most n(K − 1) X gates to first compute (for each computational basis state)
|x⊕ z1〉 |0w〉 . . . |x⊕ zK〉 |0w〉
∣∣0K〉 where z1, . . . , zK ∈ Zx. (4.3)
K copies of the quantum phase oracle Oχ can then be executed in parallel and the copies of the
search space uncomputed. This will implement the quantum phase oracle
Oχ′Z |x〉 7→ (−1)
k |x〉 where k = |{z ∈ Zx : χ(x⊕ z) = 1}|. (4.4)
When Mχ = |χ−1(x)| = 1, we have that the action of Oχ′Z as given by (4.4) is identical to that
of Oχ as given by Oχ |x〉 7→ (−1)χ(x) |x〉. In the case where we have that for some x ∈ {0, 1}n we
have chosen Z with the property such that |{z ∈ Z : χ(x ⊕ z) = 1}| = 2k for some k, then the
approximate quantum phase oracle Oχ′Z maps
|x〉 7→ (−1)2k |x〉 = 1k |x〉 = |x〉 , (4.5)
thereby having the same effect as leaving the amplitude unchanged. In this case the quantum
phase oracle Oχ′Z fails to approximate the quantum phase oracle OχZ . In general, so long as
1 ≤ Mχ  2n, it is reasonable to assume that this approximation will hold — but we can only
guarantee this in the case where Mχ = 1. We assume that Mχ = 1 in the scenarios in this thesis.
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This approach requires K(n+w+1) qubits and has an execution cost of EOχ′
Z
= K ·EOχ plus
the cost of computing and uncomputing the K−1 copies of the register |x〉 and the bitmasks. By
the above discussion this cost has a circuit-depth of 2dlog2Ke+ 2 and a circuit-size of 4n(K−1)
Clifford gates. If we assume EOχ′
Z
dominates all other costs, then we have that whilst the









· 2(n−k)/2 · E(b)Oχ (4.6)









· 2(n+k)/2 · E(b)Oχ . (4.7)
This form of parallelism is therefore useful in terms of reducing the quantum circuit-depth,
but will actually increase the total circuit-size of the quantum computation. As Zalka has
proved [Zal99], there is essentially no benefit to running Grover’s algorithm in parallel on one
quantum computer compared to running multiple smaller instances on many separate quantum
computers. This was proved relative to the number of calls to the quantum phase oracle Oχ, but
when real-world factors such as the additional circuitry, the difficulty of maintaining protecting
the state from noise in larger quantum systems and difficulties in performing massive parallelism
is factored in, then running many quantum search routines in parallel with the quantum phase
oracle Oχ is preferable to executing Grover’s algorithm with the quantum phase oracle O′χZ .
However, this is all relative to the quantum bit oracle or quantum phase oracle being treated
as a black-box. If we assume some mild structure then we can obtain mild gains in both circuit-
depth and circuit-size without increasing the number of qubits or even running parallel instances.
4.2 Efficient Neighbourhood Transition Strategies (ENTS)
Definition 4.3 (Efficient Neighbourhood Transition Strategy (ENTS)).
Let Z = {z(1), . . . , z(K)} ⊆ {0, 1}n be a bitmask set of size 1 < K ≤ 2n where z(1) = 0n.
We say that h : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}m admits an Efficient Neighbourhood Transition Strategy if
there exists a deterministic circuit such that for all x ∈ {0, 1}n and i = 1, . . . ,K−1 it holds that
evaluating h(x⊕ z(i+1)) is cheaper to evaluate if we have already evaluated h(x⊕ z(i)).
The folklore differential technique mentioned in Section 1.3.4.2 used in the Fast Exhaustive
Search algorithm [BCC+10, BCC+13] for instances of MQ(F2, n,m) is an example of an ENTS
as once we have evaluated m equations for the cost of O(mn2) we can evaluate these equations at
another point in the domain that differs by one bitflip for the cost of O(mn). The deterministic
circuit is therefore the addition of the bits corresponding to the precomputed F2-derivatives
and the bitmask set is the entire domain {0, 1}n as we can enumerate this set via a Gray
code, changing only one bit at a time (see Definition 4.8). We give an explicit treatment of its
application to quantum search in Section 4.3.3 and provide a method of implementing a Generic
ENTS (GENTS) in Section 4.4.2 with application to instances of MQ(F2, n,m) in Section 4.5.
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Employing an ENTS strategy with the single-target preimage search problem as defined by
h : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}m, yh ∈ {0, 1}m and Mχ = |h−1(yh)| can therefore be accomplished via the
following quantum circuit acting upon n + m + w qubits, where w is enough ancilla qubits to
enable computation of both the quantum evaluation Eh and the unitary operator Di which for
i = 1, . . . ,K − 1 implements the state transition
Di |x⊕ z(i)〉 |g(x⊕ z(i))〉 |h(x⊕ z(i))〉 7→ |x⊕ z(i+1)〉 |g(x⊕ z(i+1))〉 |h(x⊕ z(i+1))〉 . (4.8)
Starting from the computational basis state |x1 . . . xn〉 |0w〉 |0m〉 |0〉
1. Execute the quantum evaluation Eh to obtain the state
|x⊕ z(1)〉 |g(x⊕ z(1))〉 |h(x⊕ z(1))〉 |0〉 . (4.9)
2. We then use at most m X gates on the evaluation register to set it to |1m〉 if it is equal to
yh, a single ∧m(X) gate with the evaluation register as the controls and the last qubit as
the target, then at most m X gates again on the equation register to compute
|x⊕ z(1)〉 |g(x⊕ z(1))〉 |h(x⊕ z(1))〉 |h(x⊕ z(1)) ?= yh〉 . (4.10)
3. For i = 1, . . . ,K − 1:
(a) Execute the neighbour transition unitary Di to compute
|x⊕ z(i+1)〉 |g(x⊕ z(i+1))〉 |h(x⊕ z(i+1))〉 |
i⊕
j=1
(h(x⊕ z(j)) ?= yh)〉 . (4.11)
(b) Apply step 2) using 2m X gates and a single ∧m(X) gate to compute
|x⊕ z(i+1)〉 |g(x⊕ z(i+1))〉 |h(x⊕ z(i+1))〉 |
i+1⊕
j=1
(h(x⊕ z(j)) ?= yh)〉 . (4.12)
4. Uncompute the quantum evaluation via executing E†h to obtain the state
|x⊕ z(i+1)〉 |0w〉 |0m〉 |
K⊕
j=1
(h(x⊕ z(j)) ?= yh)〉 . (4.13)
5. Use at most n X gates to reset the first register to its original state, leaving the state
|x〉 |0w〉 |0m〉 |
K⊕
j=1
(h(x⊕ z(j)) ?= yh)〉 . (4.14)
If Mh = |h−1(yh)| = 1, then this will be correct and if 1 ≤Mh  2n it will be correct with high
probability. A description of this circuit for theMQ(F2, n,m) problem is given in Section 4.3.3.
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4.2.1 Balancing costs with ENTS
We can therefore derive a cost equation for Grover’s algorithm if we use this approach, which
can be parameterised by K, as we assume that n and m are fixed for the problem














EDi +K(E∧m(X) + 2EX⊗m) + En̄ + 2EH⊗n
)
. (4.15)
We note that when K = 1, this is simply the special case of using Grover’s algorithm with the
original quantum bit oracle (constructed using a direct approach as in Section 2.4.1) that we are
extending with the ENTS approach. This formula can be minimised towards our chosen cost
metric either by numerical simulation (we simply increase K until the costs metric reaches a




in order to find the value of K̂ ∈ R at which C(K,n,m) reaches its minimal point – rounding to
the nearest integer to obtain K = bK̂e will then give us our optimal value of K.
The actual gains using this method will naturally be problem specific and dependent upon
the relative cost of EEh and EDi . We give a specific example of this approach and the cost
formula applied to using the ENTS strategy to augment Schwabe and Westerbaan’s approach to
solving instances ofMQ(F2, n,m) in Section 4.3.3. Using this and Table 2.1 for the other costs,
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· 2n/2 ·K1/2 ·
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EDi + E∧m(X) + 2EX⊗m
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(4.17)
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· 2n/2 ·K−1/2 ·
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EDi + E∧m(X) + 2EX⊗m
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. (4.18)




= 0 ⇐⇒ K =
⌈
2EEh + En̄ + 2EH⊗n −Di
EDi + E∧m(X) + 2EX⊗m
⌋
. (4.19)
Asymptotically, we will therefore have that K is on the order of O(
EEh
Di
) and that the new
asymptotic complexity can be obtained via substitution of K into the cost equation. This gives








compared with Grover’s algorithm used naively with the original oracle, which possesses an




. It is plain that if there is a separation of complexity
between EEh and D (say EEh ∈ O(n3) and D ∈ O(n)) then we have an asymptotic advantage.
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4.3 An example of a problem specific ENTS: The MQ problem
In this section we demonstrate an example of a problem that admits an Efficient Neighbour
Transition Strategy, theMQ problem over GF(2), provide details of how this can be implemented
and analyse the gains. This section may be thought of as a proof of concept for a specific problem
that already possesses an efficient neighbour transition strategy.
We recall the classical Fast Exhaustive Search (FES) algorithm [BCC+10, BCC+13] for solving
instances of MQ(F2, n,m) that we surveyed in Section 1.3.4.2. Whilst the task of enumerating






operations using a naive exhaustive search (see Section 1.3.4.1), the FES algorithm requires
O
(
2n · 4 log2 n
)
(4.22)
operations to perform the same task. The key-features it relies upon are that of the F2-derivative
and the Gray code — in this section we exploit those features to demonstrate how an ENTS
strategy can improve the performance of quantum search procedures.
4.3.1 The F2-derivative
We recall the discussion in Section 1.3.4.2 that the F2-derivative of a degree d polynomial
f (k)(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ F2[x1, . . . , xn] with respective to the variable xv is of degree d− 1.
Definition 4.4 (The F2-derivative [BCC+10]).
Let f ∈ F2[x1, . . . , xn]. The F2−derivative of f with respect to xv for 1 ≤ v ≤ n is defined as
df
dxv
(x1, . . . , xn) = f(x1, . . . , xv ⊕ 1, . . . , xn)⊕ f(x1, . . . , xv, . . . , xn). (4.23)
Theorem 4.5 (Degree of the F2-derivative.).
The degree of an F2-derivative of a degree d polynomial f ∈ F2[x1, . . . , xn] is of degree d− 1.
Proof. This can be seen as the degree d parts cancel each other out. Explicitly, we have that
as any polynomial f ∈ F2[x1, . . . , xn] can be written as the sum and product of xv and two
polynomials h, g ∈ F2[x1, . . . , xn] which do not involve xv, so that
f(x1, . . . , xv, . . . , xn) = h(x1, . . . , xn)⊕ xv · g(x1, . . . , xn) (4.24)
where g is of degree d and h is of degree d− 1, we have that
df
dxv
(x1, . . . , xn) = f(x1, . . . , xv ⊕ 1, . . . , xn)⊕ f(x1, . . . , xv, . . . , xn) (4.25)
= h(x1, . . . , xn)⊕ (xv ⊕ 1) · g(x1, . . . , xn)⊕ h(x1, . . . , xn)⊕ xv · g(x1, . . . , xn) (4.26)
= g(x1, . . . , xn). (4.27)
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For our case, where we are interested in the F2-derivative of degree-two equations, we therefore
have that the F2-derivative is easily computed.
Theorem 4.6 (The F2-derivative of quadratic equation).
Let f ∈ F2[x1, . . . , xn] be a degree 2 equation of the form






bixi + c. (4.28)
Then the F2-derivative of f with respect to the variable xv is
df
dxv








The F2-derivatives of an instance of MQ(F2, n,m) are therefore easily classically computed.
Each one requires n bits to store the coefficients and the full set of F2-derivatives for the instance
of MQF requires mn2 bits of storage for the coefficients.
Theorem 4.7 (The F2-derivative allows an Efficient Neighbourhood Transition strategy).
Let f ∈ F2[x1, . . . , xn] and x1 . . . xn ∈ {0, 1}n be fixed and suppose we possess the evaluation of
f(x1, . . . , xv, . . . , xn). Then if we possess the F2-derivative dfdxv (x1, . . . , xn), then we can evaluate
f(x1, . . . , xv ⊕ 1, . . . , xn) for the cost of at most n− 1 additions and 1 bitflip.
Proof. This is simply the folklore-derivative technique discussed in Section 1.3.4.2 and the original
Fast Exhaustive Search paper [BCC+10]. Rewriting Equation (4.23) as
f(x1, . . . , xv ⊕ 1, . . . , xn) =
df
dxv
(x1, . . . , xv, . . . , xn)⊕ f(x1, . . . , xv, . . . , xn) (4.30)
it is easily seen that as we possess the evaluation f(x1, . . . , xn), we need only evaluate and add
df
dxv
(x1, . . . , xv, . . . , xn) to obtain f(x1, . . . , xv⊕1, xn). The addition of dfdxv (x1, . . . , xv, . . . , xn) can
be performed directly onto the stored value f(x1, . . . , xv, . . . , xn), using no additional memory.
Suppose we possess a method of enumerating {0, 1}n via a function Gn : {0, . . . , 2n−1} 7→ {0, 1}n
for which the Hamming distance between Gn(i) and Gn(i + 1) is 1 and that this function has
the property that
|{Gn(i) : i = 0, . . . , 2n − 1}| = 2n (4.31)
so thatGn is a bijection, then we can implement a search procedure on an instance ofMQ(F2, n,m)
via the following procedure.
86
Assume we have n + m bits of memory. The first n bits will store the state of the point in
the domain we are currently examining and the last m bits of memory is the equation register
and will store the evaluation of the m equations. After initialisation of memory:
1. Set the starting point x1 . . . xn ← Gn(0) and store these n bits in the state register.
2. Evaluate each equation on this point, by any method and store these m bits in the equation
storage register, so that the register holds
(
f (1)(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , f
(m)(x1, . . . , xn)
)
3. For i = 1, . . . , 2n−1:
(a) Update the state register to x′1 . . . x
′
n ← Gn(i). Denote the flipped bit as xv.
(b) Update the equation register via adding df
(k)
dxv
(x1, . . . , xn) to each stored evaluation of
f (k)(x1, . . . , xn) for k = 1, . . . ,m.
(c) Store the current state as a solution to the instance of MQ(F2, n,m) if the equation
register is in the state 0m.
The cost of this method of enumerating the solutions to the instance ofMQ(F2, n,m) is therefore
O(mn2) bit operations to make the initial evaluation of the equations in step 2), whilst the state
update function in 3(a) can be performed via 1 bitflip and the update of the equation register
can be performed using n− 1 additions and 1 bitflip. The checking of the equation register will
require at most m bit operations (though will only require 2 bit comparisons on average by the
discussion in Section 1.3.4.2), hence the entire process requires O(mn2 + 2nmn) bit operations.
4.3.2 Gray codes
Gray codes [Fra53] fulfil the condition of a successor function Gn : {0, . . . , 2n − 1} −→ {0, 1n}
as stated in Section 4.3.1 and allow the enumeration of the domain {0, 1}n of length n binary
bitstrings via only 2n − 1 bitflips, if we assume that we start from the bitstring 0n. We use the
Gray code as given by the authors of the original Fast Exhaustive Search paper [BCC+10]
Definition 4.8 (Gray code [BCC+10]).
Let Gn : {0, . . . , 2n − 1} −→ {0, 1}n be the Gray code mapping
Gn(i) 7→ in ⊕ (in  1), (4.32)
where in represents i interpreted as a length n bitstring.
in G(in) in G(in) in G(in) in G(in)
0000 0000 0100 0110 1000 1100 1100 1010
0001 0001 0101 0111 1001 1101 1101 1011
0010 0011 0110 0101 1010 1111 1110 1001
0011 0010 0111 0100 1011 1110 1111 1000
Table 4.1: Example of the Gray Code upon bitstrings of length 4.
We now proceed to briefly prove that this Gray code has the basic properties that we require.
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Theorem 4.9 (Gn is a bijection).
The function Gn : {0, . . . , 2n − 1} as defined in Definition 4.8 is a bijection.
Proof. If we assume that i 6= j and Gn(i) = Gn(j) then denoting the binary intepretations
in = in,1 . . . in,n and jn = jn,1 . . . jn,n, (4.33)
we have that
in,1 . . . in,n ⊕ 0in,1 . . . in,n−1 = Gn(i) = Gn(j) = jn,1 . . . jn,n ⊕ 0jn,1 . . . jn,n−1. (4.34)
This implies that in,1 = jn,1 as in,1 ⊕ jn,1 ⊕ 0⊕ 0 = 0. As in,i = jn,i implies that in,i+1 = jn,i+1,
the result follows from induction.
Theorem 4.10 (Gn(i) and Gn(i+ 1) differ by one bit flip.).
For i = 0, . . . , 2n − 2, the Hamming distance distance between Gn(i) and Gn(i+ 1) is exactly 1.
Proof. If we consider the sum Gn(i)⊕Gn(i+ 1), then (denoting j = i+ 1), we have that
Gn(i)⊕Gn(i+ 1) = in,1 . . . in,n ⊕ (0in,1 . . . in,n−1)⊕ jn,1 . . . jn,n ⊕ (0jn,1 . . . jn,n−1). (4.35)
Either Gn(i) will have the property that in,n = 1 or Gn(i+1) will have the property that jn,n = 1.
If in,n = 1 then we have that in,1 . . . in,n = in,1 . . . in,n−k−101
k for some 1 ≤ k < n. This implies
that jn = in,1 . . . in,n−k10
k, giving us that
in ⊕ jn = in,1 . . . in,n−k−101k ⊕ in,1 . . . in,n−k−110k = 0n−k−11k+1. (4.36)
The other component of the sum Gn(i)⊕Gn(i+ 1) is then seen to be
(in  1)⊕ (jn  1) = 0in,1 . . . in−k−101k−1 ⊕ 0in,1 . . . in−k−110k−1 = 0n−k1k. (4.37)
This gives us the sum
Gn(i)⊕Gn(i+ 1) = 0n−k−11k+1 ⊕ 0n−k1k = 0n−k−110k, (4.38)
hence only one bit differs. The proof for in,n = 0 is similar.
This is all we need to apply our method towards improving Grover’s algorithm for instances of
MQ(F2, n,m) by an ENTS strategy. The actual computation of which bits to flip to enumerate
the neighbourhood can be directly computed by a classical control system — as we assume that
the bottlenecks in costs will be the quantum resources, not the classical resources, and that the
neighbourhood explored by the Gray code will be far smaller than 2n/2 we can ignore these costs.
We note for interest that Lemma 1 of [BCC+10] admits a quicker approach to computing the
bit we must flip to obtain Gn(i+ 1) from Gn(i).
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4.3.3 Applying ENTS to quantum search for instances of MQ(F2, n,m)
With the F2-derivative from Definition 4.4 and the Gray code from Definition 4.8, we can now
define our ENTS strategy for instances of MQ(F2, n,m) using Grover’s algorithm. We require
any quantum circuit that performs the mapping of computational basis states
|x1 . . . xn〉 |0〉m |0w〉 7→ |x1 . . . xn〉 |f (1)(x1, . . . , xn)〉 . . . |f (m)(x1, . . . , xn)〉 |0〉 |0〉 . (4.39)
Schwabe and Westerbaan’s techniques can perform this action, with the cost of the quantum bit
oracles O(b)
f (k)
being O(n2) from Table 2.4.
The full quantum circuit for the ENTS approach using the F2-derivative therefore consists of the
following circuit, acting upon each computational basis state |x1 . . . xn〉 |0m〉 |0〉 |0〉.
1. Execute the m quantum bit oracles O(b)
f̃ (1)
, . . . ,O(b)
f̃ (m)
. The computational basis state is now
|x1 . . . xn〉 |f̃ (1)(x1, . . . , xn)〉 . . . |f̃ (m)(x1, . . . , xn)〉 |0〉 |0〉 . (4.40)
2. Use a ∧m(X) gate with the equation register as controls and the last qubit as a target.
3. Let v(i) be the index of the non-zero bit of Gn(i− 1)⊕Gn(i). For i = 1, . . . ,K − 1:
(a) We apply an X gate to the v(i)th qubit of the computational basis state.
(b) Add the F2-derivatives df̃
(1)
dxv(i)
(x′1, . . . , x
′
n), . . . ,
df̃ (m)
dxv(i)
(x′1, . . . , x
′
n) to their respective po-
sitions on the equation register using m X gates and m(n− 1) ∧1(X) gates.
(c) Use a ∧m(X) gate with the equation register as controls and the last qubit as a target.
4. The equation register is now in the state
|x′1 . . . x′n〉 |f̃ (1)(x′1, . . . , x′n)〉 . . . |f̃ (m)(x′1, . . . , x′n)〉 |0〉 |ZK(x1, . . . , xn)〉 , (4.41)
where ZK(x1, . . . , xn) = 1 if and only if x1 . . . xn⊕Gn(i) satisfies the m equations for some
i = 0, . . . ,K − 1 (recall that Gn(0) = 0n).
We apply the quantum bit oracles O(b)
f̃ (1)
, . . . ,O(b)
f̃ (m)
to obtain the computational basis state
|x′1 . . . x′n〉 |0m〉 |0〉 |ZK(x1, . . . , xn)〉 . (4.42)
5. At most n X gates can then be used on the first n qubits to restore the quantum to
|x1 . . . xn〉 |0m〉 |0〉 |ZK(x1, . . . , xn)〉 , (4.43)
with the precise positions we must flip being indicated by the non-zero bits of Gn(K).
For each computational basis state (assuming a single solution to the instance ofMQ(F2, n,m)),
we therefore have that ZK(x1, . . . , xn) inverts the phase of |x〉 if and only if x ⊕ Gn(i) for
i = 0, . . . ,K − 1 is interpreted as a solution to the MQ(F2, n,m) instance.
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The cost of the above quantum bit oracle is therefore higher, but crucially we have introduced
new targets into the search-space — this allows us to benefit from a drop in query-complexity. If
we denote the unitary Di as the cost of executing steps 3a) and 3b) for the index i = 1, . . . ,K−1
from the quantum bit oracle described on the previous page, then we have that the cost function




















EDi +K(E∧m(X) + 2EX⊗m) + EX⊗n + En̄ + 2 · EH⊗n
)
. (4.44)
Explicitly, we have the cost of these individual components are given by Table 4.2 below, which
have respectively been computed using the commentary for the costs in the description of the
quantum bit oracle and from Tables 2.1 and 2.4.
#Clifford #T #Total T Total #Qubits
gates gates gates depth depth
EO(b)
f̃(k)
n2 + 11n− 13 7n− 7 n2 + 18n− 20 3n− 3 n2 + 11n− 16 n+ 2
EDi mn+ 1 0 mn+ 1 0 m n+m
E∧k(X) 24k − 48 16k − 16 40k − 64 16k − 16 40k − 64 k + 2
EX⊗n/EH⊗n n 0 n 0 1 n
En̄ 26n− 44 16n− 16 42n− 60 16n− 16 40n− 62 n+ 2
Table 4.2: Clifford+T gate costs for the components used for theMQ(F2, n,m) ENTS strategy.
If we then wish to optimise toward the total circuit-size, we obtain the cost equation param-












2m(n2 + 18n− 20) + 45n−mn− 61 +K(mn+ 42m− 63)
)
, (4.45)
where we have that the inital cost of evaluating a single point costs O(mn2), whereas we can
test additional points in the search domain for a cost of O(mn) operations each. Assuming
n and m are fixed, we can therefore find the minimal quantum circuit-size for this approach
either by numerical simulation and varying K or by simply ignoring the floor function and using
basic calculus to derive the minimal point, as discussed in Section 4.2.1. Again, it is clear that
whilst we are increasing the cost of the Grover iteration, we are reducing the contribution of the
query-complexity term to the total cost.
We will optimise towards minimising Equation (4.45), so that we minimise the total quantum
circuit-size — the metric we are interested in with regards to the security parameters of the
Gui cryptosystem (see Table 1.1). We present our new quantum resource estimates for these
parameters in relation to Schwabe and Westerbaan’s low-memory quantum bit oracle design and
counter-based oracle designs. We note that we cannot use this method with the counter-based-
oracle, as the counter-register does not admit (to our knowledge) an efficient transition strategy
as only the value of whether an equation is satisfied is recorded, not their values.
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we obtain that K optimises the total circuit-size when
K =
⌊




We therefore have that K is on the order of O(n), hence the secondary search will be negligible
compared to the main quantum search procedure. Substitution of K into the Equation (4.45)




. This improvement of
O(n1/2) provides a modest, but concrete impact upon costs and, as Table 4.3 below demonstrates,
is enough to break the proposed parameters for the Gui cryptosystem (see Table 1.1). Table 4.3
was derived through numerical simulation to find the optimal value for K by simply computing
the cost function for a range of K, which in all cases agrees with Equation (4.49).
λ MQ(F2, n,m) #Clifford #T #Total T Total #Qubits Success K Oracle type
gates gates gates depth depth %
80 2 · MQ(F2, 117, 117) 2 · 277.03 2 · 273.43 2 · 277.14 2 · 273.12 2 · 276.43 236 ≈ 100.00 199 ≈ 27.64 Low-memory [SW16]
80 2 · MQ(F2, 117, 117) 2 · 279.89 2 · 274.53 2 · 279.97 2 · 274.53 2 · 279.89 236 ≈ 100.00 N/A Low-memory [SW16]
80 2 · MQ(F2, 117, 117) 2 · 280.88 2 · 276.76 2 · 280.96 2 · 275.57 2 · 280.88 126 ≈ 100.00 N/A Counter-based [SW16]
128 2 · MQ(F2, 209, 209) 2 · 2125.04 2 · 2120.70 2 · 2125.11 2 · 2120.41 2 · 2124.29 420 ≈ 100.00 378 ≈ 28.56 Low-memory [SW16]
128 2 · MQ(F2, 209, 209) 2 · 2128.35 2 · 2123.38 2 · 2128.34 2 · 2122.18 2 · 2128.35 420 ≈ 100.00 N/A Low-memory [SW16]
128 2 · MQ(F2, 209, 209) 2 · 2129.34 2 · 2124.42 2 · 2129.39 2 · 2123.21 2 · 2129.34 219 ≈ 100.00 N/A Counter-based [SW16]
256 2 · MQ(F2, 457, 457) 2 · 2251.79 2 · 2246.41 2 · 2251.83 2 · 2246.13 2 · 2250.92 916 ≈ 100.00 869 ≈ 29.76 Low-memory [SW16]
256 2 · MQ(F2, 457, 457) 2 · 2255.69 2 · 2249.63 2 · 2255.72 2 · 2248.42 2 · 2255.69 916 ≈ 100.00 N/A Low-memory [SW16]
256 2 · MQ(F2, 457, 457) 2 · 2256.69 2 · 2250.65 2 · 2256.71 2 · 2249.44 2 · 2256.69 468 ≈ 100.00 N/A Counter-based [SW16]
Table 4.3: Quantum resource estimates for solving MQ(F2, n,m) using Grover with ENTS.
From the results in Table 4.3, it is clear that there is no downside (at least with regards to
these particular metrics) in using the ENTS method over naively using a quantum bit oracle with
Grover’s algorithm. We must perform a subsequent search of the space of size K — but as K is
on the order of O(n) by the above discussion, this will be a negligible cost and can be assumed
to be performed on a classical computer. We can therefore ignore the cost of this subsequent
search. We alternatively optimise towards Clifford+T depth, the T gate count or T gate depth.
With this ENTS strategy for instances of MQ(F2, n,m) described and the costs to solve
instances of MQ(F2, n,m) provided, it is clear that we have a proof of concept application
that the ENTS approach can be used to reduce the costs involved with quantum search for at
least one problem. We have additionally broken the quantum-resistant parameters for the Gui
cryptosystem by simply optimising the existing approach of Schwabe and Westerbaan by creating
a hybrid-quantum classical search algorithm for instances of MQ(F2, n,m).
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4.4 Generic Efficient Neighbourhood Transition Strategy (GENTS)
In this section we describe a generic approach to creating an Efficient Neighbourhood Transition
Strategy (ENTS) that is based upon how we can structure quantum oracles for better use with
Grover’s quantum search algorithm (see Theorem 3.10). The process is relatively simple and
uses many of the concepts we have already discussed/are well-known in literature. Again, we
will wish to balance the query-complexity with the cost of the quantum oracle at the cost of
obtaining only partial information concerning the solution. This technique should be viewed
through the lens of methods to improve Grover’s algorithm via modification of the quantum bit
oracle and was developed before the author was familiar with how to structure quantum search
via amplitude amplification (see Theorem 3.6). The methods in Chapter 5 extend the basic
structure we provide here, demonstrating how we can exploit it separately via both preprocessing
and amplitude amplification.
The Generic Efficient Neighbourhood Transition Strategy (GENTS) is based upon the fact
that we can view any computation as that of a tree, whereby we gradually introduce variables
into the computation. This leads to a basic decomposition of a quantum phase oracle.
Definition 4.11 (Tree decomposition of a quantum bit oracle).
Let O(b)χ be a quantum bit oracle defined by the boolean indicator function χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}
acting upon n+ 1 qubits. We define the decomposed quantum bit oracle to be the n+ 1 unitaries
Uχ∗ , Uχn , . . . , Uχ1 (4.50)
acting upon n+ w + 1 qubits, such that for any x1 . . . xn ∈ {0, 1}n and b ∈ {0, 1} we have that(
I⊗n ⊗O(b)χ
)
|0w〉 |x1 . . . xn〉 |b〉 = U†χ1 · · ·U
†
χnUχ∗Uχn · · ·Uχ1 |0
w〉 |x1 . . . xn〉 |b⊕ χ(x1 . . . xn)〉 (4.51)
where we have Uχi = U
′
χi ⊗ I
⊗n−i+1, so that U ′χi acts upon w + i qubits, with
U ′χi |g(x1, . . . , xi−1)〉 |x1 . . . xi〉 7→ |g(x1, . . . , xi)〉 |x1 . . . xi〉 (4.52)
where g(x1, . . . , xi) ∈ {0, 1}w is derived only from x1, . . . , xi, g() := 0w and
Uχ∗ |g(x1, . . . , xn)〉 |x1 . . . xn〉 |b〉 7→ |g(x1, . . . , xn)〉 |x1 . . . xn〉 |b⊕ χ(x1 . . . xn)〉 . (4.53)
Each Uχi should be interpreted as a quantum circuit which takes as input a memory state which
has been computed using the variables x1, . . . , xi−1 and the variable xi. Each Uχi should be
chosen or designed so that it computes as much as is possible of the quantum bit oracle U
(b)
χ
using only the i bits x1 . . . xi. The result of this computation is then stored in the working
memory register consisting of w qubits. In this way the composed unitary operator
Ui := Uχi · · ·Uχ1 (4.54)
interacts only with the first i qubits of the search space and so the working memory of the output
is only entangled with these qubits.
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That this decomposition is always possible can be easily demonstrated as we can simply define
the trivial decomposition
U ′χi = I
⊗w+i+1 (4.55)
for i = 1, . . . , n so that Un = I⊗w+n+1 and
Uχ∗ = O(b)χ . (4.56)
Whether we can exploit this decomposition to achieve computational gains will be dependent
upon the individual cost metrics for EUχ∗ , EUχn , . . . , EUχ1 . Decompositions of this sort are quite
naturally common in all areas of computer science and in quantum algorithms. Whilst techniques
such as nested quantum search [CGW00] and the quantum backtracking algorithm [Mon15], these
are dependent upon information being revealed at various levels of the tree. Our techniques
provide far smaller computational gains than these methods, but make their gains via improving
the memory management and balancing the costs of the quantum computation — crucially the
only predicate that we use is the unitary Uχ∗ , which gives us whether the computational basis
state |x1 . . . xn〉 is the answer we are looking for. We first briefly consider the advantages of this
decomposition in classical computation.
4.4.1 Exploiting a decomposed classical function
Suppose that we possess the classical analogue of the above decomposition, so that we have
a boolean indicator function χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} that defines a search problem and that we
possess the decomposition
χ(x1 . . . xn) = χ∗(χn(χn−1(χn−2 · · · (χ2(χ1(x1), x2), . . . , )xn)) (4.57)
where
χ1 : {0, 1} −→ {0, 1}w+1 (4.58)
χi : {0, 1}w+i−1 × {0, 1} −→ {0, 1}w+i (for i = 1, . . . , n) (4.59)
χ∗ : {0, 1}w+n −→ {0, 1}. (4.60)
If the cost metrics (classical circuit-size or circuit-depth) Eχ∗ , . . . , Eχn , . . . , Eχ1 are defined for
χ∗, χn, . . . , χ1, then a simple strategy involves simply computing the intermediate memory state
g(x1, . . . , xi) = χi(χi−1(· · ·χ2(χ1(x1), x2), · · · , )xi−1), xi) (4.61)
involving a fixed assignment of k variables corresponding to the bitstring x1 . . . xk and storing
this state. We can then perform a simple depth-first search of the implicitly defined search-tree
by testing assignments of the remaining n− k variables. Once χ(x1 . . . xk‖xk+1 . . . xn) has been
evaluated, we can restart the search process from the stored memory state.
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This approach can naturally be used in an entirely recursive manner, whereby we store
the state g(x1, . . . , xi)‖x1 . . . xi ∈ {0, 1}w+i each time after introducing the bit xi. Using a
depth-first search approach whereby we evaluate the 2n leaves of the implicitly defined perfect
binary tree with this technique requires only the storage of at most n intermediate memory
states (which including the memory state we are processing). A completely recursive approach
therefore requires nw + n
2+n)
2 + 1 bit of memory and the cost is
2n · Eχ∗ +
n∑
i=1
2i · Eχi . (4.62)
This can be compared to performing a search of the 2n assignments x1 . . . xn ∈ {0, 1}n without








but only requires that we use n + w + 1 bit of memory. If we consider a simple problem where
Eχ∗ = Eχi = C for i = 1, . . . , n then the cost ratio between these two techniques is given by
2n · (n+ 1) · C




For a problem of size n = 80 and assuming a single search target, we therefore have that the
reduction in costs will be on the order of ≈ 27 = 24.74 and that the advantage will be more
extreme if the it holds that the cost of Eχi decreases as i increases. This is a very simple
cost model and ignores many real-world factors, but illustrates the gains that we can make via
memory management for evaluating decomposed functions.
The trade-off between memory and circuit-complexity is therefore clear in the case of classical
computation. In the case of Grover’s algorithm, the implementation of O(b)χ is performed by a
reversible circuit, hence if we have the tree decomposition of this unitary operator we must
execute both Uχi to compute the successive memory state and U
†
χi to uncompute this memory
state. If we have this tree decomposition of a quantum bit oracle, then postulate four (see Section
2.1.4) ensures we implicitly keep track of the intermediate memory states at all times anyway.
As we are computing these intermediate memory states anyway, we may as well exploit them —
or restructure the quantum oracle so that we can exploit them.
This is the reasoning behind the restructuring of Schwabe and Westerbaan’s quantum bit
oracle for instances of MQ(F2, n,m) that we provide in Section 2.5.2 Equation (2.86) — there
are no computational benefits to (2.86) over (2.83) if using a naive evaluation approach, but we
can exploit (2.86) using the above technique as the variables xi are introduced one by one. We
explicitly examine how GENTS can exploit this decomposition in Section 4.5.
This will later be adapted into a preprocessing technique to improve the efficiency of attacking
instances ofMQ(F2, n,m) in Section 5.1 and a quantum version of this technique in Section 5.2.
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4.4.2 The GENTS approach
Given a tree decomposition Uχ∗ , Uχn , . . . , Uχ1 of the quantum bit oracle O
(b)
χ (see Definition 4.11)
defined by the boolean indicator function χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}, the GENTS approach consists
of the following design for the modified quantum bit oracle which acts upon the computational
basis state |0w〉 |x1 . . . xn〉 |b〉, where b ∈ {0, 1}.
Choose K ∈ N to be the size of the bitmask set Z = {Gn(i) : i = 0, . . . ,K − 1} as defined by
the Gray code in Definition 4.8.
1. Execute the composed quantum bit oracle Uχ∗Uχn · · ·Uχ1 , resulting in
Uχ∗Uχn · · ·Uχ1 |0w〉 |x1 . . . xn〉 |b〉 7→ |g(x1, . . . , xn)〉 |x1 . . . xn〉 |b⊕ χ(x1 . . . xn)〉 . (4.65)
2. Let v(i) be the index of the non-zero value Gn(i) ⊕ Gn(i − 1) according to the ordering
x1 . . . xn (ie. if n = 5, then G5(6)⊕G5(5) = 00101⊕ 00111, so v(6) = 4).
For i = 1, . . . ,K − 1:
(a) Execute U †χv(i) · · ·U
†
χn (uncomputes the state to the variable we wish to change).
(b) Apply an X gate to the variable xv(i) (updates the state of the search space).
(c) Execute Uχ∗Uχn · · ·Uχv(i) (implements the action of O
(b)
χ using the updated search
register for a cheaper cost than a simple parallel approach).
3. Execute the unitary operation U †χ1U
†
χn to restore the state to
|0w〉
∣∣x′1 . . . x′n〉 |bK−1⊕
i=0
χ(x1 . . . xn ⊕Gn(i))〉 (4.66)
4. Use at most blog2(K−1)c+ 1 X gates to apply the bitmask Gn(K−1) to the search space
to obtain the state
|0w〉 |x1 . . . xn〉 |b
K−1⊕
i=0
χ(x1 . . . xn ⊕Gn(i))〉 . (4.67)
This allows us to implement a generic approach to the ENTS strategy and we need only design
the quantum bit oracles according to the heuristic that as much computation as is possible with
the variable xi must be performed via the circuit for Uχi before introducing the next variable
and doing the same with the variable xi+1 and the circuit Uχi+1 .
The fact that we have n+1 unitaries in our decomposition as opposed to merely n lends itself
to a nice interpretation with the preimage search problem defined by h : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}m and
Yh ⊆ {0, 1}m. In this scenario the decomposition Uχn · · ·Uχ1 corresponds to a decomposition of
the quantum evaluation Eh, where g(x1, . . . , xn) = g′(x1, . . . , xn)‖h(x). The unitary Uχ∗ then
corresponds to a comparison circuit which simply tests whether h(x) ∈ Yh. In the case of the
single-target preimage search problem that we are interested in, this has previously been shown
to be accomplished by a single ∧m(X) gate between two layers of at most m X gates.
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4.4.3 On structuring the tree decomposition
In many cases it will prove impossible to create a decomposition that we can easily exploit as
all variables must be used immediately in the computation, then a large amount of subsequent
computation is performed meaning that EUχn dominates the cost and so we suffer from the same
circuit-size increase as from the parallel approach discussed in Section 4.1.
One example of this from cryptography is that of the Advanced Encryption Standard [Pub01]
discussed in Section 1.4, which owing to how this function is implemented by the repeated
iteration of a particular circuit means that as all variables are introduced in the first round of
iteration we cannot create a useful decomposition. Potentially interesting sources for making
gains using the GENTS approach (and the quantum version, in Section 5.2, which relies upon
the same structure) arise from examining the preimage problem applied to cryptographic hash
functions, in the context of the Merkle-Damg̊ard extension.
In this scenario, we possess a cryptographic compression function h : {0, 1}n+c −→ {0, 1}n,
where c > 0 that is difficult to invert. The Merkle-Damg̊aard construction allows us to extend
this construction to create a cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1}∗ −→ {0, 1}n that takes
arbitrary size inputs by iteratively hashing the result of a portion of the input with the previous
hash, so that if we are hashing the message m = m1‖ . . . ‖md, where mi ∈ {0, 1}c, then we can
define zi = h(zi−1‖mi,d), where z0 := 0n. This allows us to define H(m) = zd. In this way,
finding a preimage of H has the same structure we wish to exploit — we introduce variables
in sets of size c, produce an output memory state, then introduce another set of c variables.
Analysis of whether this scenario can be of any practical use is left for future work.
4.5 Applying GENTS to instances of MQ(F2, n,m)
We recall that the definition of a single equation as given by Schwabe and Westerbaan (see
Section 2.5.1) was originally
















and that we have changed it in Section 2.86 to the representation
















which requires identical resources to evaluate. If we are considering the evaluation of (2.83) using
the GENTS approach, then it is clear that in adding x1y
(l)
1 to the equation register involves
introducing all n variables immediately, whilst adding xny
(l)
n to the register involves only the
variable xn. Rewriting this equation as (2.86) simply rewrites the index to take note of this fact.
We cannot apply the approach to the counter-based oracle approach (see Section 2.4.3), as
no state information with regards to the equations is kept and using more memory to store these
values would negate the purpose of using a counter-based oracle to obtain a low qubit count.
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The quantum bit oracle for instances ofMQ(F2, n,m) using this approach therefore consists
of defining the quantum circuits Uχ1 , . . . , Uχn by (where b ∈ {0, 1})
Uχi |f̃ (1)(x1, . . . , xi−1)〉 |f̃ (m)(x1, . . . , xi−1)〉 |0〉 |x1 . . . xn〉 |b〉 (4.68)
7→ |f̃ (1)(x1, . . . , xi)〉 |f̃ (m)(x1, . . . , xi)〉 |0〉 |x1 . . . xn〉 |b〉 (4.69)
where we define the partial sum






and Uχ∗ is a single ∧m(X) gate with the equation registers as the controls and |b〉 as the target.
Setting K = 2k for 0 ≤ k ≤ n, the cost formula for the total circuit-size is the cost to evaluate
m polynomials over F2 of degree two involving n − k variables, plus the cost of exploring the
2k leaf nodes from this point and the cost of the diffusion step. Using the cost of the quantum
evaluations from Table 2.4 and the cost of the other components from Table 2.1, this gives us the
following cost formula for using Grover’s algorithm to solve an instance of MQ(F2, n,m) with








2m((n− k)2 + 18(n− k)− 20) + 44n− 60
+ 2k(40n− 64) + 2m
k∑
i=1
2i(17 + 2(n− k + i))
)
. (4.71)
If instead we use a hybrid of this approach and the quantum oracle using n+m(n−1)+1 qubits
from Section 2.5.3, then another approach presents itself. In terms of quantum circuit-size, there
is little advantage in using this quantum bit oracle, but the quantum evaluation saves roughly
a factor of two owing to the fact that we do not have to uncompute y
(l)
i before computing y
(l)
i+1.
It offers a further advantage in that by using m(n − 2) registers to store the y(l)i , we need not
uncompute them and can add these bits to these registers as and when they become available.
In this way, we have a quantum oracle parameterised by K = 2k, where 0 ≤ k ≤ n and using
n+ (k + 1)m+ 1 qubits:
Let Uχn−k · · ·Uχ1 consist of the following procedure:
• Compute the partial sums |f (1)(x1, . . . , xn−k)〉 . . . |f (m)(x1, . . . , xn−k)〉 on the equation reg-
isters using bit oracles to leave the mk temporary storage registers in the state
∣∣0mk〉.
• Inmk registers, compute and store the components of y(1)n−k+1, . . . , y
(1)
n , . . . , y
(m)
n−k+1, . . . , y
(m)
n
involving only x1, . . . , xn−k for a total cost of mk(n− k− 1) ∧1(X) gates and mk X gates.
Then define Ui for i = n− k + 1, . . . , n as the following procedure:
• Add (if required) xi to the m(n− i+ 1) stored values y(l)i , . . . , y
(l)
n and add the m values of
xiy
(l)
i to the partial sums. This requires m ∧2(X) gates and m(n− i+ 1) ∧1(X) gates.
Uχ∗ is a ∧m(X) gate, the controls being the equation registers and the output bit as the target.
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This gives us a structuring of the Uχi whereby Eχi decreases with i, instead of increasing.
Taken all together we have the total circuit-size of Grover’s algorithm used in conjunction with








2m((n− k)2 + 18(n− k)− 20) + 44n− 60 + 2mk(n− k)
+ 2k(40m− 64) + 2m
k∑
i=1
2i(17 + k + 1− i)
)
(4.72)
4.5.1 Asymptotic and concrete results
If we take the derivative of the higher order terms of Equations (4.71) and (4.72) with respect
to k, then we can again find the optimal value of k. This turns out to be on the order of






approach (Equation (4.72)). After substitution, we find that the asymptotic complexity of the









memory approach — by using additional qubits we have further improved the quantum circuit-
size. To find the exact optimal value of k, we again use the approach of simply using the cost
formula given by Equation (4.72) and increasing k until we find the minimal point. Using this
approach we achieve the results in Table 4.4 below.
λ MQ(F2, n,m) #Clifford #T #Total T Total #Qubits Success k Oracle type
gates gates gates depth depth %
80 2 · MQ(F2, 117, 117) 2 · 278.35 2 · 274.05 2 · 278.43 2 · 273.12 2 · 277.23 236 ≈ 100.00 5 Low-memory [SW16]/GENTS
80 2 · MQ(F2, 117, 117) 2 · 275.79 2 · 275.07 2 · 276.48 2 · 274.38 2 · 276.05 1288 ≈ 100.00 9 High-memory [SW16]/GENTS
80 2 · MQ(F2, 117, 117) 2 · 279.89 2 · 274.53 2 · 279.97 2 · 274.53 2 · 279.89 236 ≈ 100.00 N/A Low-memory [SW16]
80 2 · MQ(F2, 117, 117) 2 · 280.88 2 · 276.76 2 · 280.96 2 · 275.57 2 · 280.88 126 ≈ 100.00 N/A Counter-based [SW16]
128 2 · MQ(F2, 209, 209) 2 · 2126.44 2 · 2121.32 2 · 2126.47 2 · 2120.41 2 · 2125.27 420 ≈ 100.00 6 Low-memory [SW16]/GENTS
128 2 · MQ(F2, 209, 209) 2 · 2123.63 2 · 2122.4 2 · 2124.14 2 · 2121.72 2 · 2123.39 2509 ≈ 100.00 10 High-memory [SW16]/GENTS
128 2 · MQ(F2, 209, 209) 2 · 2128.35 2 · 2123.38 2 · 2128.34 2 · 2122.18 2 · 2128.35 420 ≈ 100.00 N/A High-memory [SW16]
128 2 · MQ(F2, 209, 209) 2 · 2123.39 2 · 2122.40 2 · 2124.14 2 · 2121.72 2 · 2123.38 2509 ≈ 100.00 N/A Counter-based [SW16]
256 2 · MQ(F2, 457, 457) 2 · 2253.25 2 · 2247.03 2 · 2253.26 2 · 2246.10 2 · 2252.26 916 ≈ 100.00 7 Low-memory [SW16]/GENTS
256 2 · MQ(F2, 457, 457) 2 · 2249.71 2 · 2248.97 2 · 2250.39 2 · 2248.31 2 · 2249.92 6856 ≈ 100.00 13 Low-memory [SW16]
256 2 · MQ(F2, 457, 457) 2 · 2255.69 2 · 2249.63 2 · 2255.72 2 · 2248.42 2 · 2255.69 916 ≈ 100.00 N/A Low-memory [SW16]
256 2 · MQ(F2, 457, 457) 2 · 2256.69 2 · 2250.65 2 · 2256.71 2 · 2249.44 2 · 2256.69 468 ≈ 100.00 N/A Counter-based [SW16]
Table 4.4: Quantum resource estimates for employing GENTS to solve MQ(F2, n,m).
The GENTS approach, like the ENTS approach can be used to break the parameters for
the Gui cryptosystem. The low-memory version is not as efficient, but the high-memory version
is superior — at least in terms of total gate count. Unfortunately by the nature of GENTS
being a generic approach, we must employ the ∧2(X) gate when we wish to repeatedly add the
values of |y(l)i 〉 to the equation registers — the ENTS approach bypasses this as we only require
the addition of a linear equation and can therefore use ∧1(X) gates. The GENTS approach
would therefore seem to be useful, but we stress is only a starting point for the improvements
in Chapter 5, where we examine how preprocessing can be applied to the GENTS approach
to derive a method that is superior to the ENTS strategy for instances of MQ(F2, n,m) and
examine how amplitude amplification can be used, as opposed to Grover’s algorithm.
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Chapter 5
PARENTS and quantum nesting
“Said the mother Tern to her baby Tern
”Would you like a brother?”
Said the baby Tern to the mother Tern
”Yes. One good Tern deserves another.”
- Spike Milligan, [MG03]
In this chapter we examine several different approaches to exploiting the GENTS approach.
In Section 5.1 we meet the PARENTS approach, demonstrating how we can use classical pre-
processing to implement the action of the GENTS quantum circuit for a smaller cost than in
Section 5.1 when applying the method to instances of MQ(F2, n,m). In Section 5.2 we exam-
ine the nested application of amplitude amplification in order to improve the efficiency of the
search upon the last set of variables. In both sections we apply the procedures to instances of
MQ(F2, n,m) to examine their concrete effect upon parameter choices for Gui.
5.1 Applying preprocessing to the GENTS approach
The following is adapted from work published and presented at the International Workshop on
the Arithmetic of Finite Fields (Bergen) in 2018 and set in the context of the GENTS approach
discussed in Chapter 4. A natural question is how we can reduce the cost of Grover’s algorithm
in conjunction with the GENTS approach by using classical preprocessing to reduce the cost of
implementing the tree-decomposition of the quantum bit oracle. In this section we introduce an
improvement to the GENTS approach based on the idea that we can perform preprocessing on
the search-tree in order to obtain computational gains with respect to the GENTS approach.
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5.1.1 Preprocessing and intermediate memory states
We have defined the tree decomposition of the quantum bit oracle (see Definition 4.11) O(b)χ
defined by the boolean function χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} so that Uχ1 , . . . , Uχn , Uχ∗ are n+ 1 unitary






∣∣g(x1, . . . , xxi−1)〉 |x1 . . . xi〉 7→ |g(x1, . . . , xxi)〉 |x1 . . . xi〉 (5.1)
so that U ′χi acts upon w + i qubits and Uχ∗ is defined as
Uχ∗ |g(x1, . . . , xn)〉 |x1 . . . xn〉 |b〉 7→ |g(x1, . . . , xn)〉 |x1 . . . xn〉 |b⊕ χ(x1 . . . xn)〉 . (5.2)
We recall that the bitstring g(x1, . . . , xi) ∈ {0, 1}w represents the state of the memory after
introducing the bit xi into the computation. It will hold that for some 0 < k < n that the final
memory state can further be expressed by the decomposition
g(x1, . . . , xn) = g1(x1, . . . , xn−k)⊕ g2(x1, . . . , xn−k, xn−k+1, . . . , xn). (5.3)
where again g1(x1, . . . , xn−k) depends only upon the bits x1, . . . , xn−k whilst the intermediate
memory state g2(x1, . . . , xn−k, xn−k+1, . . . , xn) is dependent upon all the variables. In the case
where k = 0 or k = n, this is clearly a trivial decomposition where either g1() = 0
w or we can
set g2(x1, . . . , xn) = 0
w, but will have an interpretation with respect to our approach. We will
wish 0 < k < n for our approach to be useful and to express g2(x1, . . . , xn−k, xn−k+1, . . . , xn)
algebraically, so that each bit is a polynomial over F2[x1, . . . , xn−k, xn−k+1, . . . , xn] of any degree.
We can then perform a preprocessing step on a classical computer, exhaustively computing the
list of w polynomials over F2[x1, . . . , xn−k] obtained by substituting the variables xn−k+1, . . . , xn
in g2(x1, . . . , xn−k, xn−k+1, . . . , xn) for the 2
k bits zn−k+1 . . . zn ∈ {0, 1}k, giving us the list
Sk =
[
g2(x1, . . . , xn−k, zn−k+1, . . . , zn) : zn−k+1, . . . , zn ∈ {0, 1}
]
, (5.4)
which we index from i = 0, . . . , 2k − 1 and use the notation Sk[i] for the ith element of this list.
We can then use the Preprocessed Algebraic Replacement Efficient Neighbourhood Transition
Strategy (PARENTS) to compute the action of the quantum bit oracle, where as with ENTS
and GENTS, the technique will be correct if the search problem defined by χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}
has the property that Mχ = |χ−1(1)| = 1. In the case where Mχ > 1, our technique will still be
correct if there do not exist x, y ∈ χ−1(1) whose first n− k bits are identical.
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After creating the preprocessed list of equations Sk, we define U
(i)
g2 for i = 0, . . . , 2
k by their
actions (where d ∈ {0, 1}w and b ∈ {0, 1})
U (0)g2 |d〉 |x1 . . . xn−k〉 |b〉 7→ |d⊕ Sk[0]〉 |x1 . . . xn−k〉 |b〉 (5.5)
U (i)g2 |d〉 |x1 . . . xn−k〉 |b〉 7→ |d⊕ Sk[i− 1]⊕ S[i]〉 |x1 . . . xn−k〉 |b〉 for i = 1, . . . 2
k − 1 (5.6)
U (2
k)
g2 |d〉 |x1 . . . xn−k〉 |b〉 7→ |d⊕ Sk[2
k − 1]〉 |x1 . . . xn−k〉 |b〉 . (5.7)
The sum Sk[i−1]⊕Sk[i] can also be classically preprocessed. In this way, we have that applying
Uχn−k · · ·Uχ1 followed by U
(0)
g2 results in the memory storage register holding the memory state
|g1(x1, . . . , xn−k)⊕ g2(x1, . . . , xn−k, zn−k+1, . . . , zn)〉 = |g(x1, . . . , xn−k, zn−k+1, . . . , zn)〉 (5.8)
for the zn−k+1 . . . zn used to create Sk[0]. The successive action of U
(i)
g2 for i = 1, . . . , 2
k−1 will
add the difference Sk[i−1]⊕Sk[i] to the storage register, resulting in the memory storage register
holding (5.8) for the zn−k+1 . . . zn used to create Sk[i]. The unitary U
(2k)
g2 resets the state to
|g1(x1, . . . , xn−k)〉 . (5.9)
As we have cycled through the intermediate memory states described by (5.8) for a fixed
x1 . . . xn−k ∈ {0, 1}n−k and the 2k possible values for zn−k+1 . . . zn ∈ {0, 1}k, we have that
the action of Uχ∗ after applying U
(i)
g2 for i = 0, . . . , 2
k−1 will be as described in (4.60). Finally,
the intermediate memory state (5.9) can be uncomputed by the action of U †χ1 · · ·U
†
χn−k . Formally,
the quantum bit oracle acts upon w+ n− k + 1 qubit state |0w〉 |x1 . . . xn−k〉 |b〉 and consists of:
1. Apply the unitary operators Uχn−k · · ·Uχ1 to obtain |g1(x1, . . . , xn−k)〉 |x1 . . . xn−k〉 |b〉.




|g(x1, . . . , xn−k, zn−k+1, . . . , zn)〉 |x1 . . . xn−k〉 |b
i−1⊕
j=0
χ(x1 . . . xn−kzn−k+1 . . . zn)〉 . (5.10)
(b) Apply Uχ∗ to obtain
|g(x1, . . . , xn−k, zn−k+1, . . . , zn)〉 |x1 . . . xn−k〉 |b
i⊕
j=0
χ(x1 . . . xn−kzn−k+1 . . . zn)〉 . (5.11)
3. Apply the unitary operator U
(2k)
g2 to obtain
|g1(x1, . . . , xn−k)〉 |x1 . . . xn−k〉 |b
i⊕
j=0
χ(x1 . . . xn−kzn−k+1 . . . zn)〉 . (5.12)
4. Apply the sequence of unitary operators U †χ1 · · ·U
†
χn−k to obtain
|0w〉 |x1 . . . xn−k〉 |b
2k−1⊕
j=0
χ(x1 . . . xn−kzn−k+1 . . . zn)〉 . (5.13)
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We give an explicit example of how we can adapt this method to improve Schwabe and West-
erbaan’s quantum bit oracle [SW16] (see Section 2.5.1), which was the original work pub-
lished [Pri18] at WAIFI 2018 by the author.
5.1.2 Introducing the PARENTS to your instance of MQ(F2, n,m)
In the context of instances ofMQ(F2, n,m), the PARENTS approach has the following interpre-
tation. We use PARENTS in conjunction with the low-memory quantum oracle design for the
MQ problem (see Section 2.4.2) and the cost for the quantum bit oracles Of̃ (k) for individual
equation given by Table 2.5. As before, we cannot use this approach with the counter-based
quantum oracle design (see Section 2.4.3). The memory register uses w = m + 1 qubits, where
1 qubit is used for temporary storage for computation and m qubits act as an equation register
which will store the evaluated equations
|f̃ (1)(x1, . . . , xn)〉 . . . |f̃ (m)(x1, . . . , xn)〉 , (5.14)
which we recall will be in the state |1n〉 if and only if the original m equations in n variables
f (1)(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , f
(m)(x1, . . . , xn) are satisfied by the assignment x1 . . . xn ∈ {0, 1}n.
We can express any degree two equation f (l)(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ F2[x1, . . . , xn] where

















f (l)(x1, . . . , xn) = f
(l)
1 (x1, . . . , xn−k) + f
(l)


















We therefore have that
g2(x1, . . . , xn) = f
(1)
2 (x1, . . . , xn−k, xn−k+1, . . . , xn)‖ . . . ‖f
(m)
2 (x1, . . . , xn−k, xn−k+1, . . . , xn)‖0, (5.18)
where the last bit is the single bit used for computation of the y
(l)
i . If we apply the preprocessing
step of PARENTS for a chosen 0 ≤ k ≤ n, then it is clear that g1(x1, . . . , xn−k) remains
unchanged, whilst for zn−k+1 . . . zn ∈ {0, 1}k we have that
f
(l)




















As zn−k+1 . . . zn ∈ {0, 1}k, we therefore have that f
(l)
2 (x1, . . . , xn−k, zn−k+1, . . . , zn) is simply a
linear equation in n− k variables, involving up to n− k variables and 1 constant term.
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We therefore have that Uχn−k · · ·Uχ1 can be accomplished by m quantum bit oracles for m
equations in n−k variables, whilst the 2k + 1 unitaries U (0)g2 , U
(1)
g2 , . . . , U
(2k)
g2 are each m additions
of linear equations involving n − k variables and 1 constant. Uχ∗ remains as a ∧m(X) gate
with the m qubit equation register as the controls and the output of the quantum register as the
target. Putting all this together we obtain the cost formula for Grover’s algorithm in conjunction
with the PARENTS approach by using the cost of the quantum bit oracle Of̃ (l) from Table 2.4









2m((n− k)2 + 18(n− k)− 20) + 40(n− k)− 60 + 4n
+ (2k + 1)m(n− k + 1) + 2k(40m− 64)
)
. (5.20)
5.1.3 Asymptotic and concrete results
As before, we can find the asymptotic complexity of this approach via simply taking the derivative
of Equation (5.20) with respect to k. Once this derivative is set equal to 0 and solved for k, we
obtain that the optimal value of k is on the order of O (log2(n)). After substitution, we obtain





. This does not improve upon the asymptotic complexity of the GENTS low-
memory approach but does offer concrete advantages, as can be seen in Table 5.1. By numerical
simulation and using the cost metric of total quantum circuit-size as an optimisation target, we
obtain the following results by relying on our PARENTS to solve an instance ofMQ(F2, n,m).
λ MQ(F2, n,m) #Clifford #T #Total T Total #Qubits Success k Oracle type
gates gates gates depth depth %
80 2 · MQ(F2, 117, 117) 2 · 276.9 2 · 273.46 2 · 277.03 2 · 273.23 2 · 276.19 228 ≈ 100.00 8 Low-memory [SW16]/PARENTS
80 2 · MQ(F2, 117, 117) 2 · 278.35 2 · 274.05 2 · 278.43 2 · 273.12 2 · 277.23 236 ≈ 100.00 5 Low-memory [SW16]/GENTS
80 2 · MQ(F2, 117, 117) 2 · 279.89 2 · 274.53 2 · 279.97 2 · 274.53 2 · 279.89 236 ≈ 100.00 N/A Low-memory [SW16]
80 2 · MQ(F2, 117, 117) 2 · 280.88 2 · 276.76 2 · 280.96 2 · 275.57 2 · 280.88 126 ≈ 100.00 N/A Counter-based [SW16]
128 2 · MQ(F2, 209, 209) 2 · 2124.96 2 · 2120.78 2 · 2125.04 2 · 2120.55 2 · 2124.04 411 ≈ 100.00 9 Low-memory [SW16]/PARENTS
128 2 · MQ(F2, 209, 209) 2 · 2126.44 2 · 2121.32 2 · 2126.47 2 · 2120.41 2 · 2125.27 420 ≈ 100.00 6 Low-memory [SW16]/GENTS
128 2 · MQ(F2, 209, 209) 2 · 2128.35 2 · 2123.38 2 · 2128.34 2 · 2122.18 2 · 2128.35 420 ≈ 100.00 N/A Low-memory [SW16]
128 2 · MQ(F2, 209, 209) 2 · 2129.34 2 · 2124.42 2 · 2129.39 2 · 2123.21 2 · 2129.34 219 ≈ 100.00 N/A Counter-based [SW16]
256 2 · MQ(F2, 457, 457) 2 · 2251.75 2 · 2246.45 2 · 2251.79 2 · 2246.20 2 · 2250.77 906 ≈ 100.00 10 Low-memory [SW16]/PARENTS
256 2 · MQ(F2, 457, 457) 2 · 2253.25 2 · 2247.03 2 · 2253.26 2 · 2246.10 2 · 2252.26 916 ≈ 100.00 7 Low-memory [SW16]/GENTS
256 2 · MQ(F2, 457, 457) 2 · 2255.69 2 · 2249.63 2 · 2255.72 2 · 2248.42 2 · 2255.69 916 ≈ 100.00 N/A Low-memory [SW16]
256 2 · MQ(F2, 457, 457) 2 · 2256.69 2 · 2250.65 2 · 2256.71 2 · 2249.44 2 · 2256.69 468 ≈ 100.00 N/A Counter-based [SW16]
Table 5.1: Quantum resource estimates for solving MQ(F2, n,m) using Grover and PARENTS.
As is becoming a theme, we break the proposed parameters for the Gui cryptosystem. There are
several advantages to employing PARENTS, compared to GENTS. The first is that we strictly
use fewer ∧2(X) gates as we do not need to uncompute and recompute additions to the equation
registers using these gates. This leads to a slightly smaller gate count and crucially, a lower T
gate count. If we are optimising towards the T gate metric, then PARENTS has the edge over
the ENTS and GENTS approaches in this metric. PARENTS also requires slightly fewer qubits.
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5.2 Nested-quantum-search-and-memory
The concept of nesting of quantum search is well-known [CGW00], but this is usually exploited
to make asymptotic gains with regards to the query complexity of algorithms — a quantum
search algorithm that essentially works in an analogue of pruning a search tree. If the search
problem is defined by the boolean indicator function is defined by χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} and
furthermore we have the decomposition
χ(x1 . . . xn) 7→ χ1(x1 . . . xk) ∧ χ2(x1 . . . xn) (5.21)
where
χ1 : {0, 1}k −→ {0, 1} and χ2 : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} (5.22)
then amplitude amplification (see Theorem 3.6) can be used to create a quantum algorithm that
exploits this structure. We sketch this approach, which will be used later. We have used Grover’s
algorithm up til now and the reader unfamiliar with amplitude amplification is advised to revisit
Definition 3.1 of the success probability of a boolean function relative to a quantum algorithm,
our formulation of amplitude amplification in Theorem 3.6 as well as Definition 3.8 which gives
the Hadamard transformation on n qubits and Theorem 3.7 (Quadratic Speedup).
5.3 A basic nested quantum search algorithm
Let the quantum phase oracles Oχ and Oχ1 be defined by the boolean indicator functions given
above and assume that Mχ = |χ−1(1)| = 1 and Mχ1 = |χ−11 (1)|, which is known. We define
the initial quantum algorithm A1 = H⊗k ⊗ I⊗n−k, which has a success probability of a ≥
Mχ1
2k
relative to χ1 : {0, 1}k −→ {0, 1} if we consider only the first k qubits. By using amplitude
amplification with Theorem 3.7, we can create a quantum algorithm B that succeeds with a
success probability of b ≥ 1 − Mχ1
2k





the quantum phase oracle Oχ1 and quantum algorithm A1. We will know b as we know Mχ1 .
We can then define A2 = I⊗k ⊗ H⊗n−k, and in turn define the new quantum algorithm C,
which involves first executing B to create a superposition of elements in the first k bit register
which has a probability b of satisfying χ1(x1 . . . xk) = 1 and then using amplitude amplification
on the second n − k qubit register with the quantum algorithm A2 and quantum oracle Oχ.
The quantum algorithm C therefore creates the state |ϕ〉 |ψ〉, where |ϕ〉 has a probability of b of
measuring x1 . . . xk ∈ {0, 1}k such that χ1(x1 . . . xk) = 1. If we have measured such an element
and then measure the second register |ψ〉 then we have a probability of c′ ≥ 1− 1
2n−k
of obtaining
bitstring xk+1 . . . xn ∈ {0, 1}n−k such that χ(x1 . . . xkxk+1 . . . xn) = 1. C costs 1 application of B
and
√
2n−k applications of A2 and has a success probability of bc
′
Mχ1
≈ 1Mχ1 relative to χ.
We can therefore use amplitude amplification one final time in conjunction with C and Oχ








calls to the quantum
oracles Oχ1 and Oχ and has an asymptotic success probability of 1.
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If we compare this with Grover’s algorithm, the best we could do would be to use the quantum
phase oracle Oχ for a cost of O(
√
2n) or repeatedly search and sample using Grover’s algorithm
with the quantum phase oracle Oχ1 , then test the remaining n−k variables using a Grover search
with the quantum oracle Oχ. This sampling approach would therefore require on the order of









hence nesting quantum search procedures allows us to exploit information gained at levels of the
search tree implicitly defined by the introduction of variables into computation.
5.3.1 Better memory management through nesting amplitude amplification
We use the nesting of quantum search procedures in a fundamentally different way, as no ex-
ploitable information concerning whether an assignment of any subset of variables is potentially
part of a solution will be revealed for any subset of variables. Whilst our method bears similarity
to that used by Arunachalamref and de Wolf [AdW17] in their technique to optimise Grover’s
algorithm in relation to the total number of quantum gates for other than those used in the quan-
tum phase oracle — they treat the quantum phase oracle as a black-box. We require structure
to make gains, using our tree decomposition of the quantum bit oracle (see Definition 4.11) and
demonstrate that we can obtain computational gains above the ENTS, GENTS or PARENTS
approaches in certain metrics via this method.
The GENTS and PARENTS approaches share a simple concept — we compute the quantum
bit oracle up to a certain level using the sequence of unitary operators Uχk · · ·Uχ1 , then perform
a secondary search from this level so that we can exploit the computational effort we have
invested in executing Uχk · · ·Uχ1 . We can perform this same trick with amplitude amplification.
The method can be treated more formally and given a completely recursive treatment, but
unfortunately time pressures on the author did not permit including these proofs and results in
the thesis. We present the method as a simple two-stage search procedure, which will capture the
majority of the gains (through computational experiments, the number of levels never exceeded
3 and the gains were minor past 2 levels). We leave a full analysis of this for future work.
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Theorem 5.1 (Making better use of memory via nested quantum search).
Let χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} andMχ = |χ−1(1)| = 1 define a search problem and let Uχ1 , . . . , Uχn , Uχ∗
be a tree-decomposition (see Definition 4.11) of the quantum bit oracle O(b)χ , which uses w qubits
for memory, n qubits for the search space and 1 qubit for the output.







relative to χ and which costs
EB1 = EH⊗n−k +
n−k∑
i=1












EB2 = EH⊗k + k2
(
Eχ∗ + 2 ·
n∑
i=n−k+1
Eχi + Ek̄ + 2EH⊗k
)
(5.25)

























Proof. We consider the application of a quantum algorithm
A1 = Iw ⊗H⊗n−k ⊗ Ik+1 (5.28)
to the computational basis state (where d ∈ {0, 1})
|0w〉 |0n〉 |d〉 . (5.29)





|0w〉 |x〉 |0k〉 |d〉 . (5.30)
As Mχ = |χ−1(1)| = 1, for any 0 < k < n there exists a single x′ ∈ {0, 1}n−k and y′ ∈ {0, 1}k
such that χ(x′‖y′) = 1. If we examine the effect of a secondary algorithm
A2 = Iw+n−k ⊗H⊗k ⊗ I (5.31)
upon the computational basis state
|0w〉 |x′〉 |0k〉 |d〉 , (5.32)
then this results in the state
k∑
y∈{0,1}
|0w〉 |x′〉 |y〉 |d〉 . (5.33)
If we define the boolean function χx′‖ : {0, 1}k −→ {0, 1} by the action χx′‖(y) 7→ χ(x′‖y), then
A2 has a success probability of 12k relative to χx′‖ for this computational basis state. We can
therefore use amplitude amplification with Oχx′‖ and the quantum algorithm A2 to produce a
quantum algorithm B2 that succeeds with success probability b2 ≥ 1− 12k relative to χx′‖ on this












where Rk = I⊗w+n−k ⊗ −O0k ⊗ I. If we apply B2A1 to the state (5.29), then we achieve a
quantum algorithm with a success probability of b2
2n−k
relative to χ, as we have a 1
2n−k
chance of
measuring the first n− k qubits as x′ and a chance of b2 to measure y′ if we have measured x′.

































From here, we note that we can replace the quantum phase oracle with the tree-decomposition













χn−k+1 · · ·U
†
χnUχ∗Uχn · · ·Uχn−k+1Uχn−k · · ·Uχ1
)k2
A2 (5.37)






χn−k+1 · · ·U
†
χnUχ∗Uχn · · ·Uχn−k+1
)k2
A2Uχn−k · · ·Uχ1 (5.38)
as A2 introduces the last k variables, whereas Uχn−k · · ·Uχ1 involves only the first n−k variables.







χn−k+1 · · ·U
†
χnUχ∗Uχn · · ·Uχn−k+1
)k1






χn−k+1 · · ·U
†
χnUχ∗Uχn · · ·Uχn−k+1
)k2
A2 (5.40)
In this way, we have pushed a portion of the cost to an earlier part of the quantum ora-
cle computation which has a smaller query complexity — just as in the ENTS, GENTS and
PARENTS approach. If we tally the costs, we therefore get that this approach has a cost of
EB1 = EH⊗n−k +
n−k∑
i=1












EB̄2 = EH⊗k + k2
(
EUχ∗ + 2 ·
n∑
i=n−k+1
EUχi + Ek̄ + 2EH⊗k
)
(5.42)

























5.3.2 Asymptotic and concrete results
If we consider the higher-order terms for the low-memory approach and the high-memory ap-
proach as discussed with regards to the GENTS approach in Section 4.5 then we can derive their
corresponding asymptotic complexities.





hence taking the derivative with respect to k and solving the subsequent equation set equal to 0
for k gives us that the optimal value of k is on the order of O (2 log2 n). Substitution of this value










We can use the same method as described above to derive that the optimal value of k is in
the order of O (4 log2 n). Substitution into the original cost equation therefore gives us that the






Table 5.2 below gives the concrete results with regards to the low-memory strategy and the
high memory strategy, as discussed above.
λ MQ(F2, n,m) #Clifford #T #Total T Total #Qubits Success k Oracle type
gates gates gates depth depth %
80 2 · MQ(F2, 117, 117) 2 · 277.86 2 · 276.21 2 · 278.26 2 · 274.99 2 · 277.86 236 ≈ 100.00 7 Low-memory [SW16]/Theorem 5.1
80 2 · MQ(F2, 117, 117) 2 · 275.03 2 · 273.39 2 · 275.43 2 · 272.32 2 · 272.39 1756 ≈ 100.00 13 High-memory [SW16]/Theorem 5.1
80 2 · MQ(F2, 117, 117) 2 · 279.89 2 · 274.53 2 · 279.97 2 · 274.53 2 · 279.89 236 ≈ 100.00 N/A Low-memory [SW16]
80 2 · MQ(F2, 117, 117) 2 · 280.88 2 · 276.76 2 · 280.96 2 · 275.57 2 · 280.88 126 ≈ 100.00 N/A Counter-based [SW16]
128 2 · MQ(F2, 209, 209) 2 · 2125.76 2 · 2123.9 2 · 2126.12 2 · 2123.95 2 · 2125.77 420 ≈ 100.00 9 Low-memory [SW16]/Theorem 5.1
128 2 · MQ(F2, 209, 209) 2 · 2122.19 2 · 2120.46 2 · 2122.58 2 · 2119.37 2 · 2119.15 3763 ≈ 100.00 16 High-memory [SW16]/Theorem 5.1
128 2 · MQ(F2, 209, 209) 2 · 2128.35 2 · 2123.38 2 · 2128.34 2 · 2122.18 2 · 2128.35 420 ≈ 100.00 N/A Low-memory [SW16]
128 2 · MQ(F2, 209, 209) 2 · 2129.34 2 · 2124.42 2 · 2129.39 2 · 2123.21 2 · 2129.34 219 ≈ 100.00 N/A Counter-based [SW16]
256 2 · MQ(F2, 457, 457) 2 · 2252.29 2 · 2250.29 2 · 2252.60 2 · 2249.20 2 · 2252.29 916 ≈ 100.00 11 Low-memory [SW16]/Theorem 5.1
256 2 · MQ(F2, 457, 457) 2 · 2247.73 2 · 2244.75 2 · 2248.08 2 · 2244.75 2 · 2244.18 10055 ≈ 100.00 20 High-memory [SW16]/Theorem 5.1
256 2 · MQ(F2, 457, 457) 2 · 2255.69 2 · 2249.63 2 · 2255.72 2 · 2248.42 2 · 2255.69 916 ≈ 100.00 N/A Low-memory [SW16]
256 2 · MQ(F2, 457, 457) 2 · 2256.69 2 · 2250.65 2 · 2256.71 2 · 2249.44 2 · 2256.69 468 ≈ 100.00 N/A Counter-based [SW16]




Search with Two Oracles approach
If a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be content
to begin with doubts he shall end in certainties.
- Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning [Bac05]
In this chapter we examine how the quantum search algorithm put forth by Kimmel et
al. [KYYLHH15], designed to lower the quantum resources required when we have multiple
quantum search oracles at our disposal, can be adapted to real-world problems, such as quantum
cryptanalysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard and the Multivariate Quadratic hardness
assumption. Their technique, posed as a solution to a problem entitled Search with Two Oracles
(STO), is designed to reduce the total cost of quantum search when there exists one quantum
search oracle which is expensive but marks the single target we are searching for, whilst the other
quantum search oracle is relatively cheap and marks a subset of the search-space which includes
this target, and we know the size of this larger subset precisely.
The main contribution of this chapter is demonstrating how their technique can be adapted
to lower quantum resource estimates for quantum search applied to these problems when there is
uncertainty in the number of additional targets that the cheaper oracle marks. In particular we
note that in this scenario we can obtain the cost benefits of their approach, without increasing the
number of qubits required, by artifically ensuring that the cheaper oracle marks a large number
of bitstrings which we know are not solutions to the problem instance. By introducing these
false targets into the search space we ensure that the ratio between the true number of targets
marked by this oracle and the guessed number of targets marked by this oracle is close to 1 as
the number of false targets increases. In concrete terms, this allows us to lower the quantum
resource estimates for applying quantum search to instances of the key-search problem for the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and in solving instances of MQ(F2, n,m), particularly
with regards to low-qubit implementations of quantum search for these problems.
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These gains are modest, but significant, in that they outperform Grover’s algorithm naively
applied to these problems [GLRS16, SW16] and the quantum resources required to perform
cryptanalysis of AES are relevant to the ongoing NIST standardisation process for quantum-
resistant public-key cryptosystems [oST16b, oST16a]. That the low-qubit MQ oracle requires
only n+ dlog2me+ 1 qubits to implement means that this oracle may be one of the first appli-
cations of quantum search that is possible to implement, even if asymptotically more efficient
designs are possible when greater number of qubits are available [BY18, FHK+17].
In Section 6.1 we discuss the Search with Two Oracles (STO) problem [KYYLHH15] and the
complications in applying their method to several problems in cryptanalysis, that of applying
STO to real-world problems. In Section 6.2 we discuss how, given these problems, we can adapt
their method and in Section 6.3 we conclude with new resource estimates for the single-target
quantum cryptanalysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and low-qubit quantum
cryptanalysis of the Multivariate Quadratic problem over F2.
6.1 Reviewing Oracles with Costs
We now review the Search with Two Oracles (STO) problem and its cost-effective solution as
proposed by Kimmel et al. [KYYLHH15]. We make a minor modification to their results, in
that we include additional costs other than the quantum oracle. These changes preserve their
results and capture the use-case of our extension to the solution to the STO problem. Our
results will follow naturally from this formulation. In all cases, cost may be taken to mean either
circuit-depth or circuit-size.
6.1.1 The STO problem and a solution
Definition 6.1 (Search with Two Oracles (STO) [KYYLHH15]).
Let f∗, fS : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} be two boolean functions with the property that
f−1∗ (1) ⊆ f−1S (1) where M∗ = |f
−1
∗ (1)| ∈ {0, 1} and MS = |f−1S (1)| (6.1)




The Search with Two Oracles (STO) problem is to locate an element x ∈ {0, 1}n such that
f∗(x) = 1 or prove that no such element exists. It is given that EO∗ ≥ EOS .
Kimmel et al. [KYYLHH15] provide us with the promise that we know the exact value of
MS . This is not a realistic scenario for most problems and so in this section we examine both




6.1.2 A classical solution to the STO problem
A classical solution to the STO problem is to simply perform an exhaustive search on the domain
{0, 1}n with fS and when we have obtained an element such that fS(x) = 1, we test it to check
whether f∗(x) = 1. This is akin to a filtering process and both the STO solution suggested by
Kimmel et al. and our own adaptation use this basic idea — though our adaptation is somewhat
harder to draw a classical analogy for.
The complexity of the above approach can be computed — we can expect to sample 2
n+1
2
elements until we have located the single element x ∈ {0, 1}n that satisfies f∗(x) = 1, just as in
the case of naive exhaustive search. Of these elements, we can expect that MS2n satisfy fS(x) = 1.











whilst the expected cost of using a naive exhaustive search with f∗ would be
2n+1
2 · Cost(f∗).
This approach forms the basis of the solution of Kimmel et al. to the STO problem. We note
that if Cost(fS) = Cost(f∗) then the above approach offers no advantage.
6.1.3 Previous quantum solutions to the STO problem
Kimmel et al. offer three algorithms to solve STO. If E∗ = ES , then we simply use Grover’s
algorithm with the quantum oracle O∗ and ignore the quantum oracle OS , whilst if E∗ > ES we
use the quantum algorithm we describe below. The third algorithm interpolates between these
two quantum algorithms, but is not relevant to the adaptation we present in this chapter.
We now describe their solution and give its approximate costs, then examine its correctness
under potential real-world use cases where we can only guess that MS = M
′
S . It will be easily
seen that the cost of our modification is both strictly less than the solution of Kimmel et al. and
is easier to describe in closed form, as it can precisely be described in terms of the Clifford+T
gate set without having to rely upon the approximation of the arbitrary single-qubit unitary
transformations that exact amplitude amplification requires.
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Theorem 6.2 (Solution to the STO problem using exact amplitude amplification [KYYLHH15]).
Let fs, f∗ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} and M∗,MS define an instance of the STO problem.
There exists a quantum algorithm with a success probability of 1 relative to f∗ and which has






Proof. In the following, we allow Z1 and Z2 to be arbitrary single-qubit unitary transformations
used to enable exact amplitude amplification. The functions f̂S and f̂∗ are defined as in the




cost approximately the same as the quantum bit oracles O(b)fS and O
(b)
f∗
. This is easily seen to be
true in the case of the single-target preimage search problem defined by h : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}m
and yh ∈ {0, 1}m, as if |h(x)
?
= yh〉 is written via a ∧m(X) gate then we simply use a ∧m+1(X)













We first define the quantum algorithm A = H⊗n (the Walsh-Hadamard transform) and use exact
amplitude amplification (see Theorem 3.11) to create a quantum algorithm B with a success
probability of 1 relative to the function fS . By Theorem 3.11, B has a cost of




Ef̂S + En+1 + 2EH⊗n⊗Z1
)
(6.3)
We can then define a second quantum algorithm, C, by using exact amplitude amplification
with the quantum algorithm set to be B, which has a success probability relative to f∗ of 1MS .
By Theorem 3.6, we can create a quantum algorithm C with a success probability of 1 relative
to f∗. By Theorem 3.11, C has a cost of
EC = EB⊗Z2 +
 π4 arcsin√ 1MS
 ·
(
Ef̂∗ + En+1 + 2EB⊗Z2
)
. (6.4)
Using the fact that arcsinx ≈ x and that Ef̂ ≈ Ef therefore gives us that the approximate cost











2n · EfS . (6.5)




queries, but relative to a less expensive oracle. However, this asymptotic notation hides the
constant in front of EfS , which is an important real-world factor and hinders (but does not rule
out) a recursive strategy from being efficient if we possess fSi : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} such that
f−1∗ (1) ⊆ f−1S1 (1) and f
−1
Si
(1) ⊆ f−1Si+1(1). We will later provide an exact cost for a modified
version of this algorithm exploiting only exact amplitude amplification in Section 6.2. Now that
the costs have been discussed, we turn to the correctness of this algorithm under real-world




6.1.4 On the probability of success of the solution to the STO problem
Theorem 3.11 describes the behaviour of one implementation of exact amplitude amplification
when we make the wrong guess for the success probability of the quantum algorithm A relative
to the boolean function χ. We can therefore use this to obtain an expression which gives us the
success probability of the solution to the STO problem described in Theorem 6.2 when we make
make the guess that MS = M
′
S . We will retain the promise that M∗ = 1.
Theorem 6.3 (Success probability of the STO solution under the assumption MS = M
′
s).
Let fs, f∗ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} and M∗,MS define an instance of the STO problem.
Suppose we guess MS = M
′

















bg − b · bg
bg − b · b̂g
)
+
b · bg − b · b̂g


































ag − a · ag
ag − a · âg
)
+
a · ag − a · âg

















and a = MS2n .
Proof. Under the assumption that MS = M
′
S , then we have guessed that the quantum algorithm
A = H⊗n has a success probability of ag =
M ′S
2n , when in reality it is a =
MS
2n . By Theorem 3.11,
the algorithm B as described in the proof of Theorem 6.2 has a success probability of z relative
to the boolean function fS and a success probability of b =
z
MS
relative to f∗. Our guess for the
success probability of B relative to fS is 1 and our guess for the success probability of B relative




By using Theorem 3.11 again, we have that algorithm C as described in Theorem 6.2 has a
probability of success of c relative to f∗.
We now have a computational method of examining the projected success probability of
algorithm C under the potentially erroneous assumption that MS = M ′S . We note that if we
have guessed correctly, then it is easily seen by substitution that z = 1 and c = 1 as in Theorem
6.2. We demonstrate the how the success probability of C changes relative to various values of
MS and M
′
S in Figure 6-1 on the next page.
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Figure 6-1: Success of C with n = 128, M∗ = 1 and varied MS .
As can be seen from Figure 6-1, the solution of Kimmel et al. can fail if we have guessed
wrongly that MS = M
′
S . The success probability is not reliant upon the absolute value of the
difference |MS −M ′S |, but is instead reliant upon the ratio MS : M ′S . This is easily observed
by examining equations (6.6) and (6.7) above, as the quantity MS
M ′S
affects the probability z and
both the quantities z and
M ′S
MS
impact upon c, the success probability of C relative to f∗.
Quantum counting [BHT98, BHMT02] in conjunction with the oracle OfS can determine
MS to the required precision. Whilst obtaining the correct value of MS obviously ensures that
algorithm C succeeds with probability 1 relative to f∗, this approach may wipe out the com-
putational gains and the quantum counting must be performed before we execute C. We could
alternatively simply run the computation multiple times, but this again increases the cost. We
suggest a modification in Section 6.2 which recovers the correctness and computational gains.
In the modification we present in Section 6.2, we exploit the fact that it is the ratio MS : M
′
S
that affects the success probability of C relative to f∗ and artificially modify this ratio to restore
the correctness of this approach to solving the STO problem whilst retaining the computational
advantages offered by this algorithm.
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6.2 A modified solution to the STO problem
We now turn to our modified STO algorithm. The algorithm is essentially the solution of Kimmel
et al. with two modifications that take into account the fact that we are only guessing at MS and
may only know the discrete probability distribution Pr [MS = X] rather than the exact value of
MS . The first modification is minor — as the point of using exact amplitude amplification is to
achieve a deterministic quantum algororithm with a success probability of 1 relative to f∗ and
the probability that we have guessed the correct value of MS may be small, we will simply use
amplitude amplification (see Theorem 3.6) instead of exact amplitude amplification (see Theorem
3.11). This simplifies the analysis and the modified algorithm can be implemented exactly by
any universal quantum gate set that can implement Grover’s algorithm exactly.
The second modification is the core result and allows us to increase the success probability
of the algorithm by changing the ratio MS : M
′
S . This is done by noting that fact that the ratio
2t + Ms : 2
t + M ′S approaches 1 when 2
t > MS and as t → 2n. Thus, if we can instead modify
the cheaper quantum oracle to work with this ratio instead of MS : M
′
S , then we can tame the
success probability when only the discrete probability distribution Pr [MS = X] is known.
Theorem 6.4 (A modified solution to the STO problem).
Let fS , f∗ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}, M∗ ∈ {0, 1} and MS = |f−1S (1)| define an instance of the STO
problem, where MS is unknown. Let M
′
S ∈ N and ε ∈ [0, 1] be such that Pr[MS ≥M ′S ] ≤ ε and
let t ∈ N such that 0 ≤ t ≤ n. Then there exists a quantum algorithm that terminates with a
success probability relative to f∗ greater than




























+ (2k1 + 1)(2k2 + 1)EH⊗n (6.10)





















Proof. Let S = f
−1(1)
S and Zt =
{
1n−t‖x′ : x′ ∈ {0, 1}t
}
be the set of 2t bitstrings of length n
whose first n− t values are 1. We now define the function fS∪Zt : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} by
fS∪Zt(x) 7→
1 (fS(x) = 1) ∨ (x ∈ Zt)0 otherwise (6.12)
and use the notation MS∪Zt = |f−1S∪Zt(1)|. This naturally defines the quantum phase oracle
OfS∪Zt , which will replace the role of the quantum phase oracle OfS . We will detail how OfS∪Zt
may be constructed from the quantum evaluation EfS and prove the computational resources
required for our modification after first proving a computational lower bound on the success
probability of our modification.
Our first step is to define the quantum algorithm B by using amplitude amplification (see



































 = b′ (6.14)
by using the fact that x ≤ arcsinx, x − 1 < bxc and that the argument of sine in (6.13) is less
than π2 , hence we can exploit the fact that sine is an increasing function on the domain [0,
π
2 ].
We therefore have a computational lower bound b′ on the success probability of B relative to
fS∪Zt . The success probability of B relative to f∗ is therefore bMS∪Zt and our lower bound on the




































M ′S + 2
t
 = c′ (6.16)
relative to f∗ using the same strategy and arguments used to derive that b > b
′ in conjunction
with the fact that b
′
M ′S+2
t ≤ bMS∪Zt ≤
1
2t . We therefore have a computational lower-bound on the
success probability of C assuming that MS < M ′S . The probability of this occurring is at least
1− ε by assumption, hence the success probability of C relative to f∗ is greater than (1− ε) · c′.
117
Implementing OfS∪Zt . We assume that we possess a circuit to compute the quantum evaluation




quantum bit oracle O(b)fS . The identity A ∨ B ≡ A ⊕ B ⊕ (A ∧B) implies we can implement
fS∪Zt : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} via computing
fS∪Zt(x) = fS(x)⊕ (x ∈ Zt)⊕ (fS(x) ∧ (x ∈ Zt)) . (6.17)
We can compute O(b)fS∪Zt with a single ancilla qubit. We first compute and store |fS(x)〉 in this
ancilla qubit via one quantum evaluation EfS and write it to the output qubit using a single
∧1(X) gate. We can then write |(x
?
∈ Zt)〉 to the output qubit via a single ∧n−t(X) gate with
the controls set to be the first n− t qubits of |x〉. The addition of fS(X)∧ (x ∈ Zt) is performed
via a single ∧n−t+1(X) gate with the controls set to be the first n− t qubits of |x〉 as before and
the additional control being the qubit holding |fS(x)〉. The output register then holds
|x〉 |g(x)〉 |fS(x)〉 |fS(x)⊕ (x ∈ Zt)⊕ (fS(x) ∧ (x ∈ Zt))〉 (6.18)
and we need only execute E†fS (the quantum evaluation EfS in reverse) to clear up the working
memory used to compute |fS(x)〉. Assuming that we have a single qubit kept in the state |−〉,
the quantum phase oracle OfS∪Zt therefore has an execution cost of
EOfS∪Zt
= 2EEfS + E∧n−t(X) + E∧n−t+1(X) + E∧1(X) (6.19)
and as a ∧k(X) gate can be implemented with O(k) gates, it is easily seen that EOfS∪Zt ≈ EOfS
if we are working with quantum evaluations as we can implement a quantum bit oracle via two
quantum evaluations and one ∧1(X) gate.









, we have that
EB = EH⊗n + k1 ·
(
2EEfS + ∧1(X) + E∧n−t(X) + E∧n−t+1(X) + En̄ + 2EH⊗n
)
. (6.20)









, we have that
EC = EB + k2
(








+ (2k1 + 1)(2k2 + 1)EH⊗n (6.23)
+ (2k2 + 1)k1
(
2EEfS + E∧n−t(X) + E∧n−t+1(X) + E∧1(X) + En̄
)
. (6.24)
Putting these execution costs together, we have the total cost as given in Theorem 6.4.
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· 2(n−t)/2, k2 ≈
π
4




Under the assumption that 2EEfS∪Zt
≈ EOfS∪Zt (as it is for the single-target preimage search
problem) and that EH⊗n  EOfS  EOf∗ , we have that the term
π2
8 · 2
n/2 ·EOfS will dominate
the execution cost, as in the original solution to the STO problem given in Theorem 6.3.
6.2.1 Advantages and disadvantages of the STO approach
Our main concern is the circuit-size of the quantum circuit, but circuit-depth is also an important
metric. We briefly discuss the impact of our approach upon quantum circuit-depth. If EOf∗ and
EOfS represent the respective quantum circuit-depths of the quantum oracles Of∗ and OfS , then
if we are using a fully parallel approach to implementing these oracles then it may hold that
EOf∗ ≈ EOfS — this can easily be seen to occur in the case where f∗ and fS are derived from a
constraint-based decomposition (see Definition 2.24) and we evaluate each constraint in parallel.
If we are considering circuit-depth as the sole metric in this scenario, then the STO technique
will negatively impact upon circuit depth.
One potential countermeasure for this is trading off some of the advantage in circuit-size/circuit-
width for circuit-depth via a fixing strategy and running instances in parallel. In this scenario,
we have multiple quantum computers and run parallel quantum search procedures upon the
problem, with k out of n bits fixed. This leads to a scenario where we are running 2k algorithms
in parallel on separate quantum computers, but each at a much smaller cost. Unfortunately it is
well-known [Zal99] that Grover’s algorithm at least is not embarassingly parallel procedure, in
that this fixing strategy would result in a speedup of approximately 2k/2 but also increase the
total number of quantum gates that we must execute by approximately 2k/n. This can easily be
seen as if the circuit-size of the quantum oracle is fixed at C and the circuit-depth is fixed at D,
then the total number of gates we must execute will be
2k · 2
n−k




2 · C (6.26)




We note that this fixing strategy may negate the need to use the STO approach, as if the number
of solutions MS = |f−1S (1)| is small then fixing bits of the search-space may reduce the problem to
that of a single-target search problem where we simply use the cheaper quantum oracle OfS with
Grover’s algorithm and avoid the constant increase in costs associated with using the quantum
oracle Ofs with STO approach.
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6.3 Applications of STO to quantum resource estimation
We now proceed to examine applications of our approach to obtain new quantum resource es-
timations for solving both instances of MQ(F2, n,m) (see Section 1.3) and the AES key-search
problem (see Section 1.4). The quantum oracles and evaluations for these problems were previ-
ously discussed respectively in Sections 2.5.2 and 2.6. In this section we examine several applica-
tions of the modified STO approach given in Theorem 6.4 to existing quantum resource estimates
in cryptanalysis, specifically cryptanalysis via direct quantum search of the MQ problem over
F2 (see Section 1.3) and the key-search problem applied to the AES (see Section 1.4).
Both are instances of the single-target preimage search problem (see Definition 1.2) defined by
h : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}m, Yh = {yh} ⊆ {0, 1}m and the assumption that Mh = |h−1(yh)| = 1, which
in turn defines the boolean indicator χ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} for the unstructured search problem,
where Mχ = |χ−1(1)|. Both problems additionally exhibit a constraint-based decomposition so
that there exist k non-trivial boolean functions χ1, . . . , χk : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} with the property
χ(x) 7→ χ1(x) ∧ · · · ∧ χk(x). (6.28)
In relationship to the STO problem (see Definition 6.1) and Theorem 6.4, we will wish to define
the functions fS , f∗ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1} in relationship to this decomposition. If we induce the
subscript 0 < r ≤ k to the function fS , then we can define the function fSr : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}
fSr(x) 7→ χi1(x) ∧ · · · ∧ χir(x), (6.29)
where i1, . . . , ir ∈ {1, . . . , k} and are unique. In this case, we have that f∗ = fSk and fS = fSr
for some chosen value of r. In the general case it will hold that Eχi may be very different when
i 6= j, but in both the cryptanalysis of theMQ problem over F2 and the key-search problem for
AES-{128, 192, 256} it will hold that Eχi ≈ Eχj .
Given the cost framework we have introduced in Chapters 2 and 3 it will prove a relatively
simple task to compute the circuit-complexity and logical qubit requirements for these scenarios.
The reason why we require our modification to the STO algorithm given in Theorem 6.4 as
opposed to simply using the solution by Kimmel et al given in Theorem 6.2 is because we cannot
exactly know MSr = |f−1Sr (1)|.
6.3.1 On the probability distributions of pseudorandom functions
We will use Markov’s inequality for purposes of computing M ′S such that Pr[MS < M
′
S ] ≥ 1− ε.
Theorem 6.5 (Markov’s inequality [GS01]).
If X is any positive valued random variable such that E[X] <∞ and a > 0, then




Corollary 6.6 (Tail bound via Markov’s inequality).
If X is any positive valued random variable such that E[X] <∞ and a > 0, then
Pr[X ≥ E[X]
a
] ≤ a. (6.31)
Proof. Substitution of a = E[X]a in Markov’s inequality.
To ensure that the condition Pr[MS ≥ M ′S ] ≤ ε holds for a chosen value of ε, we therefore
simply need to take M ′S =
E[X]
ε . With M
′
S and ε fixed, the only parameter left to consider in
Theorem 6.4 is therefore 0 ≤ t ≤ n and by numerical simulation we can compute the success
probability and costs involved for various choices of t by the given formulae.
6.3.1.1 The MQ problem
For an instance of MQ(F2, n,m), the respective cost of the quantum oracles Of∗ and OfS are
therefore simply the cost of quantum oracles for an instance of MQ(F2, n,m) and a quantum
oracle for an instance of MQ(F2, n, r) for 0 < r < m. Explicitly, f∗ = fSm and fS = fSr , where
fSr(x1 . . . xn) 7→
(




∧ · · · ∧
(





For a random instance MQ(F2, n,m) of the MQ problem over F2 we expect each equation to
act as a pseudorandom function, in that for a uniformly chosen x1 . . . xn ∈ {0, 1}n, we expect
f (k)(x1, . . . , xn) to evaluate to 0 or 1 with equal probability. The probability of whether r
equations are satisfied by a given x1 . . . xn ∈ {0, 1}n is then the product of r independent Bernoulli
trials, giving a probability of 2−r that f (1)(x1, . . . , xn) = · · · = f (r)(x1, . . . , xn) = 0. The number
of elements x1 . . . xn ∈ {0, 1}n that are expected to satisfy r ≤ m equations is therefore the
expectation of the binomial distribution with 2n trials, each of which have a success probability
of 2−r. This gives us that the expected number of elements that satisfy r equations is 2n−r.
The cost for theMQ(F2, n,m) quantum bit oracle using both the low-memory and counter-
based approaches described in Section 2.4 are given in Table 2.5. We will examine three scenarios
1. where OfSm and OfSr are both implemented via the low-qubit oracles, so that we use
n+m+ 2 qubits.
2. where OfSm and OfSr are both implemented via the counter-based method, so that we use
n+ dlog2(m+ 1)e+ 2 qubits.
3. where OfSm is implemented via the counter-based method and OfSr is implemented via
the low-qubit approach, where we use an intermediate number of qubits.
We choose ε = 2−15, which gives us that Pr[MS < M
′
S ] ≥ 1− 2−15 > 0.9999, which will give us
our upper-bound for the minimal success probability of our approach.
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We obtain the results in Table 6.1 below by numerical simulation to find an appropriate value
of 0 < t < n by simply increasing t until the probability of success begins to decrease. The code
used to generate these results may be found in the code attached to this thesis. As is standard
in this thesis, we provide the resources required in relation to the initially proposed parameters
for the Gui cryptosystem [PCY+15, PCDY17a, PCDY17b] (see Section 1.3.7). We denote the
cost by 2 · 2x to emphasise that two serial searches are required to forge a signature for Gui.
λ MQ(F2, n,m) #Clifford #T #Total T Total #Qubits Success ε r t Notes
gates gates gates depth depth %
80 2 · MQ(F2, 117, 117) 2 · 278.69 2 · 274.55 2 · 278.77 2 · 273.40 2 · 278.69 236 99.996 2−15 29 111 Low-memory
80 2 · MQ(F2, 117, 117) 2 · 279.68 2 · 275.56 2 · 279.76 2 · 274.39 2 · 279.68 126 99.996 2−15 29 112 Counter-based
80 2 · MQ(F2, 117, 117) 2 · 278.84 2 · 274.70 2 · 278.92 2 · 273.56 2 · 278.84 153 99.996 2−15 34 106 Hybrid approach
80 2 · MQ(F2, 117, 117) 2 · 279.89 2 · 274.53 2 · 279.97 2 · 274.53 2 · 279.89 236 ≈ 100.00 N/A N/A N/A Grover [SW16]
128 2 · MQ(F2, 209, 209) 2 · 2126.45 2 · 2121.52 2 · 2126.49 2 · 2120.37 2 · 2126.45 420 99.996 2−15 33 199 Low-memory
128 2 · MQ(F2, 209, 209) 2 · 2127.42 2 · 2122.49 2 · 2127.46 2 · 2121.32 2 · 2127.42 219 99.996 2−15 34 198 Counter-based
128 2 · MQ(F2, 209, 209) 2 · 2126.55 2 · 2121.63 2 · 2126.59 2 · 2120.47 2 · 2126.55 246 99.996 2−15 35 197 Hybrid approach
128 2 · MQ(F2, 209, 209) 2 · 2128.35 2 · 2123.38 2 · 2128.34 2 · 2122.18 2 · 2128.35 420 ≈ 100.00 N/A N/A N/A Grover [SW16]
256 2 · MQ(F2, 457, 457) 2 · 2252.78 2 · 2246.76 2 · 2252.81 2 · 2245.60 2 · 2252.78 916 99.996 2−15 36 444 Low-memory
256 2 · MQ(F2, 457, 457) 2 · 2253.76 2 · 2247.74 2 · 2253.78 2 · 2246.55 2 · 2253.76 468 99.996 2−15 36 444 Counter-based
256 2 · MQ(F2, 457, 457) 2 · 2252.83 2 · 2246.81 2 · 2252.85 2 · 2245.65 2 · 2252.83 497 99.996 2−15 38 441 Hybrid approach
256 2 · MQ(F2, 457, 457) 2 · 2255.69 2 · 2249.63 2 · 2255.72 2 · 2248.42 2 · 2255.69 916 ≈ 100.00 N/A N/A N/A Grover [SW16]
Table 6.1: Quantum resource estimates for instances ofMQ(F2, n,m) using our STO approach.
As we can see from Table 6.1, the low-memory approach to oracle design can be improved
upon enough to break the proposed parameters for Gui, though the counter-based oracle for
λ = 80 and λ = 128 cannot. When we replace the cheaper oracle with the low-memory design
and exploit the counter-based oracle only in the more expensive oracle, we can achieve a quantum
search algorithm that break all of Gui’s proposed quantum resistant parameters and only uses
slightly more qubits than the counter-based approach. The algorithm as it stands is superior in
all metrics to Grover, with the exception of the success probability — the author believes that
with finer-grained analysis and reformulation of the algorithm that this can be improved upon.
6.3.1.2 The Advanced Encryption Standard
In the case of the key-search scenario (see Section 1.4), we are given that there exists at least one
solution to this search problem, which corresponds to the users key. However, as the function
hr : {0, 1}k −→ {0, 1}rn defined by the fixed set of r different plaintexts P1, . . . , Pr ∈ {0, 1}n and
hr(x) 7→ Enc(x, P1)‖ . . . ‖Enc(x, Pr) (6.33)
is expected to act as a pseudorandom function, the probability that the element x ∈ {0, 1}k has
the property that hr(x) = C1‖ . . . ‖Cr ∈ {0, 1}rn for a given r is 2−rn. Given that we are promised
one solution, the expected number of solutions is therefore 1 + (2n− 1) · 2−rn = 1 + 2n−rn− 2−rn
by the binomial distribution, giving us our value of E[X].
As before, this problem admits a constraint-based decomposition indexed by r and the re-
spective costs for the quantum bit oracles for the AES are given in Table 2.8 for the expensive
oracle Of∗ (where r = 2 for AES-128/192 and r = 3 for AES-256) and in Table 2.9 for the
cheaper oracle OfS (where r = 1 for AES-128/192/256).
Using these quantum oracles, we can therefore derive the following quantum resource estimates.
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AES-k/ #Clifford #T #Total T Total #Qubits Success ε t Quantum algorithm/oracle type
gates gates gates depth depth %
128 285.71 285.32 286.53 281.02 282.39 1969 ≈ 100.00 2−30 50 STO (Theorem 6.4)/direct-evaluation
128 285.71 285.32 286.53 281.02 282.39 988 ≈ 100.00 2−30 50 STO (Theorem 6.4)/counter-based
128 286.05 285.67 286.87 280.37 281.73 1969 ≈ 100.00 N/A N/A Grover/direct-evaluation [GLRS16]
128 286.64 286.23 287.45 281.92 283.07 988 ≈ 100.00 N/A N/A Grover/counter-based [GLRS16]
192 2117.89 2117.89 2118.89 2112.85 2114.0 2225 ≈ 100.00 2−30 120 STO (Theorem 6.4)/direct-evaluation
192 2117.89 2117.89 2118.89 2112.85 2114.0 1340 ≈ 100.00 2−30 120 STO (Theorem 6.4)/counter-based
192 2118.23 2118.23 2119.23 2112.2 2113.34 2225 ≈ 100.00 N/A N/A Grover/direct-evaluation [GLRS16]
192 2118.82 2118.44 2119.64 2113.63 2114.89 1340 ≈ 100.00 N/A N/A Grover/counter-based [GLRS16]
256 2150.21 2149.83 2151.03 2145.28 2146.42 4009 ≈ 100.00 2−30 172 STO (Theorem 6.4)/direct-evaluation
256 2150.21 2149.83 2151.03 2145.28 2146.42 1340 ≈ 100.00 2−30 172 STO (Theorem 6.4)/counter-based
256 2151.14 2150.76 2151.96 2144.64 2145.78 4009 ≈ 100.00 N/A N/A Grover/direct-evaluation [GLRS16]
256 2151.88 2151.5 2152.7 2146.89 2148.04 1340 ≈ 100.00 N/A N/A Grover/counter-based [GLRS16]
Table 6.2: Quantum resource estimates for the AES key-search problem via the STO approach.
As we can see from Table 6.2 above, we have that we can achieve a near 100% success
probability, using fewer qubits. The only metric that suffers is the quantum circuit-depth. As
is plain, there is no benefit in using the direct-evaluation strategy for the secondary quantum
oracle over the counter-based approach — the negligible increase in depth is absorbed by the
depth contributed by the first less expensive quantum oracle OfS consisting of one AES-k circuit
being evaluated and tested against a single ciphertext.
There is marked notice on quantum circuit-depth when comparing Grover with a direct
parallel evaluation as used in [GLRS16] against the STO approach, we can recover some of this
circuit-depth by the discussion in Section 6.2.1, using a fixing strategy and parallel evaluation
to trade circuit-size for circuit-depth whilst keeping the number of qubits fixed.
6.4 Summary and future work
We have begun work on an approach to lower the projected costs of executing quantum algo-
rithms by modifying the original solution to the STO problem [KYYLHH15] to take into account
real-world factors, such as lack of knowledge concerning the exact value of the number of ele-
ments marked by the cheaper oracle and minor advantages of relaxing the conditions so that the
algorithm uses amplification amplification instead of exact amplitude amplification.
There is the possibility to extend this work in several directions. In terms of the algorithm
in general, whilst the approach is valid it may prove slightly advantageous — either in terms
of performance or analysis — to reformulate this algorithm or (in the context of Theorem 6.4)
choose slightly different values of k1 and k2. In particular, the author believes that Theorem 6.4
might be reformulated to provide a worst-case guarantee on its success probability that takes into
account the case when MS ≥M ′S . A thorough treatment of exactly when Theorem 6.4 provides
an average-case advantage over the original STO algorithm is also missing. It is clear that for
AES−128 the unmodified ratio MS : M ′S may be relatively large, but for AES−192/256 the
original STO algorithm (relaxed to use amplitude amplification) using an expectation derived
from the binomial distribtion should suffice in the average-case.
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A tighter analysis of the discrete probability distribution for Pr[MS = X] for either the
problems we have examined or in general is also in order. In particular, the Markov inequality is
a very weak bound and as the probability distribution we study for both cryptographic problems
we study is known to be the binomial distribution, this work would benefit by examination how
the Chernoff inequality applies. We note again that if other probability distributions are known
for alternate problems, then there may be more efficient quantum search methods [Mon10] that
can be used. An examination of the performance of this algorithm used both in comparison to,
and in conjunction with, a fixing strategy is also an open problem.
We have only examined two simple problems in cryptanalysis. The author believes that many
problems will benefit from the adapted STO approach and it would be particularly interesting
to apply this problem to the case where the cost of the quantum evaluation for each constraint
EEχi and the expected size of the preimages Mχi = |χ
−1




The first principle is that you must not fool yourself and you are the easiest person
to fool. So you have to be very careful about that. After you’ve not fooled yourself,
its easy not to fool other scientists. You just have to be honest in a conventional way
after that.
- Richard Feynman, 1974 Caltech Graduation address [Fey74]
In this final chapter we briefly reflect on the results of this thesis, lessons learnt, the author’s
personal thoughts on the impact of this work and future extensions. The field of cryptographic
research is by nature one that crosses many disciplines and this thesis has examined the gap in
knowledge between those cryptographic and quantum algorithm design communities.
At the time of writing, the cryptographic community is currently designing new crypto-
graphic primitives that will be (hopefully) resistant against attacks by quantum computers.
Part of this process is the important topic of choosing parameters for these cryptosystems,
which has a crucial impact upon the efficiency and long-term security of these schemes. As
we have seen, quantum resistant parameters were previously derived for the Gui cryptosys-
tem [PCY+15, PCDY17a, PCDY17b] based upon the impact of Grover’s algorithm based upon
using the best known quantum attack on instances of MQ(F2, n,m) to the cryptographic com-
munity, that being Schwabe and Westerbaan’s quantum bit oracle in conjunction with Grover’s
algorithm. The focus of this thesis was to develop a body of evidence that the current practice
of extrapolating cryptographic parameters from existing, unoptimised quantum algorithms is
dangerous in terms of long-term security.
The ENTS approach was the starting work for this thesis, providing the general theme of
what we can do to balance the costs involved with Grover’s algorithm when there exists structure
we can exploit to artificially introduce new solutions into the search domain. This was then
generalised into the GENTS framework, with an examination of how preprocessing could be
applied to GENTS and how, moving away from Grover’s algorithm, amplitude amplification can
be used to further improve these results. Finally, we examined the Search with Two Oracles
method [KYYLHH15] and how it could be applied to both quantum bit oracles for the MQ
problem and the key-search problem for AES, using both large and small numbers of qubits.
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Whilst ENTS, GENTS and the work on preprocessing and secondary quantum search dealt
mainly with optimisation of the low-memory quantum oracle design approach, the STO modifi-
cation focused upon how quantum search could be optimised when we have only a small number
of logical qubits at our disposal, demonstrating that low-qubit quantum search is not as detri-
mental to total quantum circuit-size as once thought if there exists structure we can exploit with
the STO approach.
7.1 Impact
All our methods clearly break the parameters for the Gui signature scheme [PCY+15] proposed
to resist attacks by quantum computers. These parameters [PCDY17a, PCDY17b] were chosen
relative to a quantum attack on instances ofMQ(F2, n,m) by Schwabe and Westerbaan [SW16].
The choice of these parameters is particularly interesting — Gui was initially proposed and anal-
ysed with respect to analysis with classical computers[PCY+15], mentioning Grover’s algorithm
as an afterthought. The method proposed to counter the impact of Grover’s algorithm was simply
to double the number of bits — in effect discounting the cost of the implementing the quantum
oracle. After Schwabe and Westerbaan’s quantum bit oracle was published [SW16] new parame-
ters were proposed which took into account the entire cost of this attack [PCDY17a, PCDY17b].
In relation to the current NIST competition [oST16a], other schemes (see MQDSS [CHR+17])
as well as Gui are also having their parameters chosen relative to the projected costs of quantum
search algorithms including the overhead of the quantum oracle. On the other hand, others are
being more cautious and choosing lower bounds corresponding only to the query-complexity of
these attacks (see GeMSS [CFMR+17]). We emphasis that our optimisations do not break the
suggested parameters for the Gui submission in the NIST competition, owing to the inclusion
of the MAXDEPTH parameter, which places a constraint upon the maximum depth of any
quantum circuit used in the cryptanalysis of these schemes.
The author believes that for long-term security choosing parameters relative to current im-
plementations of quantum search using Grover’s algorithm is a risky business. As we have seen
in Chapter 3, Grover’s algorithm [Gro96] (see Theorem 3.10) can be viewed as simply a special
case of amplitude amplification [BHMT02] (see Theorem 3.6), hence naively using a special case
of an algorithm can be seen as being somewhat dangerous. Whilst Grover’s algorithm is well-
understood by the cryptographic community, the nuances of amplitude amplification seems to be
less-well known. and the basic method of taking a classical circuit, converting this to a quantum
circuit and using Grover’s algorithm to determine the cost of quantum search, the cryptographic
community is less familiar with the nuances of amplitude amplification, alternative quantum
search algorithms and optimisation methods.
The safe choice would appear to be choosing the query-complexity of Grover’s algorithm as
a lower-bound, effectively giving the cost of implementing the quantum oracle and diffusion step
as a unit cost, so that
Eχ + En̄ + 2EH⊗n = 1. (7.1)
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This clearly protects against any minor optimisations that can be made and would mean that
the optimisations in this thesis have no impact on parameter sizes. A halfway measure might be
instead to choose to simply allow Eχ = 1, so that the overhead is simply
1 + En̄ + EH⊗n , (7.2)
as the diffusion step must be implemented for Grover’s algorithm to succeed. However, optimi-
sations such as [AdW17] impact upon this approach. This approach also ignores the fact that
we can effectively hide computational work within the quantum bit oracle if we assign it a unit
cost — for instance we could define the quantum bit oracle so that it performs a classical search
on K = 2n/2 elements of the search domain {0, 1}n, implying that we have a two stage search






whilst the subsequent search of the K = 2n/2 elements has a cost of
≈
√
2n/2 = 2n/4, (7.4)
implying the cost of quantum search is ≈ 2 · 2n/4. One safe countermeasure for this approach
might be to allow the cost of the quantum oracle to be a unit cost if it only recognises a single
target in the search domain. The discussion is clearly nuanced and the benefits and long-term
security risks is something that must be decided by the community.
Finally, our results on the cryptanalysis of the AES key-search problem via STO impact
upon the NIST competition directly, as the call for proposals [oST16b] explicitly states that for
submissions
”Any attack that breaks the relevant security definition must require computational
resources comparable to or greater than those required for key search on a block
cipher with a 128/192/256-bit key (eg.AES-128/192/256).”
Our work on cryptanalysis with small numbers of qubits via STO may also mean that the threat
that quantum computers pose may be closer than previously thought, as whilst the number of
qubits available on a quantum computer increase each year, logical qubits will most likely always
be a scarce resource.
7.2 Caveats
None of the techniques in this thesis even approach removing the overhead of the quantum phase
oracles with Grover’s algorithm. We make modest gains, but ones that are enough to shave a
few bits off the security parameters. The author believes that there is future work to be done
in finding interesting optimisations to existing quantum search routines for specific problems, as
many proofs and assumptions are based upon treating the quantum phase oracle as a black box.
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Choosing cryptographic parameters with regards to purely the query complexity of Grover’s
algorithm (as was commonly done before quantum resource estimation became relatively com-
mon) is clearly the safe way to go for the single-target search case. We cannot ensure that
new and improved quantum or classical algorithms are not invented, but we can protect against
optimisations in this way.
Finally, we stress that the work in this thesis is relative to a specific security model involving
quantum computing that the cryptographic community uses. The real cost of running any
quantum search routine is expected to be vastly more expensive [ADMG+16], as it will involve
quantum error-correction schemes, which imply an additional polynomial overhead over the
quantum resource estimates contain in this thesis.
7.3 Future work
In terms of future work, the ENTS and GENTS framework in Chapter 4 and examples demon-
strate that the balancing of costs is an important real-world (at least in this model) factor for
designing quantum search algorithms — we hope that this message is absorbed by the community
and that this becomes a general heuristic towards the design of quantum algorithms. It would be
interesting if there were application specific ENTS that were not similar to their implementation
in the GENTS framework. An example of ENTS which could be implemented where GENTS
could not be or an example where ENTS provides some advantage over a nested approach to
quantum search would also be interesting to find.
The quantum extension of GENTS in Chapter 5 could additionally benefit from a refined
examination of both the extension to a recursive application of this quantum algorithm and
optimisation. As with ENTS and GENTS, examining more applications — particularly hash
functions via the Merkle-Damg̊ard construction technique is of interest to see if there are gains.
The STO algorithm as given in Chapter 6 requires refinement, in terms of potentially refor-
mulating the algorithm to allow clearer analysis and in obtaining better lower bounds for the
probability of success. There is also the question of extending this to multi-target preimage
search, which should yield advantageous results.
The application of these techniques to problems that impact upon industry is an open question
that the author would like to investigate. Finally, whether these optimisations transfer favourably
to model of quantum computing that takes into account quantum error-correction would be of
immense interest to the author.
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